有意识和无意识意向性之间的关系

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-10 DOI:10.1017/S0031819121000383

Raamy Majeed

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引用次数: 1

摘要

当代关于有意识意向性和无意识意向性之间关系的观点包括两种观点:(i)无意识的命题态度与有意识的态度以同样的方式表征世界;(ii)两种态度都通过具有确定的命题意旨来表征世界。Crane(2017)对这两种说法都提出了质疑，相反，他提出无意识命题态度与有意识命题态度的不同之处在于，它们在本质上不那么确定。本文旨在评价克兰的建议。特别是，我明确并批判了Crane为支持他的不对称性所做的某些假设，并提出了一个有条件的主张:如果Crane认为无意识的意图状态是(相对)不确定的是正确的，这表明有意识的意图状态也以类似的方式是不确定的。

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The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality

Abstract The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: (i) unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and (ii) both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane (2017) has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his asymmetry, and argue for a conditional claim: if Crane is right that unconscious intentional states are (relatively) indeterminate, this suggests that conscious intentional states are indeterminate in a similar fashion as well.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.