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Perspectival Realism by Michela Massimi (Oxford University Press, 2022). ISBN 978019755620 Michela Massimi的透视现实主义(牛津大学出版社，2022)。ISBN 978019755620
2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819123000311
Jack Ritchie
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引用次数: 0
Duty, Virtue, and Filial Love 责任、美德和孝心
2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1017/s003181912300030x
Sungwoo Um
{"title":"Duty, Virtue, and Filial Love","authors":"Sungwoo Um","doi":"10.1017/s003181912300030x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181912300030x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this paper is to argue that the normative significance of the inner aspects of filial piety – in particular, filial love – is better captured when we understand filial love as part of the virtue of filial piety rather than as an object of duty. After briefly introducing the value of filial love, I argue that the idea of a duty to love one's loving parents faces serious difficulties in making sense of the normative significance of filial love. Then I show why the virtue-ethical approach to filial love, which views filial love as a constitutive part of the virtue of filial piety, can do justice to its normative significance while avoiding the difficulties.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"2019 36","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135813863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
J.S. Mill's Puzzling Position on Prostitution and his Harm Principle 密尔对卖淫的困惑立场及其伤害原则
2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-25 DOI: 10.1017/s003181912300027x
Mark Tunick
{"title":"J.S. Mill's Puzzling Position on Prostitution and his Harm Principle","authors":"Mark Tunick","doi":"10.1017/s003181912300027x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181912300027x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract J.S. Mill argues against licensing or forced medical examinations of prostitutes even if these would reduce harm, for two reasons: the state should not legitimize immoral conduct; and coercing prostitutes would violate Mill's harm principle as they do not risk causing non-consensual harm to others, their clients do. There is nothing puzzling about Mill opposing coercive restrictions on self-regarding immoral conduct while also opposing state support of that conduct. But why does Mill oppose restrictions on prostitutes’ liberty if those restrictions could prevent harm to third parties? Mill's position is not puzzling once we recognize that his harm principle is not a harm-prevention principle that warrants restrictions on liberty to prevent harm no matter who caused it (as David Lyons famously argued) but instead warrants restrictions on liberty only of individuals who are the morally relevant cause of that harm. Mill's discussion of prostitution shows he prioritizes both individuality and moral progress over harm reduction.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135112681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Later Wittgenstein on ‘Truth’ and Realism in Mathematics 后来维特根斯坦论数学中的“真理”和实在主义
2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-19 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819123000281
Philip Bold
{"title":"Later Wittgenstein on ‘Truth’ and Realism in Mathematics","authors":"Philip Bold","doi":"10.1017/s0031819123000281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819123000281","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I show that Wittgenstein's critique of G.H. Hardy's mathematical realism naturally extends to Paul Benacerraf's influential paper, ‘Mathematical Truth’. Wittgenstein accuses Hardy of hastily analogizing mathematical and empirical propositions, thus leading to a picture of mathematical reality that is somehow akin to empirical reality despite the many puzzles this creates. Since Benacerraf relies on that very same analogy to raise problems about mathematical ‘truth’ and the alleged ‘reality’ to which it corresponds, his major argument falls prey to the same critique. The problematic pictures of mathematical reality suggested by Hardy and Benacerraf can be avoided, according to Wittgenstein, by disrupting the analogy that gives rise to them. I show why Tarskian updates to our conception of ‘truth’ discussed by Benacerraf do not answer Wittgenstein's concerns. That is, because they merely presuppose what Wittgenstein puts into question, namely, the essential uniformity of ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ in ordinary discourse.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135731195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Would a Viable Consent App Create Headaches for Consequentialists? 一个可行的同意应用程序会让结果论者头疼吗?
2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819123000293
Scott Woodcock
{"title":"Would a Viable Consent App Create Headaches for Consequentialists?","authors":"Scott Woodcock","doi":"10.1017/s0031819123000293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819123000293","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Greater public awareness of the occurrence of sexual assault has led to the creation of mobile phone apps designed to facilitate consent between sexual partners. These apps exhibit serious practical shortcomings in realistic contexts; however, in this paper I consider the hypothetical case in which these practical shortcomings are absent. The prospect of this viable consent app creates an interesting challenge for consequentialism – one that is comparable to the objection that the theory justifies killing innocent persons to prevent large numbers of less serious harms like experiencing brief, painful headaches. I outline and reject the most straightforward way for consequentialists to address this challenge, and I argue that the empirical calculations at stake reveal something rarely appreciated: consequentialists ought to sometimes favour reinforcing deontological constraints in common-sense morality rather than seeking to undermine them.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction Revisited: Towards an Explication 重新审视个人/亚个人的区别:走向解释
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000220
Lars Dänzer
{"title":"The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction Revisited: Towards an Explication","authors":"Lars Dänzer","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000220","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The distinction between the personal and the subpersonal is often invoked in philosophy of psychology but remains surrounded by confusion. Building on recent work by Zoe Drayson, this paper aims to help further improve this situation by offering a satisfactory explication of the distinction that remains close to Dennett's original intentions. Reasons are offered for construing the distinction as applying to representational (as opposed to worldly) items, for not building contested theoretical assumptions into it, and for taking it to apply in the first instance to descriptive statements and only derivatively to explanations. An explication of the distinction that accords with these points is then developed, according to which the distinction should be drawn in terms of what personal and subpersonal-level statements are ‘transparently about’. The theoretical role of this explication is discussed, and potential objections are addressed.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"507 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42633462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political Rage and the Value of Valuing 政治愤怒与价值取向
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000244
Mica Rapstine
{"title":"Political Rage and the Value of Valuing","authors":"Mica Rapstine","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000244","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper focuses on the question of political anger's non-instrumental justification. I argue that the case for anger is strong where anger expresses a valuable form of valuing the good. It does so only when properly integrated with non-angry emotional responsiveness to the good. The account allows us to acknowledge the non-instrumentally bad side of anger while still delivering the intuitive verdict that anger is often justified. Moreover, it provides an avenue for criticizing much of the anger run amok in contemporary political life without directly engaging entrenched moral and political views.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"451 - 475"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47521334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Empathy and Psychopaths’ Inability to Grieve 移情与精神病患者的悲伤能力
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000232
Michael Cholbi
{"title":"Empathy and Psychopaths’ Inability to Grieve","authors":"Michael Cholbi","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000232","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Psychopaths exhibit diminished ability to grieve. Here I address whether this inability can be explained by the trademark feature of psychopaths, namely, their diminished capacity for interpersonal empathy. I argue that this hypothesis turns out to be correct, but requires that we conceptualize empathy not merely as an ability to relate (emotionally and ethically) to other individuals but also as an ability to relate to past and present iterations of ourselves. This reconceptualization accords well with evidence regarding psychopaths’ intense focus on the temporal present and difficulties in engaging in mental time travel, as well as with the essentially egocentric and identity-based nature of grief.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"413 - 431"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45190801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
PHI volume 98 issue 4 Cover and Front matter PHI第98卷第4期封面和封面
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819123000256
{"title":"PHI volume 98 issue 4 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0031819123000256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819123000256","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45521493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causation in Psychology by John Campbell (Harvard University Press, 2020). ISBN 9780674967861 约翰·坎贝尔的《心理学因果关系》(哈佛大学出版社，2020年)。ISBN 9780674967861
IF 1 2区 哲学
PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-05 DOI: 10.1017/S0031819123000189
Hemdat Lerman
{"title":"Causation in Psychology by John Campbell (Harvard University Press, 2020). ISBN 9780674967861","authors":"Hemdat Lerman","doi":"10.1017/S0031819123000189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819123000189","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"537 - 544"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45029487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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