重新审视个人/亚个人的区别:走向解释

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Lars Dänzer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

个人与亚个人的区别在心理学哲学中经常被提及,但一直被混淆所包围。本文以Zoe Drayson最近的工作为基础,旨在通过提供一个令人满意的解释来进一步改善这种情况,这一解释仍然接近Dennett的初衷。理由是将这种区别解释为适用于表征(而不是世俗)项目,不建立有争议的理论假设,以及首先将其应用于描述性陈述而仅衍生于解释。然后,对符合这些观点的区别进行了解释,根据这种解释,应该根据个人和亚个人层面的陈述“透明地关于”什么来区分。讨论了这一解释的理论作用,并提出了潜在的反对意见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction Revisited: Towards an Explication
Abstract The distinction between the personal and the subpersonal is often invoked in philosophy of psychology but remains surrounded by confusion. Building on recent work by Zoe Drayson, this paper aims to help further improve this situation by offering a satisfactory explication of the distinction that remains close to Dennett's original intentions. Reasons are offered for construing the distinction as applying to representational (as opposed to worldly) items, for not building contested theoretical assumptions into it, and for taking it to apply in the first instance to descriptive statements and only derivatively to explanations. An explication of the distinction that accords with these points is then developed, according to which the distinction should be drawn in terms of what personal and subpersonal-level statements are ‘transparently about’. The theoretical role of this explication is discussed, and potential objections are addressed.
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.
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