{"title":"Justice Jean E. L. Côté: Keeping the \"Civil\" in Civil Procedure","authors":"B. Billingsley, Thelma Ross","doi":"10.29173/ALR2555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2555","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46686178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Right to Be Heard: Representative Authority as a Requirement in Enforcing Métis Consultation","authors":"Moira Lavoie","doi":"10.29173/ALR2549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2549","url":null,"abstract":"The challenges that non-settlement Métis communities continue to face when attempting to enforce the duty to consult are reflected in the 2016 Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Fort Chipewyan decision. In Fort Chipewyan, the Court appeared to require representative authority in order to trigger the duty to consult, effectively adding a new step to the Haida test for Aboriginal consultation. This creates a unique burden for non-settlement Métis communities in Alberta, in part because their governance systems are not statutorily recognized in Canadian statute. Nevertheless, a representative authority requirement, if interpreted purposively and in accordance with Indigenous principles of good governance, is justified by the Honour of the Crown. The Métis Nation of Ontario’s approach to consultation governance provides suggestions for governance reforms that could be undertaken by Alberta Métis to more effectively enforce the duty to consult.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44913967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Honourable Chief Justice of Alberta Catherine A. Fraser
{"title":"Remarks at the Symposium in Honour of The Honourable Jean Eduoard Léon Côté in Recognition of His Honourary Doctorate from the University of Alberta","authors":"The Honourable Chief Justice of Alberta Catherine A. Fraser","doi":"10.29173/alr2553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2553","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42910769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beware of Tiger: The Logic of Justice Jean E. L. Côté's Tort Law","authors":"A. Acorn","doi":"10.29173/ALR2554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2554","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47226341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Honouring The Honourable William A. Stevenson","authors":"Theron Brown","doi":"10.29173/alr2541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2541","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44415734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reconstitutions of Harm: Novel Applications of the Labaye Test Since 2005","authors":"Richard Jochelson, J. Gacek","doi":"10.29173/ALR2543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2543","url":null,"abstract":"In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court revised the test for Criminal Code offences involving indecency and obscenity, replacing the previous community standards of tolerance test. Despite the Supreme Court’s demand for positive knowledge of (risk of) harm, the Labaye test still largely protects a normative vision of society rather than promoting human sexuality and freedom of expression. The judiciary post-Labaye continue to fill evidentiary vacuums with circumstantial evidence and intangible harms, informed by judicial tastes rather than empirical harm. Labaye has also become a discursive construct that is explicative of harm in other public law arenas. This article reveals the inconsistencies in applications of the Labaye test and considers whether a more principled definition of harm is needed in indecency and obscenity cases and beyond.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41465611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bill C-59 and CSIS’s “New” Powers to Disrupt Terrorists Threats: Holding the Charter-Limiting Regime to (Constitutional) Account","authors":"Michael E Nesbitt","doi":"10.29173/alr2575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/alr2575","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017, the Liberal government released Bill C-59, which was its update to the national security legislation that was introduced by the previous government via Bill C-51. Bill C-59’s goal was to address the criticisms of its predecessor, including the new “kinetic” powers granted to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) to actively disrupt threats to the security of Canada. While Bill C-59 made some improvements to ensure that CSIS’s new powers are exercised in accordance with the Charter, there are still deficiencies to be addressed. This article reviews the changes brought in with Bill C-59, examines how those amendments may not avoid constitutional challenge, and outlines what a section 1 Oakes justification may look like. Ultimately, to address the Charter implications of the new legislation, further changes are required, including the use of court-appointed special advocates to ensure an adversarial system and further oversight of CSIS’s new, disruptive authority.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47594049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Instrumental Rationality and General Deterrence","authors":"Colton Fehr","doi":"10.29173/ALR2564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2564","url":null,"abstract":"The Supreme Court of Canada concluded in R. v. Nur that the use of general deterrence in sentencing is not “rationally connected”to its objective of lowering crime levels. Although this conclusion was drawn in the Charter section 1 context, its logic applies with equal force at the section 7 stage of analysis. As a law bearing no rational connection to its purpose is arbitrary, the author contends that judicial reliance on general deterrence in sentencing runs afoul of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This conclusion is significant not only because it would forestall judicial use of general deterrence, but also for what it reveals about the relationship between the instrumental rationality principles. Commentators maintain that the Supreme Court’s “individualistic” approach to instrumental rationality resulted in the arbitrariness principle becoming subsumed by overbreadth. Yet, challenging the general deterrence provisions with overbreadth is not possible given the discretion given to judges to avoid its unnecessary application. The fact that a law can be arbitrary but not overbroad provides support for the Supreme Court’s insistence upon keeping the principles distinct. It also, however, requires that the Supreme Court adjust its position with respect to its method for proving arbitrariness.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43756893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Urban Indigenous Courts: Possibilities for Increasing Community Control Over Justice","authors":"Gabe Boothroyd","doi":"10.29173/ALR2529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2529","url":null,"abstract":"The settler colonial justice system of the Canadian state continues to inflict immense harm on Indigenous people. One response to these harms could be the creation of urban Indigenous courts in line with the Truth and Reconciliation’s call for Indigenous justice systems that are expressions of self-determination. While any initiative that operates within the confines of the mainstream justice system has significant limitations, the practices of existing courts that avoid convictions, apply Indigenous legal principles, and cede genuine control to Indigenous people and communities demonstrate the potential for a meaningful break from the status quo. The creation of an urban court could facilitate a resurgence of Indigenous justice while mitigating the harm caused by the settler colonial justice system.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47918253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}