Bill C-59 and CSIS’s “New” Powers to Disrupt Terrorists Threats: Holding the Charter-Limiting Regime to (Constitutional) Account

IF 0.3 Q3 LAW
Michael E Nesbitt
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

In 2017, the Liberal government released Bill C-59, which was its update to the national security legislation that was introduced by the previous government via Bill C-51. Bill C-59’s goal was to address the criticisms of its predecessor, including the new “kinetic” powers granted to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) to actively disrupt threats to the security of Canada. While Bill C-59 made some improvements to ensure that CSIS’s new powers are exercised in accordance with the Charter, there are still deficiencies to be addressed. This article reviews the changes brought in with Bill C-59, examines how those amendments may not avoid constitutional challenge, and outlines what a section 1 Oakes justification may look like. Ultimately, to address the Charter implications of the new legislation, further changes are required, including the use of court-appointed special advocates to ensure an adversarial system and further oversight of CSIS’s new, disruptive authority.
C-59法案和CSIS颠覆恐怖分子威胁的“新”权力:追究宪章限制制度的(宪法)责任
2017年,自由党政府发布了C-59号法案,这是对上届政府通过C-51号法案提出的国家安全立法的更新。C-59法案的目标是解决对其前任的批评,包括授予加拿大安全与情报局(CSIS)新的“动态”权力,以积极瓦解对加拿大安全的威胁。尽管C-59号法案做出了一些改进,以确保CSIS的新权力根据《宪章》行使,但仍有不足之处需要解决。本文回顾了C-59法案带来的变化,研究了这些修正案如何可能无法避免宪法挑战,并概述了奥克斯第1条的理由可能是什么样子。最终,为了解决新立法对《宪章》的影响,需要进行进一步的修改,包括使用法院任命的特别辩护人来确保对抗性制度,并进一步监督CSIS新的破坏性权力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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20.00%
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2
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