Asia Policy最新文献

{"title":"Introduction","authors":"J. Hwang, Jeffrey W. Hornung","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903858","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903858","url":null,"abstract":"I n May 2022, South Korea saw a new government, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, come to power. Part of the defining characteristics of the new government has been a more forward-looking approach in engagement with countries in the region, illustrated, in part, by the release of an Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy’s release sparked debate within South Korea and abroad, not only regarding its vision and implementation challenges but also regarding its content, feasibility, and alignment with reality. Amid this active debate, the Institute for Global Strategy and Cooperation hosted an international conference on the Indo-Pacific in Seoul in March 2023. Entitled “The Path of Korean Diplomacy in the Era of the Indo-Pacific,” the conference brought together over one hundred participants from twenty-two countries, including experts from sixteen countries, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives in Seoul from thirteen countries, the deputy speaker of the National Assembly of South Korea, and parliamentarians from four countries. The conference highlighted the fact that interest in the Indo-Pacific has transcended any one country and become an integral part of regional policy approaches. Indeed, many countries today have their own Indo-Pacific strategies. However, these strategies are not in lockstep with one another. Indo-Pacific strategies mean different things to different states. And yet, for most, the defining characteristic of the growing interest in the Indo-Pacific region appears to be a looming showdown between China and the United States. The competition between the two nations is fierce, and many countries feel forced to choose sides despite the desire to maintain positive relations with both powers. This roundtable seeks to build upon the proceedings in Seoul and invite additional regional voices to explore how countries in the Indo-Pacific perceive the growing U.S.-China competition, how these states plan to","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49154759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"South Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy: More than Strategic Clarity and toward Becoming a Global Player","authors":"J. Hwang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903861","url":null,"abstract":"I s the region we live in called the “Asia-Pacific” or the “Indo-Pacific”?1 Many countries around the world are currently formulating their positions toward the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, actively or passively, and regardless of whether they support it. In the case of South Korea, at a summit with U.S. president Joe Biden in May 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States with the goal of promoting a free and open IndoPacific region.2 This move by the newly inaugurated Yoon signified that South Korea, which until that point had been debating whether to use the term “Asia-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific,” had determined decisively to go all in on the latter. Then, on December 28, the administration officially unveiled its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, in which it pledged to transform South Korea into a “global pivotal state” that contributes to the freedom, peace, and prosperity of the international community.3 South Korean foreign minister Park Jin not only described the strategy as a “turning point in the history of South Korea’s foreign policy” but also announced that it would serve as the “foreign policy doctrine of the Yoon Suk-yeol government.”4 This essay argues that the Yoon administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy plays a crucial role in realizing the president’s vision of South Korea as a","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42273009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"UK Policy on the Indo-Pacific: Balancing Global Ambition in an Era of Resource Scarcity and Rising Insecurity","authors":"John Nilsson-Wright","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903866","url":null,"abstract":"T he United Kingdom’s formal articulation of its policy toward the Indo-Pacific dates from 2021 and is associated with two key policy documents: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (hereafter the Integrated Review), which articulated a position for “global Britain in a competitive age,” and the government’s Defence Command Paper Defence in a Competitive Age, also published in 2021.1 The review advocated a “tilt” toward Asia, with a focus primarily on engaging economically and politically with the region and secondarily on advocating for an expanded UK military role in addressing critical security issues in the region. This essay examines the origins, rationales, and policies set forth in the UK government’s tilt toward the Indo-Pacific; addresses the UK’s areas of strength operating in the region; assesses challenges toward actualizing the tilt’s objectives; and concludes with recommendations for UK policy.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49337799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"France in the Indo-Pacific: From a Balancing Power to a Constructive Stakeholder","authors":"Céline Pajon","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903865","url":null,"abstract":"F rance was the first European country to announce an Indo-Pacific strategy, launching it in 2018.1 France is a resident power in the region. It maintains territories in both the Indian Ocean (the islands of Mayotte and Réunion, the Scattered Islands, and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton Island), with 1.5 million citizens living in these territories and in other regional countries, and more than 90% of its large exclusive economic zone (9 million square kilometers) located in the two oceans. To take care of this vast area, France maintains a military presence of 8,000 personnel in the region. Its original position derives from the country’s sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific and aims to propose a way out of the U.S.-China rivalry through an inclusive and multilateral approach to regional affairs that also maintains the rules-based order. Since 2021, the French approach of “strategic autonomy” has been challenged by several developments, specifically by the AUKUS defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States but also more broadly by growing Chinese assertiveness, the ideological turn of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, and the implications of the war in Ukraine. However, as geopolitical polarization grows and international security worsens, the feasibility and sustainability of an Indo-Pacific strategy in which France acts as a “balancing power”—a puissance d’équilibre(s)—are seriously called into question. There is indeed a significant gap between the political rhetoric of French priority and ambition for the Indo-Pacific and the reality of the resources it has committed to the region. Against this background,","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41327339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War","authors":"J. Reeves","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0020","url":null,"abstract":"J ust as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia’s aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia’s militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia’s invasion in the group’s joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement’s drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia’s actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47850776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Japan's Decaying Antimilitarism Ecosystem","authors":"C. Hughes","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0023","url":null,"abstract":"J apan’s postwar military posture has always demanded careful analysis, given its intricacies and implications for East Asian security. Right now, it warrants even greater attention with the government’s avowed intention in its 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) to “fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities.”1 Tom Phuong Le’s Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century forms a key part of the debate on Japan’s military trajectory and should be read by all scholars and practitioners engaged in this topic. It contains much that is valuable, innovative, and provocative. At the same time, the volume presents overextended claims and argumentation that undermine its conclusions and impact. These issues were evident upon the volume’s release in mid-2021, and events thereafter—Japan’s further “major shift” or “major transformation” of its defense posture—have confirmed these flaws.2 The essential contention of Japan’s Aging Peace is that many scholars and practitioners, and particularly “realists,” have too readily accepted the factors contributing to Japanese “remilitarization” or “normalization” but have not focused enough on the continuing and dominant strength of internal obstacles—both material and ideational—in forming an “antimilitarism ecosystem” (p. 33) that prevents Japan from remilitarizing, or at least remilitarizing along a certain trajectory. If Japan is experiencing any change in its military posture, then it is toward types of “militarism” that leave the constraints of the past intact and contribute to nontraditional security objectives, such as UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43958029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Rising Security Challenge of East Asia's \"Dual Graying\": Implications for U.S.-Led Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"Andrew L. Oros","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0028","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article explains the impact of \"dual graying\"—the concurrent phenomena of rapid population aging and the proliferation of gray-zone conflicts—on the security planning and postures of Northeast Asian states and considers the implications of these trends in the broader context of Indo-Pacific demographics.main argumentThe major Northeast Asian powers (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as Russia are at the leading edge of one of the most consequential challenges of the 21st century: the rapid aging of their populations at a rate unprecedented in human history that is resulting in a shrinkage of their total population sizes. In addition to the graying of their populations, these powers face a range of new \"gray\" conflicts—interactions residing somewhere between war and peace—that exacerbate long-standing military concerns. Contrary to predictions that rapid aging will diminish the likelihood of interstate war, security tensions are rising among graying rivals in this region of the world, and states are increasing both military spending and military development. This \"dual graying\" underscores the need for new approaches to the U.S. network of regional security partners.policy implications• The rapid aging among regional powers does not so far suggest that an \"aging peace\" is likely to develop; rather, tensions are increasing over old and new areas of conflict.• The escalation of regional gray-zone conflicts is taxing U.S. allies and partners with graying and shrinking populations. Demographic changes in several of these major partners may necessitate a re-examination of roles and commitments within the U.S. alliance network.• Innovations in military and civilian technologies may eventually offset many of the challenges resulting from shrinking and rapidly aging populations, but in the meantime growing labor shortages will force many militaries to seek to adapt in other ways to maintain robust force postures.• In the wider Indo-Pacific, differential aging and population growth among major security actors suggests a growing role for several middle-power states (such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) that may benefit from a \"demographic dividend\" over the next several decades.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46975179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Waters: Japan, South Korea, and Maritime Security Assistance in Southeast Asia","authors":"Ryan Ashley, Jada Fraser","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0021","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article proposes that Southeast Asia is an ideal space for cooperation between Japan and South Korea, given that both countries share strategic priorities in the region.main argumentAlthough Japan and South Korea's bilateral ties are typically defined by long-standing issues over historical issues and territorial disputes, each country shares a wide set of geopolitical interests, leading to an \"Asian paradox\" of mismatched priorities. This paradox is clearly visible in Southeast Asia. While Tokyo's strategic ties with the subregion, often via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeper and predate Seoul's, South Korea is increasingly expanding its own relations with the region alongside its growing security outreach across the Asia-Pacific. As a result, Japan's and South Korea's interests and activities are meeting in strategic spaces in Southeast Asia, such as the South China Sea and the Mekong River basin. Despite sharing common goals in these spaces, so far Seoul and Tokyo have not collaborated in their efforts. While many hurdles still limit direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, even indirect cooperation in shared strategic spaces in Southeast Asia could provide both countries an opportunity to build trust and provide security benefits to countries in Southeast Asia.policy implications• The U.S. can incentivize Japan–South Korea cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Quad Plus framework.• Expanding the General Security of Military Information Agreement between Japan and South Korea could be a method of increasing their cooperation in Southeast Asia.• To achieve greater cooperation toward these aims, the U.S. should support strategic latitude for Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48795776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Central Asia's Balancing Act","authors":"N. Kassenova","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0017","url":null,"abstract":"C entral Asia is the Asian subregion most directly affected by Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is part of Russia’s “near abroad,” and Moscow feels a special attachment and entitlement to this post-Soviet space. For the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), the Kremlin’s denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s incorporation of Ukrainian territories is very bad news because it undermines the founding principles of the post-Soviet security and political order—the mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty and the existing borders at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Will the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states be respected by Russia? Kazakhstan is particularly concerned since it shares a long border with Russia, and its northern regions are sometimes claimed to be part of “historical Russia.” This essay examines the position of the Central Asian states relative to the Russia-Ukraine war and the delicate balancing act these states are undertaking between Russia and their other partners. It first looks at how Russia has upset its long-held arrangements with the Central Asian states before turning to assess four policy trends within the region. It then focuses on Kazakhstan, which shares similarities (as well as differences) with Ukraine and has been the most wary and proactive in response to the Russia-Ukraine war.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"U.S. Lessons from Russia's War on Ukraine","authors":"M. Kroenig, Clementine G. Starling","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0018","url":null,"abstract":"W hat lessons should the United States draw from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? While the invasion has been a shock to the European global and security architecture and a humanitarian tragedy, it has also been a laboratory for understanding the future of warfare. This essay reviews the major lessons Washington has learned and provides recommendations to policymakers. The invasion has sparked an intense debate about how to deal with the “two peer challenger” problem and whether the United States can provide support to Ukraine while still meeting other demands, such as countering a revisionist China in the Indo-Pacific. This essay argues that the sides of this debate are in fact further apart in rhetoric than reality and that there is an emerging broad consensus on some of the steps necessary to deal with the two-peer-challenger problem. It also reviews lessons learned related to military basics, emerging technology, Taiwan, nuclear deterrence, and other key issues. The essay recommends that the United States (1) develop a defense strategy and force posture capable of dealing with China and Russia simultaneously, (2) increase defense spending, (3) adapt defense innovation adoption, (4) augment its security assistance program, and (5) strengthen nuclear deterrence.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45017003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}