{"title":"Opinion Formation in the Presence of Hidden Internal Opinions and Possibility of Influencing Them","authors":"K. O. Urtyakova, E. M. Parilina","doi":"10.1134/S106456242560112X","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S106456242560112X","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper proposes a modified concealed voter model MCVM in which each agent in the network is represented by two nodes corresponding to her external (public) and internal (hidden) opinion. Agents exchange opinions in the external layer and copy the internal opinion into the external layer and vice versa. In our work, one more action has been added—transmitting the external opinion of an agent to another agent in the internal layer. We find a formula to calculate the average time to reach consensus and compare them for MCVM and CVM. The results of numerical simulations of opinion dynamics according to the proposed MCVM model are presented.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S32 - S41"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Price of Anarchy in the Congestion Game with Flow Constraints","authors":"A. Yu. Krylatov, T. Qiao","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601131","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601131","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper considers the congestion game with flow constraints. While the total number of players in the congestion game is usually specified and the flow of players assigned to each of the alternatives is, generally speaking, unlimited, in the formulation considered in this paper, the flow of players can be limited for each of the available alternatives and in total. The paper provides a general formulation of the congestion game with flow constraints and studies its solution space. We estimate the price of anarchy for different numbers of players, which helps us determine when the game’s equilibrium assignment is close to the social optimum and when it deviates. Finally, we consider examples of practical problems and cases that can be modeled and described using the corresponding game.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S21 - S31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Comparative Analysis of Incentive-Based and Structural Control in Games on Networks with Linear Best Response","authors":"I. V. Petrov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425600988","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425600988","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines games on networks with linear best responses, which allow for the analysis of how interaction structures influence agents’ strategic behavior. Special attention is given to intervention issues in such models, particularly in selecting optimal intervention strategies aimed at maximizing the central planner’s objective function. Two main control policies are analyzed: individual agent incentives and modifications of the interaction structure. The concept of a representative agent is introduced to simplify equilibrium analysis and control problems in games on networks. Both aggregate outcome maximization problems and adversarial scenarios between competing central planners are considered. Analytical conditions are derived to determine whether controlling the interaction structure is more effective than influencing individual incentives. Numerical experiments confirm the theoretical results and demonstrate their applicability to different types of network structures.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S103 - S110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On One Differential Game with Payoff Functions of the Germeier Convolution Type","authors":"V. A. Gorelik, T. V. Zolotova","doi":"10.1134/S106456242560099X","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S106456242560099X","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper considers a differential game model with functionals represented by a convolution in the form of the minimum of two criteria, one of which describes the competition of players in a common (external) sphere of activity and the other describes the personal achievements of each player (in the internal sphere). The player’s control is the resource redistribution between the external and internal spheres. It is shown that, under some natural assumptions of monotonicity of criteria in such games, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria exist and coincide, possessing the properties of stability and Pareto optimality. </p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S111 - S118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conflict Triangles and Hexamatrix Games","authors":"A. V. Orlov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601088","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601088","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper considers one class of finite non-cooperative games (with a finite number of strategies for each player)—E.B. Yanovskaya’s polymatrix games. More specifically, three-player polymatrix games, so-called hexamatrix games (HMGs), which can be completely described by six matrices, are studied. A number of model examples of three-party conflicts, describing some real-life situations, are presented and formulated as HMGs. The feasibility of using hexamatrix games to model economic relationships between three participants is demonstrated. To find the Nash equilibrium in the formulated games, an optimization approach is used, where the equilibrium problem is reduced to a nonconvex optimization problem with a bilinear structure. The latter is solved using A.S. Strekalovskii’s Global Search Theory (GST) for (d.c.) optimization problems with objective functions representable as the difference of two convex functions.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S42 - S52"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Partial Sums of Zero-Sum Games and Their Applications","authors":"M. M. Lutsenko","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601179","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601179","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An abstract algebraic approach to the formation of high-dimensional matrix games is proposed. The considered class of games includes, in particular, statistical games. A general method for constructing randomized decision rules for the problem of estimating a parameter of a discrete random variable is discussed. For economically significant tasks, the cost of an additional observation is calculated.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S1 - S10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"About One Differential Game on Hypergraph","authors":"A. V. Tur, I. R. Tantlevskij","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601052","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601052","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A cooperative differential game on a hypergraph is considered. A characteristic function of special type is introduced taking into account the network structure of the game, and its properties are studied. The Shapley value is used as a cooperative optimality principle. For games on hypergraphs with a cycle-free line graph, an explicit formula for the Shapley value is obtained. An illustrative example is considered.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S60 - S66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Harsanyi Extensions and the Cores of Almost Positive Games","authors":"V. A. Vasil’ev","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601076","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601076","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the paper, we introduce and study the so-called Harsanyi extensions of finite TU cooperative games. A complete description of the cores for the Harsanyi extensions of almost positive games is obtained by applying sub-differential calculus. For each such a game, we establish that any standard core imputation is represented as a unique unblockable payoff of an appropriate Harsanyi extension of the game under consideration.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S73 - S79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Study of Computational Complexity of an Algorithm for Finding the Traffic Flow Wardrop Equilibrium","authors":"Yu. V. Chirkova","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425601064","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425601064","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper describes an algorithm for finding the Wardrop equilibrium and optimal distributions of traffic flows in an urban road network. A software code has been developed to implement this algorithm. A procedure is described for conducting numerical experiments and analyzing their results to study the computational complexity of the algorithm depending on the model dimension.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 1","pages":"S67 - S72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147686670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum to: Scene Graph Forecasting Using Neural Network-Based Methods","authors":"A. M. Trunova, D. A. Yudin","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425330051","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425330051","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"112 3","pages":"633 - 633"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2026-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1134/S1064562425330051.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147560382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}