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Potential Game in a Parallel Transportation Network with Symmetric Externalities
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602555
Yu. V. Chirkova
{"title":"Potential Game in a Parallel Transportation Network with Symmetric Externalities","authors":"Yu. V. Chirkova","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602555","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602555","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A model of a transportation system with parallel channels and BPR latency functions with symmetric linear externalities is considered in the case where the impact of the channel loads on latency is pairwise symmetric. For this case, it is proved that the game of traffic allocation among the channels is potential, and the price of anarchy is bounded above by a value of <span>(frac{4}{3})</span>.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S440 - S444"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143717063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intransitive Sets of Financial Strategies with Constant Levels
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702387
A. A. Kovalchuk
{"title":"Intransitive Sets of Financial Strategies with Constant Levels","authors":"A. A. Kovalchuk","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702387","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702387","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The phenomenon of intransitivity of trading strategies with constant levels in the stock market is studied. By using Doob’s stopping theorem and basic concepts from probability theory, accurate estimates for the strength of intransitivity are derived for the case of strategies with constant levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S367 - S375"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Models of Optimal Organization of Tax Inspection
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602609
A. A. Vasin, N. I. Tsyganov
{"title":"Models of Optimal Organization of Tax Inspection","authors":"A. A. Vasin,&nbsp;N. I. Tsyganov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602609","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602609","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The problem of optimal organization of state inspection with an honest head and rational auditors is considered. Audit schemes are investigated in which the honest behavior of taxpayers and auditors turns out to be resistant to coalition deviations. In addition to hierarchical structures, a three-stage scheme with cross-checking is considered. It is proved that cross-checking is never optimal. The minimum audit costs for two- and three-level structures are determined. The best option is specified depending on the model parameters.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S468 - S472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minimax Differential Game with a Fixed End Moment
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602737
V. N. Ushakov, A. M. Tarasyev, A. V. Ushakov
{"title":"Minimax Differential Game with a Fixed End Moment","authors":"V. N. Ushakov,&nbsp;A. M. Tarasyev,&nbsp;A. V. Ushakov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602737","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602737","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The minimax game problem of approach of a conflict-controlled system in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space at a fixed time moment is studied. Issues related to the construction of solutions to the problem are discussed, namely, the calculation and approximate calculation of solvability sets and the first player’s solving feedback strategies. N.N. Krasovskii’s method of unification is further developed. A feedback strategy of the first player based on the extreme aiming of the system’s trajectory at finite systems of sets in the phase space that approximate the solvability set of the approach problem is studied. As the main result, we justify the effectiveness of the extreme aiming strategy for an approximate solution of the problem. The effectiveness of the strategy is justified using unification constructions supplementing Krasovskii’s unification method.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S495 - S509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Multistage Model for Renewable Resource Extraction by Players of Two Types
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602592
D. V. Kuzyutin, N. V. Smirnova, I. R. Tantlevskij
{"title":"Multistage Model for Renewable Resource Extraction by Players of Two Types","authors":"D. V. Kuzyutin,&nbsp;N. V. Smirnova,&nbsp;I. R. Tantlevskij","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602592","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602592","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines an infinite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with two types of players differing in the discount rates of future payoffs. Using the dynamic programming method, we construct a noncooperative solution—a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in stationary feedback strategies—and a cooperative (Pareto optimal) solution for the case of complete cooperation of all players. The resulting solutions are analyzed for sensitivity to variations in model parameters. In particular, the range of the coefficient of natural resource renewal is found in which a noncooperative solution leads to complete depletion of the resource, while a cooperative scheme allows the players to avoid this negative scenario. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the theoretical results obtained.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S445 - S451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Large Language Models in Cyberattacks
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562425700012
S. V. Lebed, D. E. Namiot, E. V. Zubareva, P. V. Khenkin, A. A. Vorobeva, D. A. Svichkar
{"title":"Large Language Models in Cyberattacks","authors":"S. V. Lebed,&nbsp;D. E. Namiot,&nbsp;E. V. Zubareva,&nbsp;P. V. Khenkin,&nbsp;A. A. Vorobeva,&nbsp;D. A. Svichkar","doi":"10.1134/S1064562425700012","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562425700012","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The article provides an overview of the practice of using large language models (LLMs) in cyberattacks. Artificial intelligence models (machine learning and deep learning) are applied across various fields, with cybersecurity being no exception. One aspect of this usage is offensive artificial intelligence, specifically in relation to LLMs. Generative models, including LLMs, have been utilized in cybersecurity for some time, primarily for generating adversarial attacks on machine learning models. The analysis focuses on how LLMs, such as ChatGPT, can be exploited by malicious actors to automate the creation of phishing emails and malware, significantly simplifying and accelerating the process of conducting cyberattacks. Key aspects of LLM usage are examined, including text generation for social engineering attacks and the creation of malicious code. The article is aimed at cybersecurity professionals, researchers, and LLM developers, providing them with insights into the risks associated with the malicious use of these technologies and recommendations for preventing their exploitation as cyber weapons. The research emphasizes the importance of recognizing potential threats and the need for active countermeasures against automated cyberattacks.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S510 - S520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intransitively Winning Chess Players’ Positions
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702417
A. Poddiakov
{"title":"Intransitively Winning Chess Players’ Positions","authors":"A. Poddiakov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702417","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702417","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Chess players’ positions in intransitive (rock-paper-scissors) relations are considered. Intransitivity of chess players’ positions means that: position A of White is preferable (it should be chosen if choice is possible) to position B of Black, if A and B are on a chessboard; position B of Black is preferable to position C of White, if B and C are on the chessboard; position C of White is preferable to position D of Black, if C and D are on the chessboard; but position D of Black is preferable to position A of White, if A and D are on the chessboard. Intransitivity of winningness of chess players’ positions is considered to be a consequence of complexity of the chess environment—in contrast with simpler games with transitive positions only. The space of relations between winningness of chess players’ positions is non-Euclidean. The Zermelo-von Neumann theorem is complemented by statements about possibility <i>vs</i>. impossibility of building pure winning strategies based on the assumption of transitivity of players’ positions. Questions about the possibility of intransitive players’ positions in other positional games are raised.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S391 - S398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Maximize the Total Strength of Survivors in a Battle and Tournament in Gladiator Game Models
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602725
M. A. Khodiakova
{"title":"How to Maximize the Total Strength of Survivors in a Battle and Tournament in Gladiator Game Models","authors":"M. A. Khodiakova","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602725","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602725","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In 1984, Kaminsky, Luks, and Nelson formulated the gladiator game model of two teams with given strengths. Suppose that a team wants to maximize its expected strength at the end of a battle. We consider an optimization problem: how to distribute the team’s strength among its gladiators. In the above we suppose that the teams distribute their strengths at the beginning of a battle. We also consider Nash equilibria when the teams may change gladiators’ strengths before every fight. We consider two cases. In both, the first team wants to maximize its strength. The second team wants to maximize its strength too in the first case or wants to minimize the first team’s strength in the second case.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S452 - S462"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Models of Competition and Cooperation in Cournot Oligopoly Taking into Account the Environmental Impact
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424602610
P. D. Demchuk, A. V. Korolev, G. A. Ugolnitsky
{"title":"Dynamic Models of Competition and Cooperation in Cournot Oligopoly Taking into Account the Environmental Impact","authors":"P. D. Demchuk,&nbsp;A. V. Korolev,&nbsp;G. A. Ugolnitsky","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424602610","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424602610","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The basic model of the Cournot oligopoly taking into account competition-cooperation and environmental pollution as a differential game in a normal form is described. The numerical analysis for independent and cooperative behavior is carried out for an example used in the future. Games in the form of the characteristic von Neumann–Morgenstern, Petrosyan–Zaccour, and Gromova–Petrosyan functions are constructed, and the Shapley values are calculated. Hierarchical games with information regulations for direct and reverse Stackelberg games are analyzed, payoffs’ comparative analysis for all methods of organization is provided. All the results are presented for the dynamic game with three players.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S473 - S486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic Models of Competition with Endogenous Network Formation: The Case of Constant Output
IF 0.5 4区 数学
Doklady Mathematics Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1134/S1064562424702375
V. A. Kochevadov, A. A. Sedakov
{"title":"Dynamic Models of Competition with Endogenous Network Formation: The Case of Constant Output","authors":"V. A. Kochevadov,&nbsp;A. A. Sedakov","doi":"10.1134/S1064562424702375","DOIUrl":"10.1134/S1064562424702375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The paper examines discrete-time network models of competition with a finite planning horizon. Firms produce a homogeneous product in constant quantities and sell it in a common market. In a nonterminal period, the behavior of each firm is characterized by a multicomponent profile that includes, among other things, the amount of investment and the structure of bilateral links with partner firms. The latter affects the technological state of the firm and allows it to reduce its current costs. The endogenous structure of partner firms is described by a network. For the models under study, an open-loop Nash equilibrium is characterized.</p>","PeriodicalId":531,"journal":{"name":"Doklady Mathematics","volume":"110 2 supplement","pages":"S357 - S366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143716947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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