TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-09-27DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i2.80713
Timothy Pawl
{"title":"Scholastic Hylomorphism and Dean Zimmerman","authors":"Timothy Pawl","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.80713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.80713","url":null,"abstract":"I present Dean Zimmerman’s conceptualization of the varieties of substance dualism. I then focus attention on a form of dualism that he has discussed briefly in a few places, Thomistic dualism as he calls it, or hylomorphic dualism, as I call it. After explicating hylomorphic dualism, I consider the two places where Zimmerman says the most about it, finding, in one case, a way to alleviate a worry he raises using the resources internal to hylomorphism, and, in the other case, a general agreement with his categorizing hylomorphic dualism as an intermediary position between substance dualism and materialism. Since hylomorphic dualism is something of an intermediary position between substance dualism and materialism, it stands to reason that it could be susceptible to attack from both sides. Thus, in the last portions of this article I consider the arguments Zimmerman answers against dualism and levels against materialism. I argue that the hylomorphic theorist can answer the charges against dualism at least as well as the other dualists can. I find that the main argument against materialism that Zimmerman provides, if sound, would also show any composite form of dualism to be false, too. Happily, the hylomorphic thinker has a method of denying the truth of the first premise of that argument, and so, of denying the soundness of the argument.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135536649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.14428/thl.v7i2.67263
Agustín Echavarría
{"title":"O felix culpa!","authors":"Agustín Echavarría","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.67263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.67263","url":null,"abstract":"The claim of the Easter Proclamation that original sin is a “happy fall” (felix culpa) that earned us the Incarnation of the Son of God seems to virtually contain the elements for developing a “Greater God Theodicy,” according to which sin has been permitted by God “in order to” obtain some greater goods. In this paper I introduce four ways in which greater good theodicies can be drawn from the felix culpa claim: two “supralapsarian” ways (a deterministic and a Molinist one) and two “infralapsarian” ways (a conditional and a retrospective one). I consider the philosophical pros and cons of each proposal, showing that infralapsarian options are preferable.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136308099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-08-28DOI: 10.14428/thl.v7i2.67763
BenjaminThomas Page
{"title":"Presentism, Timelessness, and Evil","authors":"BenjaminThomas Page","doi":"10.14428/thl.v7i2.67763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v7i2.67763","url":null,"abstract":"There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted since on this view evil is never “destroyed,” “vanquished,” “eradicated” or defeated. By contrast, some divine temporalists think that presentism is the key that allows evil to be destroyed/vanquished/eradicated/defeated. However, since presentism is often considered to be inconsistent with timelessness, it is thought that the presentist solution is not available for defenders of timelessness. In this paper I first show how divine timelessness is consistent with a presentist view of time and then how defenders of Presentist-Timelessness can adopt the presentist solution to the removal of evil. After this, I conclude the paper by showing that it’s far from clear that the presentist solution is successful and that unless one weakens what is meant by the destruction/vanquishing/eradication/defeat of evil, one can only make the presentist solution work by adopting a number of additional assumptions that many will find unattractive.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88282259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-08-19DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i2.79893
D. Hershenov
{"title":"A Divine Alternative to Zimmerman’s Emergent Dualism","authors":"D. Hershenov","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i2.79893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i2.79893","url":null,"abstract":"Dean Zimmerman argues for the existence of souls as they enable us to avoid certain vagueness-inspired, metaphysical puzzles that plague materialist accounts of the person. There are far too many overlapping material thinking candidates for being the referent of “I”. Zimmerman suggests that an emergent soul whose creation is overdetermined by overlapping material entities will avoid the unwelcome overpopulation of physical thinkers. I will argue that parallel problems plague Zimmerman’s emergent dualism, there are too many souls produced where we want just one.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89488636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-07-25DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.67743
Line Ryberg Ingerslev
{"title":"What the Experience of Transience Tells Us About the Afterlife","authors":"Line Ryberg Ingerslev","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.67743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.67743","url":null,"abstract":"Sigmund Freud’s reflections on transience left him surprised that someone could revolt against the process of mourning. In Jonathan Lear’s interpretation of transience, the revolt is not simply a passing struggle of the mind, but a response to a difficulty of reality, that is, an existential struggle. Central to the experience of transience, according to Lear, is the disbelief in the existence of an afterlife. How might we understand the idea of an afterlife philosophically? I first consider three different philosophical conceptions of the afterlife that—in different ways—underline the relation between collective memory and the process of mourning. These reflections make it clearer which aspects of the afterlife play a role in the existential struggle that Lear describes. However, a further analysis of the temporality at stake in the denial of an afterlife is needed. I therefore look at two psychoanalytic interpretations of the refusal to mourn. The first considers the refusal to mourn as a way to deny change. The second interpretation sees the refusal as a realisation of meaninglessness that prevents the flow of time. I end the paper by arguing that the afterlife can be understood as a practice of articulation, which allows a shared time to flow. Such a practice will commit us anew to a shared world in which we survive with the wounding difficulties of reality.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90192132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-06-30DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.76873
Enric Fernández Gel
{"title":"Negro sobre Blanco. En defensa de las Cinco Vías tomistas","authors":"Enric Fernández Gel","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.76873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.76873","url":null,"abstract":"Resumen: Analizo y critico las principales objeciones que Carlos Blanco plantea, en Las fronteras del pensamiento, contra las 5 vías de Tomás de Aquino. Mi objetivo es mostrar que dichas objeciones fallan, lo cual nos va a permitir traer, a la literatura en español, ciertas discusiones del mundo filosófico anglosajón.\u0000Palabras clave: 5 vías, Tomás de Aquino, Tomismo, Existencia de Dios, Filosofía de la religión\u0000Abstract: I analyze and critique Carlos Blanco’s main objections against Aquinas’s 5 ways, to be found in his latest book, Las fronteras del pensamiento. My aim is to show how these objections miss the mark. This will allow us to bring into the Spanish literature some discussions that have taken place in the English-speaking world.\u0000 Kewyords: 5 ways, Thomas Aquinas, Thomism, God’s existence, Philosophy of religion","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77164494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-06-27DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.74563
Andrew Hollingsworth
{"title":"Eschatology, the Elimination of Evil, and the Ontology of Time","authors":"Andrew Hollingsworth","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.74563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.74563","url":null,"abstract":"Part and parcel of the eschatology of the three Abrahamic faiths is the belief that sin and evil will be eliminated upon the consummation of God’s kingdom on earth. Not only do these beliefs affirm that God will ultimately “deal” with the problem of sin and evil, but that sin and evil will be no more. I refer to this eschatological belief as “the elimination of evil” (EOE). The EOE has important implications for how one understands the ontology of time. In this paper, I contribute to this discussion by arguing that ontologies of time that affirm the concrete existence of past moments are incompatible with the EOE. I also argue that solutions based on theories of hypertime, such as those posited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Samuel Lebens, also fail to solve the problems posed to those ontologies of time affirming the concrete existence of the past. I conclude that the ontology of time that best facilitates the EOE is presentism.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74951953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-06-26DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.74633
J. Alvarado
{"title":"Simplicidad divina radical","authors":"J. Alvarado","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.74633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.74633","url":null,"abstract":"many philosophers have combined a Platonic metaphysics about abstract entities and a theistic conception according to which God is the creator of ‘heaven and earth’, of all ‘visible and ‘invisible’. Supposedly, God is the unique entity a se, i. e., the unique entity on which every other depends ontologically. It has been a traditional contention of Platonists, nevertheless, that abstract things, like universals or numbers, are independent. How are these theses compatible? Several critics have argued that they are not. A theist ontology imposes —for them— the outright rejection of Platonism or, eventually, a milder form of Platonism that substitutes universals and other abstracta by ‘concepts’ or ‘ideas’ in the divine intellect. Philosophers of Platonic convictions have tried to assuage the conflict introducing restrictions in divine aseity or by subjecting universals to some form of ‘absolute creation’. None of these attempts has been successful. In this work a different approach is presented and defended. It is argued that the universal of ‘deity’, W, is identical to God. This is a radicalization of the doctrine of divine simplicity.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76871899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-06-25DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.68353
Steven Nemes
{"title":"Jesus’s Confession of Ignorance and Consubstantiality","authors":"Steven Nemes","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.68353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.68353","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues that Jesus’s confession of ignorance about the day and hour of his return (Matt. 24:36; Mark 13:32) is logically inconsistent with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan doctrine of his “consubstantiality” (homoousia) with God the Father. The essay first defines “consubstantiality”, then presents three formulations of the argument, and finally rebuts a number of possible responses: from the textual originality of the phrase “nor the Son”; from the reinterpretation of “knows” as “makes known”; from the ideas of partitive exegesis and communicatio idiomatum; and from the question of the Holy Spirit’s knowledge of the things of God.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83568133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
TheoLogicaPub Date : 2023-06-24DOI: 10.14428/thl.v8i1.68683
Stanisław Ruczaj
{"title":"Is Faith Supernatural?","authors":"Stanisław Ruczaj","doi":"10.14428/thl.v8i1.68683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v8i1.68683","url":null,"abstract":"The Cognitive Science of Religion represents a contemporary attempt at a naturalistic explanation of religion. There is debate as to whether its account of how religious beliefs arise is reconcilable with the religious account, which holds that religious beliefs are caused by God. In my paper, I argue that these two accounts cannot be reconciled when it comes to the specific question of how Christian religious beliefs arise if one accepts an important theological doctrine of the supernaturality of Christian belief. This doctrine implies that there can be no natural explanation for how Christian beliefs arise because they are a gift of divine grace. This leads to a conundrum for Christian theists: they can either reject the CSR account of how their religious beliefs arise, or they can reject the supernaturality of Christian belief. I argue that the latter is preferable. I then draw on the work of the theologian Denis Edwards to illustrate how one can drop this doctrine without abandoning some other fundamental tenets of Christian theology.","PeriodicalId":52326,"journal":{"name":"TheoLogica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87481581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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