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The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’ 隐修会：梅的“新定义”
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102
Sidra Shahid
{"title":"The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’","authors":"Sidra Shahid","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite the significant amount of debate that Merleau-Ponty’s work has seen over the years, it remains an unresolved issue whether his phenomenology offers what he announces as a ‘new definition of the a priori’. In this paper, I make a case in favor of his claim by clarifying his commitments to the a priori against two dominant lines of interpretation, naturalist and Kantian. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s view that the sciences themselves rely on the a priori method of Wesensschau establishes his basic commitment to apriority. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the a priori differs in important respects from the Kantian a priori and its transcendental idealist ramifications because, on his view, the subject is not the unique ground of constitution. Having tackled these obstacles to understanding Merleau-Ponty’s commitments to the a priori, I argue in light of his conception of ‘radical reflection’ that rather than being a static element of experience, the a priori stands in a dynamic relation with the a posteriori as a distinctive way of articulating structures of lived experience.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"399 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46693249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking Peirce’s Graphs Seriously 认真对待皮尔斯图
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228
Dave Beisecker
{"title":"Taking Peirce’s Graphs Seriously","authors":"Dave Beisecker","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"438 - 445"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46355144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion 知识共享:断言的功能主义解释
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231
Preston Stovall
{"title":"Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion","authors":"Preston Stovall","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231","url":null,"abstract":"References Dreff, E. Forthcoming. Spinoza: A Philosopher of Love. Berlin: De Gruyter Press. Sharp, H. 2011. Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Spinoza, B. 2016. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Translated. edited by E. M. Curley. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press Strawser, M. 2021. Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love. London, Lexington Books. Youpa, A. 2020. The Ethics of Joy: Spinoza on the Empowered Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"456 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43236152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition 一心一意的动物:共同意向性、规范性和话语认知的基础
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232
Carl B. Sachs
{"title":"The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition","authors":"Carl B. Sachs","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"446 - 452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47056530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Intellectual Love of God in Spinoza 斯宾诺莎对上帝的理智之爱
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734
N. Ayalon
{"title":"The Intellectual Love of God in Spinoza","authors":"N. Ayalon","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most famous and identifiable of Spinoza’s ideas is his amor Dei intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). It has been argued that this concept is somewhat alien to the main tenets of the Ethics, especially since it is reminiscent of more orthodox religious relations to God, and has a certain mystical (and so, nonrational) quality.In this paper, I will show that it is a consistent development of Spinoza’s interconnected and elaborate theories of knowledge and the affects. Spinoza discusses three kinds of love: passionate love, friendship and the intellectual love of God.The intellectual love of God is nothing but a necessary outcome of Spinoza’s rationalistic project as a whole. Moreover, by culminating his ethical theory with such a concept, Spinoza is placing himself in a rich tradition of thinkers who develop epistemological and ethical systems that put love (either as eros or philia) as the backbone of their philosophy. In order to illustrate the similarities between Spinoza’s philosophical use of love and that of his predecessors, I will address salient features of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, emphasizing the relationship between love and ethics, as well as the nature of the philosophical impulse.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"420 - 437"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41902901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Blame as a sentiment 责备是一种感情
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893
Marta Johansson Werkmäster
{"title":"Blame as a sentiment","authors":"Marta Johansson Werkmäster","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"239 - 253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46733170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shared Guilt among Intimates 亲密关系中的共同内疚
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897
Amy J. Sepinwall
{"title":"Shared Guilt among Intimates","authors":"Amy J. Sepinwall","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper seeks to vindicate a common but philosophically puzzling phenomenon: Sometimes, a person experiences extreme guilt in relation to a wrong that their loved one has committed, even though they are not at fault for that wrong. Guilt in these cases violates a foundational principle in our moral lives – viz., the fault principle. On that principle, one is blameworthy for a wrong only if one is at fault with respect to that wrong. Insofar as the family members explored here are not at fault, their professed experience of guilt looks to be irrational. Against the charge of irrationality, I argue that it is sometimes morally appropriate, and perhaps even morally required, to judge oneself to be blameworthy for the wrong of a loved one in which one played no culpable part. Further, insofar as the first-personal experience ought to dictate the responsibility assessments of victims and third parties, I conclude that these other individuals will have reason to take the intimate to be blameworthy too. I end by extending the phenomenon of faultless guilt beyond the intimate context, to the experience of white guilt.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"202 - 218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43611802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Irrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously 非理性的爱情:认真对待罗密欧与朱丽叶
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895
N. McKeever, J. Saunders
{"title":"Irrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously","authors":"N. McKeever, J. Saunders","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper argues that there are important irrational elements to love. In the philosophical literature, we typically find that love is either thought of as rational or arational and that any irrational elements are thought to be defective, or extraneous to love itself. We argue, on the contrary, that irrationality is in part connected to what we find valuable about love. We focus on 3 basic elements of love: 1) Whom you love 2) How much you love them 3) How much of a role love plays in your life And in each case, we argue that love can be irrational and valuable.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"254 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48828537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Betrayal, Trust and Loyalty 背叛，信任和忠诚
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121892
R. Stout
{"title":"Betrayal, Trust and Loyalty","authors":"R. Stout","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121892","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I argue that while every betrayal is a breach of trust, not every breach of trust is a betrayal. I defend a conception of trust as primarily a feature of behaviour (i.e. trusting behaviour) and only secondarily a feature of a mental attitude. So it is possible to have the attitude of distrust towards someone while still trusting them in the way you behave. This makes sense of the possibility of Judas Iscariot breaching Jesus’ trust, and so betraying him, even though Jesus presumably knew that Judas would do just that. This conception of trust may be spelt out in terms of making oneself reliant on somebody in a collaboration with them. Such collaborations include relationships like friendships and love affairs, as well as political activities or defending one’s country against aggression. I argue that only when these collaborations involve a commitment to loyalty is a breach of trust a betrayal. And loyalty is a feature of those collaborations or relationships that exclude others – us/them collaborations.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"339 - 356"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46277657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy 情感煤气灯和情感共情
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121894
Katharina Anna Sodoma
{"title":"Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy","authors":"Katharina Anna Sodoma","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121894","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Gaslighting is a form of manipulation that undermines a target’s confidence in their own cognitive faculties. Different forms of gaslighting can be distinguished according to whether they undermine a target’s confidence in their emotional reactions, perceptions, memory, or reasoning abilities. I focus on ‘emotional gaslighting’, which undermines a target’s confidence in their emotional reactions and corresponding evaluative judgments. While emotional gaslighting rarely occurs in isolation, it is often an important part of an overall gaslighting strategy. This is because emotions can help us to understand the evaluative aspects of our situation and thus put us in a position to protest wrongs, which is a context in which gaslighting frequently occurs. I argue that affective empathy constitutes an important antidote to emotional gaslighting. Affective empathy can lead to endorsement of a target’s emotional reaction as appropriate to their situation and agreement with the corresponding evaluative judgment. When it leads to endorsement, affective empathy can counteract the effects of emotional gaslighting because it reassures a target in their ability to make evaluative judgments based on their emotional reactions. Because of its opposing effects, affective empathy with the victim thus constitutes an important intervention to emotional gaslighting on the part of third parties.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"30 1","pages":"320 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48588802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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