发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love 斯宾诺莎与爱的哲学
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148229
Ian MacLean-Evans
{"title":"Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love","authors":"Ian MacLean-Evans","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148229","url":null,"abstract":"Strawser’s Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love is a long-needed investigation into what Spinoza has to say about love, how Spinoza’s views of love are historically situated, and how Spinoza’s views of love may have implications for how we ought to live today. To date, this aspect of Spinoza’s thought has not been the subject of a comprehensive book-length study, despite love being an important element of Spinoza’s moral philosophy. Strawser’s contribution in this book is thus both novel and needed in Spinoza scholarship, and holds within it many important observations about contemporary applications of Spinoza’s approach to interacting with others. Strawser claims his central argument is that Spinoza should be considered ‘predominantly a philosopher of love’ (2). To make this case, Strawser does not principally concern himself with Spinoza’s approval of the ‘intellectual love of God’. This might surprise Spinoza scholars who may assume he would focus on it, given the high esteem Spinoza offers of such. Rather, Strawser focuses on what he calls Spinoza’s theory of noble love. Strawser’s reading of noble love is principally developed in the book’s Introduction, and it is the ‘guide (of) the remaining study’ (17). The introduction is, then, the central portion of the book, and it is an impressive and vital resource for anyone looking at Spinoza’s moral philosophy generally, since it finds so much ethical weight in Spinoza’s philosophy of love. Yet, as we will see, the Introduction does not save a disagreement I have with some of Strawser’s later critique of Spinoza’s speciesism in Chapter 4 of the book. On Strawser’s reading, noble love is the kind of love that is expressed by nobility (generositas) whereby rational people aim to join together with other people in friendship and to increase their wellbeing. Strawser rightly justifies a reading of noble love by referring to Spinoza’s identification of love (amor) with nobility (generositas) through a number of passages, though most directly","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47245856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Review of Recent Editions of Derrida Texts 德里达文本最新版本评论
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148230
Mihail Evans
{"title":"Review of Recent Editions of Derrida Texts","authors":"Mihail Evans","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148230","url":null,"abstract":"Mind recently published a review by Simon Glendinning of Michael L. Morgan’s Levinas’ Ethical Politics which solely focused on the final chapter, a lengthy and robust engagement of the existing literature. It can be that with certain books it is perhaps better to give them time to digest rather than participating in a rush to speak. Equally, there might be particular points that do need to be observed immediately. Geschlecht III is a very different sort of publication to Morgan’s but it is conceivably one that is also in need of a notice of an unusual type, focusing solely on certain aspects of its presentation. Geschlecht III is edited by Geoffrey Bennington, Katie Chernoweth and Rodrigo Therozo and translated by the latter pair. It is to be commended as a scholarly edition which finds a worthy place alongside the other fine productions of the Derrida Seminars Translation Project. There are, however, certain elements which are in need of remarking. A preface is written by Therozo. The","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44897755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taking Peirce’s Graphs Seriously 认真对待皮尔斯图
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228
Dave Beisecker
{"title":"Taking Peirce’s Graphs Seriously","authors":"Dave Beisecker","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148228","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46355144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’ 隐修会：梅的“新定义”
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102
Sidra Shahid
{"title":"The A Priori: Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’","authors":"Sidra Shahid","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite the significant amount of debate that Merleau-Ponty’s work has seen over the years, it remains an unresolved issue whether his phenomenology offers what he announces as a ‘new definition of the a priori’. In this paper, I make a case in favor of his claim by clarifying his commitments to the a priori against two dominant lines of interpretation, naturalist and Kantian. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s view that the sciences themselves rely on the a priori method of Wesensschau establishes his basic commitment to apriority. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the a priori differs in important respects from the Kantian a priori and its transcendental idealist ramifications because, on his view, the subject is not the unique ground of constitution. Having tackled these obstacles to understanding Merleau-Ponty’s commitments to the a priori, I argue in light of his conception of ‘radical reflection’ that rather than being a static element of experience, the a priori stands in a dynamic relation with the a posteriori as a distinctive way of articulating structures of lived experience.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46693249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion 知识共享:断言的功能主义解释
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231
Preston Stovall
{"title":"Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion","authors":"Preston Stovall","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148231","url":null,"abstract":"References Dreff, E. Forthcoming. Spinoza: A Philosopher of Love. Berlin: De Gruyter Press. Sharp, H. 2011. Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Spinoza, B. 2016. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Translated. edited by E. M. Curley. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press Strawser, M. 2021. Spinoza and the Philosophy of Love. London, Lexington Books. Youpa, A. 2020. The Ethics of Joy: Spinoza on the Empowered Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43236152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
The Intellectual Love of God in Spinoza 斯宾诺莎对上帝的理智之爱
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734
N. Ayalon
{"title":"The Intellectual Love of God in Spinoza","authors":"N. Ayalon","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2136734","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One of the most famous and identifiable of Spinoza’s ideas is his amor Dei intellectualis (the intellectual love of God). It has been argued that this concept is somewhat alien to the main tenets of the Ethics, especially since it is reminiscent of more orthodox religious relations to God, and has a certain mystical (and so, nonrational) quality.In this paper, I will show that it is a consistent development of Spinoza’s interconnected and elaborate theories of knowledge and the affects. Spinoza discusses three kinds of love: passionate love, friendship and the intellectual love of God.The intellectual love of God is nothing but a necessary outcome of Spinoza’s rationalistic project as a whole. Moreover, by culminating his ethical theory with such a concept, Spinoza is placing himself in a rich tradition of thinkers who develop epistemological and ethical systems that put love (either as eros or philia) as the backbone of their philosophy. In order to illustrate the similarities between Spinoza’s philosophical use of love and that of his predecessors, I will address salient features of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, emphasizing the relationship between love and ethics, as well as the nature of the philosophical impulse.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41902901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition 一心一意的动物:共同意向性、规范性和话语认知的基础
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232
Carl B. Sachs
{"title":"The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition","authors":"Carl B. Sachs","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2148232","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47056530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Blame as a sentiment 责备是一种感情
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893
Marta Johansson Werkmäster
{"title":"Blame as a sentiment","authors":"Marta Johansson Werkmäster","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46733170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shared Guilt among Intimates 亲密关系中的共同内疚
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897
Amy J. Sepinwall
{"title":"Shared Guilt among Intimates","authors":"Amy J. Sepinwall","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121897","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper seeks to vindicate a common but philosophically puzzling phenomenon: Sometimes, a person experiences extreme guilt in relation to a wrong that their loved one has committed, even though they are not at fault for that wrong. Guilt in these cases violates a foundational principle in our moral lives – viz., the fault principle. On that principle, one is blameworthy for a wrong only if one is at fault with respect to that wrong. Insofar as the family members explored here are not at fault, their professed experience of guilt looks to be irrational. Against the charge of irrationality, I argue that it is sometimes morally appropriate, and perhaps even morally required, to judge oneself to be blameworthy for the wrong of a loved one in which one played no culpable part. Further, insofar as the first-personal experience ought to dictate the responsibility assessments of victims and third parties, I conclude that these other individuals will have reason to take the intimate to be blameworthy too. I end by extending the phenomenon of faultless guilt beyond the intimate context, to the experience of white guilt.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43611802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Irrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously 非理性的爱情:认真对待罗密欧与朱丽叶
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895
N. McKeever, J. Saunders
{"title":"Irrational Love: Taking Romeo and Juliet Seriously","authors":"N. McKeever, J. Saunders","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2121895","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper argues that there are important irrational elements to love. In the philosophical literature, we typically find that love is either thought of as rational or arational and that any irrational elements are thought to be defective, or extraneous to love itself. We argue, on the contrary, that irrationality is in part connected to what we find valuable about love. We focus on 3 basic elements of love: 1) Whom you love 2) How much you love them 3) How much of a role love plays in your life And in each case, we argue that love can be irrational and valuable.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48828537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信