INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献_第8页

Thomas Reid, Common Sense, and Pragmatism 托马斯·里德、常识与实用主义

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2209591

Peter Baumann

引用次数: 0

Blame, Nudging, and the Actual Moral Relationship 责备、督促和实际的道德关系

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2169740

Nicholas Sars

{"title":"Blame, Nudging, and the Actual Moral Relationship","authors":"Nicholas Sars","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2169740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2169740","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT T. M. Scanlon posits a universal moral relationship in response to the worry that his relational approach to blame cannot answer the question of how strangers can fittingly blame one another. However, commentators have noted that appealing to universal moral standards seems to explicitly deviate from a relational approach’s basis in actual relationship norms. This paper argues that Scanlon’s idea of a moral relationship can nevertheless provide a basis for response to the problem of strangers if we recognize that actual and ideal moral relationships both play a role within the relational approach. An interesting consequence of this recognition is that it seems to undermine the moral relationship’s universality. However, a presumptive case for assuming the relationship exists even between strangers can be found in seeing our blaming practices as akin to public policy nudges, where blame operates like an opt-out choice architecture with respect to the moral relationship. On this understanding, though the moral relationship is escapable, individuals are naturally encouraged to participate through the expression of interpersonal attitudes that communicate relational norms and expectations.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48322870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Phenomenalism, Skepticism, and Sellars’s Account of Intentionality 现象主义、怀疑主义和塞拉斯对意向性的描述

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162314

Griffin Klemick

引用次数: 0

Response to Critics: Phenomenalism, Fallibilism and Finitude 对批评家的回应：现象主义、谬误主义和有限性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162316

Luz Christopher Seiberth

引用次数: 0

Being in Touch with the World 与世界保持联系

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162312

Anke Breunig

{"title":"Being in Touch with the World","authors":"Anke Breunig","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2162312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2162312","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article discusses two claims from Seiberth's book Intentionality in Sellars: A Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge, both of which bear on the question of what it takes to be in touch with the world. Seiberth claims, first, that the philosophical method known as transcendental analysis, which Sellars adopts from Kant, is more basic than Sellars's other methodological commitments, including the method of providing a conceptual analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of man-in-the-world. I ask whether the results of transcendental analysis should be applied to the manifest image. Does Sellars think that the manifest image fulfills the transcendental conditions for any conceptual system that is a) about the world of which it is a part and that b) allows those using it to gain knowledge of that world? On Seiberth's reading of Sellars, the answer seems to be negative. Second, Seiberth claims that there is only one kind of vertical relation between the conceptual and the real, the non-semantic relation Sellars calls picturing. I contest that claim, arguing that Seiberth gives too strong an interpretation of Sellars's denial that meaning statements are relational statements connecting a word with an independently existing object. This precludes Seiberth from seeing that Sellars, just like Kant, is an empirical realist in a robust sense. I also argue that picturing provides a meagre substitute for what in my reading of Sellars we might call vertical 'semantical' relations between words and things after all.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46536076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Normativity between Naturalism and Phenomenology 自然主义与现象学的规范性

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2160782

Thomas J. Spiegel

{"title":"Normativity between Naturalism and Phenomenology","authors":"Thomas J. Spiegel","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2160782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2160782","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is an unresolved stand-off between ontological naturalism and phenomenological thought regarding the question whether normativity can be reduced to physical entities. While the ontological naturalist line of thought is well established in analytic philosophy, the phenomenological reasoning for the irreducibility of normativity has been largely left ignored by proponents of naturalism. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Schütz, Stein and others, I reconstruct a phenomenological argument according to which natural science (as the foundation of naturalization projects) is itself a part of the essentially normative life-world to the effect that ontological naturalism faces a bootstrapping problem. I aim to demonstrate that this stand-off is grounded in a deep disagreement about the possibility of reduction. I close by arguing that this deep disagreement turns on the question which conception about the nature of (natural) science is true. This result pits a perfectionist model of science (implied by ontological naturalism) against a pragmatist conception of science (in favour of the phenomenological argument). The motivation is that transforming the disagreement about the controversial principle into a disagreement about conceptions of science may help to offer a foundation for different attempts at solving the stand-off.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47166962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Sellars’s Transcendental Philosophy 塞拉斯的先验哲学

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162313

Michael R. Hicks

引用次数: 0

Forms of Sensibility, or: Hegel on Human Capacities 《感性的形式》或《黑格尔论人的能力

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2023.2164935

Lucian Ionel

{"title":"Forms of Sensibility, or: Hegel on Human Capacities","authors":"Lucian Ionel","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2164935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2164935","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel treats human sensibility differently in the sections on anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. With the recent revival of Hegel’s work, there has been a lively debate about how to understand the progression from more primitive to more sophisticated human capacities. This paper differentiates three influential readings to that effect – the animals-first, the emancipatory, and the rational-first reading – and argues that they risk misconstruing mental development as a transition from one category of capacities to the other. The transition is rendered in terms of either accumulation, emancipation, or maturation. But this basic picture confuses the capacities characterizing us as a kind of animal, a kind of consciousness, and a conceptually self-conscious being. This paper explains how anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology articulate complementary, but irreducible categories of human capacities. The apparently more basic capacities are abstractable aspects of those that come later in the order of presentation. The distinct kinds of capacities do not stand separately on a three-step ladder of mental development but are aspects of one singular and synchronous development of the human mind. Their particular development is mutually dependent on each other but can be properly accounted for only in distinctive categorial terms.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44250822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Précis of Intentionality in Sellars: A Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge 论塞拉斯的意向性:有限知识的先验解释

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2162315

Luz Christopher Seiberth

{"title":"A Précis of Intentionality in Sellars: A Transcendental Account of Finite Knowledge","authors":"Luz Christopher Seiberth","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2022.2162315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2022.2162315","url":null,"abstract":"The key question I pursue in this book can be captured as follows: How can reference to the world be justified in a non-relational conception of intentionality? The overarching context of this project is given by the wide-scope concern to understand what it takes to think ourselves as part of a world we can in fact have knowledge about, while acknowledging that all our con-jectures are fallible. My main contention in taking up the challenges voiced in these questions is that the concept of intentionality is the beating heart of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy. How so? The concept of intentionality has not only a rich medieval history, it has also been given a deep treatment in the tradition downstream from Kant, a depth not recognised properly in contemporary analytic philosophy. I set out to demonstrate Sellars’ thinking to belong to this very tradition. His account of intentionality gives life to two intersecting tasks inherent in ‘the attempt to take both man and science seriously’ (Sellars 1968, SM I §1; Sellars 1970, I §87). On my reading, Sellars’ philosophical project comes to light when seen as a transcendental phenomenalism, indebted to a transcendental methodology in which picturing is the linchpin of finite knowledge","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59592536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Self-Knowledge of Desire: When Inference Is Not Enough 欲望的自我认识：当推理还不够的时候

IF 0.6 3区哲学

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2022-08-08 DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108101

Uku Tooming

引用次数: 0