INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES最新文献

{"title":"Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions","authors":"Rach Cosker-Rowland","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2264721","url":null,"abstract":"We have controversial intuitions about the rightness of retributive punishment, keeping promises for its own sake, and pushing the heavy man off of the bridge in the footbridge trolley case. How do these intuitions relate to ethical theories? Should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain them? Or are only uncontroversial intuitions relevant to explanatory ethical theorising? I argue against several views that we might hold about the relationship between controversial intuitions and ethical theories. I then propose and defend the view that ethical theories should only aim to fit with and explain the intuitions that almost all people (who minimally understand the relevant issues) share. I argue that this view has interesting and important implications for ethical theorising and theorising about justice and equality.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unknown Peers","authors":"Marc Andree Weber","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263711","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTUnknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested.KEYWORDS: EpistemologyevidencedisagreementpeersEqual Weight Viewjustification AcknowledgementThe paper benefitted a lot from comments and impulses by Wolfgang Freitag (who also convinced me of the need to clarify how EW is to be defined), Sanford Goldberg, Jonathan Matheson, Christoph Schamberger, Nadja-Mira Yolcu, Elia Zardini, Q1 Alexandra Zinke, and several anonymous referees.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For the purpose of the present paper, this rough characterization of epistemic peerhood suffices. See, e.g., Matheson (Citation2015, 24–25), Elga (Citation2007, 499, fn. 21), King (Citation2011), Vorobej (Citation2011), and my Weber (Citation2017b) for a more detailed discussion of the concept.2. See Lasonen-Aarnio (Citation2014, 317) and Rosenkranz and Schulz (Citation2015, 570–572).3. Analogously, it does not speak against the A-Variant that it is compatible with giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer. For it does not follow that one could instead focus on first-order evidence alone, since one cannot consider first-order evidence withing interpreting it, which means that there must be at least one person to whose interpretation one gives more than zero weight. This person need not be oneself or one’s peer: arguably, giving no weight to both one’s own view and that of one’s epistemic peer is exactly what one should do if there is an epistemic superior regarding the matter under debate.4. A case in point is Kelly (Citation2010, 112).5. David Enoch also distinguishes what I call the A-, B-, and C-Variant and argues for the latter; see Enoch (Citation2010, 970–972).6. This position is usually called the Right Reasons View. For versions this view, see Kelly (Citation2005, 180) and Titelbaum (Citation2015). A strong externalist element is also p","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"6 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction: The Ethics and Politics of Disagreement","authors":"Maria Baghramian","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2278832","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2278832","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction to the special issue on the Ethics and Politics of Disagreement provides a history of the Robert Papazian and PERITIA IJPs Essay prizes, announces the winners of the 2023 prizes, provides a brief overview of the articles in this special issue and highlights some of their connections, and concludes with an announcement of a new IJPS essay prize.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"492 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135949914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Disagreeing with Experts","authors":"Manuel Almagro Holgado, Neftalí Villanueva Fernández","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263712","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper addresses the question of who should be trusted as an expert and when, particularly in the context of public deliberation. Trust in experts is crucial in making decisions about public policies that involve complex information beyond the expertise of most people. However, fruitful deliberation also requires being able to resist misinformation campaigns, no matter how widespread these might be; being able, in general, to evaluate the evidence at our disposal and form our own opinions. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on this apparent tension between epistemic deference and epistemic independence. The paper has two goals. First, it aims at providing a more nuanced understanding of the question of who should be trusted as an expert by examining cases in which seemingly factual claims are made in public settings by experts. Second, it emphasizes the need to pay attention to the conditions under which we actually trust each other. We suggest that fostering trust in science may be better approached by modifying the conditions under which scientific dialogue takes place, rather than trying to convince the public to trust experts, or blaming them for not doing so.KEYWORDS: Trustdistrustexpertsdisagreementscience communication AcknowledgmentsWe thank Manuel de Pinedo for his comments on a previous version of this article. We also thank the participants of the workshop (No) more stories: The new challenges of science communication, led by Ophelia Deroy, and organized by the Center of Advanced Studies’ Research Group Challenges and norms of science communication (University of Munich).Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Kappel (Citation2020) for a recent discussion of what we should do, epistemically speaking, when we learn that others don’t trust the ones we do trust.2. Recent literature has started to explore not only the characteristics of experts, but also the heterogeneity of non-experts and how this heterogeneity impacts the context of science communication (see Pérez-González and Jiménez-Buedo Citation2023).3. The effectiveness of these strategies is limited. Research has shown that we tend to underestimate our own biases compared to those of others, known as the ‘bias blind spot’, which can hinder our ability to recognize our own biases. Additionally, some scholars have recently argued that there is no circumstance under which introspection can be reliable to detect our biases (see, for instance, Kelly Citation2023).Additional informationFundingThe publication of this work was made possible with funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883. This work was also partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Universities and Next-Generation EU, the Spanish Ministry of Science [PID2019-109764RB-I00, PID2022-140562NB-I00], Junta de Andalucía [B-HUM-459-UGR18], the BBVA Foundation [BBVA2021-EQUIPOS, AYUDAS F","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?","authors":"Ruth Weintraub","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a prominent view about disagreement, rationally requires us to suspend judgement about contentious matters, is seen to be too pessimistic.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"345 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards a Politicized Anatomy of Fundamental Disagreement","authors":"Sophie Juliane Veigl","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2265230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2265230","url":null,"abstract":"Fundamental disagreement is at the core of many debates surrounding epistemic relativism. Proponents of epistemic relativism argue that certain disagreements are irresolvable because proponents base their views on fundamentally different epistemic principles and, thus, fundamentally different epistemic systems. Critics of epistemic relativism argue that this analysis is wrong since the particular epistemic principles in question are most of the time derived from or instances of the same, more basic, epistemic principle. With regard to the individuation of epistemic systems, there is, thus, an impasse within the epistemic relativism literature. It is the aim of this article to employ the recently developed notion of ‘situated judgments’ as well as the concepts of ‘world-traveling’ and ‘epistemic friction’ to provide an epistemic agent-based, dynamic account of disagreeing and thereby also contribute to the question of how to individuate an epistemic system.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Making Room for the Solution: A Critical and Applied Phenomenology of Conflict Space","authors":"Niclas Rautenberg","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2264724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2264724","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis essay discusses the normative significance of the spatial dimension of conflict events. Drawing on qualitative interviews conducted with political actors – politicians, officials, and activists – and on Heidegger’s account of spatiality in Being and Time, I will argue that the experience of conflict space is co-constituted by the respective conflict participants, as well as the location where the conflict unfolds. Location and conflict parties’ (self-)understandings ‘open up’ a space that enables and constrains ways of seeing and acting. Yet, a purely transcendental phenomenology will remain oblivious to the quasi-transcendental, societal structures of power that shape a person’s conflict experience. To illuminate these facets of the phenomenon, phenomenology has to join forces with critical theory. Introducing Garland-Thomson’s feminist distinction of fit/misfit, I will illustrate how power shapes conflict space in manifold ways. The essay thereby fills a gap in the philosophical literature that rarely analyses political conflict as a phenomenon sui generis.KEYWORDS: Conflictspacecritical phenomenologyapplied phenomenologyHeideggerGarland-Thomson AcknowledgmentsFor comments on earlier drafts of this essay, I would like to thank Fabian Freyenhagen, Jörg Schaub, Matt Burch, Irene McMullin, Robin Celikates, Sean Irving, Felix Schnell, Johanna Amaya-Panche, Béatrice Han-Pile, Wayne Martin, and Timo Jütten. I owe special gratitude to Matt Burch, Fabian Freyenhagen, and Wayne Martin for inviting me to give guest lectures on the topic at their seminars. Their students’ feedback was much appreciated. Further, I received helpful comments at the 2022 conference of The British Society for Phenomenology, the ‘11th Congress for Practical Philosophy’ in Salzburg, the 2022 MANCEPT workshop ‘Equality and Space’, and the University of Essex’s SPAH Philosophy Colloquium. Research on the essay was funded by The German Academic Scholarship Foundation, the Consortium for the Humanities and the Arts South-East England, and the Royal Institute of Philosophy.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. I am aware of the (ethical) tension in drawing on Heidegger’s work and critical theory. I do not, however, share the conviction that Heidegger’s appalling political positions necessarily render his philosophy invalid. Instead, one has to reflexively engage with his work and let it be interrogated by the theories and testimonies of people from marginalized groups. For a meditation on the role of the White philosopher, including my own, in tackling racism and other forms of oppression, see Rautenberg (Citation2023, 2–4).2. Similar approaches can be found in recent sociological research on space (e.g. Löw Citation2008). See also the ‘spatial turn’ in the field of peace and conflict studies (e.g. Björkdahl and Buckley-Zistel Citation2016; Björkdahl and Kappler Citation2017; Brigg and George Citation2020).3. For furt","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Understanding Deep Disagreement","authors":"Duncan Pritchard","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263709","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe axiological account of deep disagreements is described and defended. This proposal understands this notion in terms of the existential importance of the topic of disagreement. It is argued that this account provides a straightforward explanation for the main features of deep disagreements. This proposal is then compared to the contemporary popular view that deep disagreements are essentially hinge disagreements – i.e. disagreements concerning clashes of one’s hinge commitments, in the sense described by the later Wittgenstein. It is claimed that hinge disagreements are only plausibly deep disagreements insofar as there can be a specific class of hinge commitments that are axiological in nature, thereby lending further support to the axiological account of deep disagreement.KEYWORDS: Deep disagreementepistemologyepistemology of disagreementhinge epistemologyWittgenstein Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. For discussion of this general idea, see Fogelin (Citation1985), Brenner and Godden (Citation2010), Pritchard (Citation2018c), Lavorerio (Citation2020), Ranalli (Citation2020), and Siegel (Citation2021). See also the related discussion of epistemic relativism in the context of hinge epistemology, such as Williams (Citation2007), Coliva (Citation2010), Pritchard (Citation2010, Citation2018c), Kusch (Citation2016), and Carter (Citation2017). For two recent critical discussions of the relationship between hinge disagreements and deep disagreements, see Ranalli (Citation2021) and Pritchard (Citationforthcoming-a).2. There is, of course, a wealth of philosophical material on the question of what, if anything, could appropriately perform the role of being of fundamental value in the sense that we are interested in. For a recent work that usefully engages with questions of this general kind, see Tiberius (Citation2018).3. See Pritchard (Citation2018a).4. The case is due to Christensen (Citation2007, 193) and is widely discussed in the epistemology of peer disagreement literature.5. For some prominent defences of (versions of) conciliationism, see Christensen (Citation2007), Elga (Citation2007), Feldman (Citation2007), and Cohen (Citation2013).6. I explore this point about reflection and non-conciliationism, along with some of its implications for the epistemology of disagreement, in Pritchard (Citation2018b, Citation2019). See also Pritchard (Citation2020, Citation2022c).7. Interestingly, this high level of conviction can go hand-in-hand with periods of anxiety about whether such conviction is warranted. I discuss this phenomenon as it manifests itself in the religious case in Pritchard (Citationforthcoming-b, Citationforthcoming-c).8. I offer my own reading of On Certainty in a number of places, but see especially Pritchard (Citation2015, part 2). For some of the main texts in this regard, see Strawson (Citation1985), McGinn (Citation1989), Williams (Citation1991), Moyal-Sharrock (Cita","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hidden Depths: Testimonial Injustice, Deep Disagreement, and Democratic Deliberation","authors":"Aidan McGlynn","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2263710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2263710","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDeep disagreements are those involving a disagreement about (relatively) fundamental epistemic principles. This paper considers the bearing of testimonial injustice, in Miranda Fricker’s sense, on the depth of disagreements, and what this can teach us about the nature and significance of deep disagreements. I start by re-evaluating T. J. Lagewaard’s recent argument that disagreements about the nature, scope, and impact of oppression will often be deepened by testimonial injustice, since the people best placed to offer relevant testimony will be subject to testimonial injustice, pushing the disagreement into one about the bearing of certain epistemic sources on the original debate. I take issue with this last step, but I build on the argument to bring attention to unappreciated and worrying ways in which prejudices can make a disagreement deep in ways that can be hidden from one or more of the participants and from observers. Finally, I revisit some of the ways that deep disagreement has been thought to be problematic for the proper functioning of a democracy, and I examine whether the kinds of hidden deep disagreements I argue for in the paper make these problems any worse, concluding that they likely do.KEYWORDS: Deep disagreementepistemic injusticetestimonial injusticedemocracypolitical polarisation AcknowledgmentsThis publication was made possible through funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 870883.My thanks to audience members at the 2022 European Epistemology Network meeting, hosted by the Cogito Epistemology Research Centre at the University of Glasgow, particularly to Thirza Lagewaard, Guido Melchior, Chris Ranalli and Mona Simion, as well as to anonymous readers for this journal.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Though if I regard you as an epistemic peer with respect to the issues under contention, there are tricky and widely discussed questions about whether and how I need to change my confidence in my original verdict while we wait for this further evidence. The restaurant example comes from Christensen (Citation2007, 193), and the horse race from Elga (Citation2007, 486–487).2. Such ‘faultless’ disagreements have often been thought to call into question the objectivity of the domain under dispute (for example, matters of taste), and to call for some kind of relativistic treatment, though it’s contested what exactly this involves. See, for example, Wright (Citation1992) and the papers in Wright (Citation2023), and MacFarlane (Citation2014, chapter 7).3. Lynch calls the kinds of cases we’re interested in ‘epistemic disagreements’ instead of the more standard ‘deep disagreements’.4. Reflecting my primary focus in section 5 below, this sketches de Ridder’s point rather than Lynch’s, though I do say a little about the latter below too.5. For Fricker, epistemic injustice involves a person being wronged disti","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135950565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Experience in Descartes","authors":"Vili Lähteenmäki","doi":"10.1080/09672559.2023.2250178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2023.2250178","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I will focus on Anik Waldow’s reading of Descartes as contributing towards a specific form of human experience and the related capacity for self-determination. I discuss how this notion of experience relates to what is often taken to be the crux of Descartes’s Meditations. I conclude by noting that three elements are central to Waldow’s interpretation: Descartes’s intellectual metaphysical pursuit for epistemic certainty about essences of things, the specific kind of experience of our selves that arises out of the embodied state of the mind revealing ourselves as both active and passive, and a resulting new capacity for self-determination. The moral of Waldow’s reading is that we should not read the Meditations as an account of what the mind is but as an account of what the mind can do and how we can upraise ourselves not as metaphysicians but in our interactions with the world and others.","PeriodicalId":51828,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135748184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}