谁害怕分歧?

IF 0.7 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2023-05-27 DOI:10.1080/09672559.2023.2264723

Ruth Weintraub

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文不涉及(充分讨论过的)关于对同伴分歧的理性反应的问题。相反，它解决了一个(很少被讨论的)问题，许多关于分歧(认识论)意义的观点都很容易(在某种程度上)受到这个问题的影响:自我破坏。我拒绝了文献中提出的几个答案，捍卫了一个已经提出的答案(通过满足对它的反对意见)，并表明，在它的光照下，普遍的假设，即“同等权重观点”，一个关于分歧的突出观点，理性地要求我们暂停对有争议问题的判断，被视为过于悲观。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?

This paper is not concerned with the (amply discussed) question as to the rational response to peer disagreement. Instead, it addresses a (considerably less often debated) problem to which many views about the (epistemic) significance of disagreement are vulnerable (to some extent or another): self-undermining. I reject several answers that have been proposed in the literature, defend one that has been offered (by meeting objections to it), and show that in its light, the prevalent assumption that the ‘equal-weight view’, a prominent view about disagreement, rationally requires us to suspend judgement about contentious matters, is seen to be too pessimistic.

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来源期刊

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Journal of Philosophical Studies (IJPS) publishes academic articles of the highest quality from both analytic and continental traditions and provides a forum for publishing on a broader range of issues than is currently available in philosophical journals. IJPS also publishes annual special issues devoted to key thematic areas or to critical engagements with contemporary philosophers of note. Through its Discussion section, it provides a lively forum for exchange of ideas and encourages dialogue and mutual comprehension across all philosophical traditions. The journal also contains an extensive book review section, including occasional book symposia. It also provides Critical Notices which review major books or themes in depth.