British Journal for the History of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"<i>Nous thurathen</i> : between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias","authors":"Robert Roreitner","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle’s school, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the early – genuinely Peripatetic – reception of Aristotle’s account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations).KEYWORDS: Rationalityontogenyaristotelianismsoulmortality AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this paper was presented at HU Berlin in July 2022. I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments and a stimulating discussion, especially Lukas Apsel, Malina Buturovic, Stephen Menn, and Zhixi Wang. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of BJHP for many valuable suggestions. The research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (project No. 22-21829S).Notes1 See Menn, Plato on God.2 See Iuv. 10 472a22–24 and GA II.3 736b27–29, respectively. There is a third use no less puzzling than these two at GA II.6 744b21–22.3 See especially DA 90.19–91.4; and also Philoponus, InDA 518.6–8, 535.4–5.4 See e.g. Connell, “Nous Alone”, 114, 121, 129.5 See Averroes, Long Commentary, 389–91, 399, 432.6 See Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus 2.66–92, 5.386–396. For an overview of Aquinas’ account and its influence, see Haldane and Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment” or Eberl, “Aquinas’ Account”.7 For the nature of Aristotle’s inquiry, see especially the contributions by Falcon, Gotthelf, Lefebvre, and Leunissen in Falcon and Lefebvre, Aristotle’s Generation of Animals.8 The details are disputed. A major question discussed by scholars is how mechanistic or pre-programmed the whole process really is and how sensitive it is to inputs from external and internal environment. For two different approaches, see Connell, “Living Animal from Semen”, and Henry, “Aristotle on Epigenesis”.9 This, of course, does not imply that, say, a human embryo has the same essence as a horse embryo (thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry). Only the former can become a human being and only the latter can become a horse, and this must determine what","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The concept of dignity in Edmund Burke’s writings on the French revolution","authors":"Samuel Harrison","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2272258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2272258","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the concept of dignity played an important role in the political thought of Edmund Burke. It seeks to show that, in contrast with the egalitarian and individual version of dignity associated with Immanuel Kant, Burke devised a conception of dignity that rested on reverence, grandeur and formality, to be manifested through institutions, customs, and social relations. Burkean dignity was thus closely linked with the ancient constitution. In his thought, dignity played an essential role in maintaining social stability and ensuring wise governance. This conviction informed Burke’s opposition to the French Revolution, which he feared would destroy the conditions necessary for dignity to thrive. Unpicking Burke’s understanding of dignity thus gives us new insights into the intricacies of his political thought and another perspective on his opposition to the French Revolution.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135589381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Critical discussion of recent work in Kantian ethics: Timmermann, Herman, Timmons","authors":"Sabina Vaccarino Bremner","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2261515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2261515","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTA critical discussion of three recent monographs on Kantian ethics: Jens Timmermann's Kant's Will at the Crossroads, Barbara Herman's The Moral Habitat, and Mark Timmons' Kant's Doctrine of Virtue. I start by laying out some of the main claims of all three works, and then examine some of the main points of contention between them: principally, the issue of moral complexity, the derivation of duties, and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. I conclude with some remarks on how the insights of all three works might be fruitfully combined to advance the current state of thought on the structure and composition of the Kantian moral system, as well as on the sense in which it might be taken to parallel, or otherwise be related to, Kant's theoretical system.KEYWORDS: Kantpractical reasonKantian ethicsmoral psychologymoral duties Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The argument for self-perfection parallels the one for others' happiness: “Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which belong to the end of nature with regard to the humanity in our subject; to neglect these would perhaps be consistent with the preservation of humanity, as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end” (4:430). Both arguments thus conclude the insufficiency of a conception of morality in terms merely of limiting conditions.2 “The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us; we transform the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws, but also in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and which are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding apprehends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature” (5:314). Compare Kant's positing of a teleological “kingdom of nature” as necessary in order to arrive at the formulation of a kingdom of ends (4:436n).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"41 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t","authors":"Amber D. Carpenter","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2262547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2262547","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDemocritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with a view that positively implies a concrete mode of practical engagement, and resources for a critical stance. Even if certain atoms end up proven incoherent, there is no danger of slipping into the morally fatal indifference of inadvertent skepticism. For the ethical implications, it matters how one arrives at one’s atomism.KEYWORDS: AtomismDemocritusVasubandhuBuddhistskepticism AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Ugo Zilioni, whose invitation to participate in a conference on atomism first prompted this work; and also the conference participants themselves, particularly David Sedley, whose contributions offered a valuable perspective on Democritus and Vasubandhu. My thanks are also due to Oren Hanner, whose invitation to participate in a conference on skepticism provided the opportunity to investigate the ethical dimensions of atomism which this paper addresses; and again the conference participants themselves, particularly Mark Siderits, were invaluable in sharpening my arguments. Audiences at the Universität Paderborn, Uppsala Universitet, Boston University, and Columbia University were terrific interlocutors, whose questions have helped to focus and clarify the ideas presented here, and Sylvia Berryman and Ugo Zilioni offered helpful comments on the penultimate draft. Nicholas Lua provided invaluable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Abbreviationsadv. Math. =Against the ProfessorsAKBh.=Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya [Treasury of Abhidharma, with Commentary]DK=Diels, rev. Kranz, Die Fragmente der VorsokratikerKRS=Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic PhilosophersMN=Majjhima Nikāya [Middle-Length Discourses]MP=Milindapañha [Questions of King Milinda]PTS=Pali Text SocietySN=Saṃyutta Nikāya [Connected Discourses]Notes1 Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 342. The following quotations are from pages 345, 345, and 349 of the same.2 And this is so even if one does not share Barnes’ own dismissive view of the very possibility of a meaningful connection between Democritus’ ethics with his metaphysics (see Presocratic Philosophers, 533–4).3 Aristotle in de caelo Γ4, 303a5 reports that Democritus and Leucippus “say that their primary magnitudes are infinite in number and indivisible in magnitude” (KRS 577).4 Whether atoms have weight is contested. Aristotle attributes weight to the atoms at de gen et corr. A8, 326a9; and Barnes claims “ample evidence” spe","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"75 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"James Sully’s psychological reduction of philosophical pessimism","authors":"Patrick Hassan","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2268125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2268125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mary Astell on self-government and custom","authors":"Marie Jayasekera","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2264359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2264359","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without validation by our own understanding of the reasons supporting them, then they are not our own. The capacities requisite for responsiveness to our own reasoning are those of examining and evaluating our own motives and of resisting the social pressure to conform to others’ opinions. An upshot of this interpretation of Astell’s theory of self-government is that it reveals her insights into the ways ‘custom’ can undermine an individual’s ability to govern oneself.KEYWORDS: Astellself-governmentcustomfree willliberty AcknowledgementsThanks to Allauren Forbes and Sean Greenberg for detailed comments on an earlier version of the paper, as well as Michaela Manson, Donald Ainslie, Marcy Lascano, Lisa Shapiro, and audience members at the Pacific Northwest – Western Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy and the UCSD Modern Philosophy Graduate Workshop for helpful discussions of earlier versions of the material. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for this journal for their detailed and constructive suggestions and references to the secondary literature. This paper was supported by funding from The Office of Research and Economic Development at California State University, Long Beach.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The notion of self-government is often referred to as ‘autonomy’ in the present-day literature. Commentators distinguish between various notions of autonomy employed in moral and political philosophy; the target concept of this paper is often referred to as ‘personal autonomy’ or ‘individual autonomy’. I use the term ‘self-government' because we find related notions in Astell's works and to forestall expectations of continuity with the Kantian conception of autonomy.2 I use the following abbreviations of Astell’s works: SP I = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part 1; SP II = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II; and CR = The Christian Religion, as Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England. References to SP I and SP II are to page numbers, and references to CR are to section numbers. Unless otherwise noted, emphases in quoted texts are Astell’s own. I present references to Locke’s Essay by book, chapter, and section.3 In so doing, this project complements and builds on other recent discussions of freedom, individual autonomy, and relational autonomy in Astell by Jacqueline Broad (Mary Astell; “Selfhood”; “Merger of Wi","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Shaftesbury on natural beauty, science, and animals <i>A philosophy of beauty: Shaftesbury on nature, virtue, and art</i> , by Michael B. Gill, Princeton &amp; Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2022, pp. 238, £35.00 (hb), ISBN: 978-0691-22661-3.","authors":"Karl Axelsson","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2259439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2259439","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAt the heart of Michael B. Gill's impressive study of the third Earl of Shaftesbury's theory of beauty is the notion of nature and its moral, aesthetic, and religious ramifications. In this article, I elaborate on one of Gill's primary claims up to a point where I think a weak spot occurs. The claim concerns nature, and the weak spot is the interpretation of Shaftesbury's references to science (natural philosophy). On the whole, Gill holds that Shaftesbury is “no enemy of a rational understanding of nature, no enemy of science” (44). While I agree with the first clause, I find the second problematic. I argue that, for Shaftesbury, a central problem with science is that it disrupts the moral and aesthetic unity of nature, a flaw shared by society's general exploitation of nature and animals.KEYWORDS: Beautyanimalssciencenature Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Limits of intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein <b>Limits of intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein</b> , edited by Jens Pier, New York and London, Routledge, 2023, pp. xii + 308, £108.00 (hb), ISBN: 9780367689629","authors":"Francesco Gandellini","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2260076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2260076","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsFor useful discussion and comments, I wish to thank Filippo Casati, Denis McManus, Jens Pier, James Clark Ross, and Arturo Vazquez.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the University of Southampton Presidential Scholarship Scheme.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135142067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle’s unlimited <i>dunamis</i> argument: an unrecognized proof of the immobility of the prime mover","authors":"Diana Quarantotto","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2261504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2261504","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAccording to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover.KEYWORDS: AristotlemetaphysicsPrime Moverunlimited dunamis argument AcknowledgementI am grateful to the anonymous referees for reading the paper and for their useful suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 A partial exposition can be found in De caelo I.7 275b21–23, where Aristotle mentions two parts of the unlimited dunamis argument and refers to its Physics VIII.10 full version (ἐν τοῖς πϵρὶ κινήσϵως).2 The argument concerns the Prime Mover but is clearly extendable to all immovable movers that cause motion for an unlimited time. This is confirmed by the fact that, after summarizing the argument in Metaph. Λ.7 1073a5–11, in Metaph. Λ.8 1073a38 Aristotle attributes the lack of magnitude to all heavenly immovable movers. Of course, the scholars who (like e.g. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, 101–2) think that, when writing the Physics, Aristotle had not yet theorized the existence of a plurality of heavenly immovable movers (and that therefore maintain that passages such as 259b28–31 are later additions) would claim that the target of the unlimited dunamis argument, in its first formulation, is the Prime Mover alone.3 In Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.7 Aristotle understands these three properties (lack of parts, lack of magnitude, and indivisibility) as equivalent to each other, since by “parts” he means the parts into which a magnitude can be divided (for this meaning, see Metaph. Δ.13 1020a7–14, V.25 1023b12–17, Phys. VI.10 240b12–13). Further, when he claims that the mover of an eternal motion lacks parts and magnitude, he means that it is such both by itself and by accident. This is shown by the fact that he conceives the mover as a subject (i.e. the subject of a dunamis, which is the form whereby a mover causes motion: see below note 21) and that one of the hypotheses about the Prime Mover’s position is the geometrical centre of the first sphere (267b6–7), namely a point. This excludes that he understands the lack of magnitude as only per se.4 Against the traditional interpretation, Lang maintains that this argument concerns the position of the primary eternal motion, not that of the first immovable mover (Lang, Aristotle’s Immaterial Mover). For a criticism (successful in my view) of Lang’s proposal, see Judson, Heavenly Motion, 168 note 48.5 Here I focus on modern scholarship. On the Neoplatonic interpretation and use of the unl","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134975379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aristotle on sexual difference: metaphysics, biology, politics <b>Aristotle on sexual difference: metaphysics, biology, politics</b> , by Marguerite Deslauriers, New York, Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. xvi + 354, $110.00 (hb), ISBN: 978-0-19-760618-6","authors":"Emily Kress","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2259432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2259432","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsThanks to Sukaina Hirji for reading a draft of this review.Notes1 See also Nielsen, “Private Parts of Animals” (378), developing Witt, “Form, Normativity, and Gender”.2 I agree with Gelber that we need a distinction between being “defective with respect to the ability to concoct” and “being defective results of the generative process” (“Females in Aristotle’s Embryology”, 175); my question is (in the first instance) about the latter.3 As Charles (“Aristotle on Agency”, n. 24) notes; see Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (24n14: “[t]he other conditional capacities it possesses, e.g. to ψ if partially impeded, will be realisations of the same capacity under differing circumstances”) and Kress, “Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation” (185–6). See also Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics Book θ, on views that “identif[y] the content of a capacity with what its bearer does under ideal circumstances” (105; see 122 on De Caelo).4 One thus might resist by arguing that to fully concoct is to hit a ‘threshold’ – but then we need a further account of the relevant standard for (further) perfection, if it does not come from the capacity and is yet a standard for the process and not its result (see n. 2).5 Hirj: “the art of shoemaking has, internal to it, a certain kind of normative standard: its fullest expression is not just in producing shoes, but in produing [sic] excellent shoes” (“External Goods”, 47). When a shoemaker “produces a mediocre shoe, even if it is the best shoe she could produce given the limited materials available”, she “falls short” (47).","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}