Nous thurathen : between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle’s school, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the early – genuinely Peripatetic – reception of Aristotle’s account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations).KEYWORDS: Rationalityontogenyaristotelianismsoulmortality AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this paper was presented at HU Berlin in July 2022. I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments and a stimulating discussion, especially Lukas Apsel, Malina Buturovic, Stephen Menn, and Zhixi Wang. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of BJHP for many valuable suggestions. The research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (project No. 22-21829S).Notes1 See Menn, Plato on God.2 See Iuv. 10 472a22–24 and GA II.3 736b27–29, respectively. There is a third use no less puzzling than these two at GA II.6 744b21–22.3 See especially DA 90.19–91.4; and also Philoponus, InDA 518.6–8, 535.4–5.4 See e.g. Connell, “Nous Alone”, 114, 121, 129.5 See Averroes, Long Commentary, 389–91, 399, 432.6 See Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus 2.66–92, 5.386–396. For an overview of Aquinas’ account and its influence, see Haldane and Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment” or Eberl, “Aquinas’ Account”.7 For the nature of Aristotle’s inquiry, see especially the contributions by Falcon, Gotthelf, Lefebvre, and Leunissen in Falcon and Lefebvre, Aristotle’s Generation of Animals.8 The details are disputed. A major question discussed by scholars is how mechanistic or pre-programmed the whole process really is and how sensitive it is to inputs from external and internal environment. For two different approaches, see Connell, “Living Animal from Semen”, and Henry, “Aristotle on Epigenesis”.9 This, of course, does not imply that, say, a human embryo has the same essence as a horse embryo (thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry). Only the former can become a human being and only the latter can become a horse, and this must determine what each essentially is. We will see that Theophrastus’ account brings this intuition forcefully home.10 Aristotle does not reduce the role of the female to a merely passive contribution. See Henry, “Reproductive Hylomorphism” (with Henry, The Hylomorphic Theory, 118–29) and Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals, 91–160 for two ways of undermining this traditional idea. Once the process is set up by the male, the female material can also contribute productively.11 See primarily Moraux’ influential “À propos”. See also e.g. Charlton, “Place of Mind”, 413–16, and Connell, “Nous Alone”, 123–25.12 Sections III and IV aim at giving the large picture. For a detailed discussion of Theophrastus’ view on the place of nous in human ontogeny, I refer the reader to my “Human Ontogeny”.13 The two preserved testimonies discussed below leave no doubt that Theophrastus has GA II.3 736b27–29 in mind. Indeed, ‘from without’ and ‘from outside’ are close synonyms, used sometimes interchangeably by Aristotle; in the extant corpus, Theophrastus always uses ‘from outside’ even in contexts where Aristotle prefers ‘from without’. For more on this front, see the reference in the preceding note.14 See Simplicius, In Phys. 964.29–965.6 (271 FHS&G).15 See DA I.1 403a3–16 (cf. I.4 408b18–30 and I.5 411b15–18), II.1 413a6–7 and III.4 429a18–b5.16 Cf. DA III.4 429a24.17 Aristotle’s characterization from DA III.4 429a24 is picked up at DA III.5 430a10–17, where the nous in question is compared with matter and characterized as what can “become everything”. That is clearly an important background for Theophrastus (see also Themistius, InDA 108.18–24 = 320A FHS&G).18 Its actuality is “not the actuality of any body” (DA II.1 413a7). This does not mean that the “most general account” of soul cannot be applied to nous at all. Nous is presumably the actuality of the human body in the sense that it determines what this body needs to be like, and also in the sense that it cannot exist separately from the body; Theophrastus’ point seems only to be that nous is not a part of the form of the body.19 Theophrastus seems to build on the kind of contrast Aristotle draws at DA II.5 417b16–18: the first actualization of the perceptive capacity has already taken place during embryogenesis, whereas nous needs yet to be developed.20 ‘Moving nous’ is Theophrastus’ considered label for the so-called agent nous of DA III 5 (see Themistius, InDA 108.25–27 = 320A FHS&G) which he seems to understand, like Alexander later, as a transcendent divine nous rather than as a constitutive part of the human soul.21 See especially DA III.7–8 (431b2–12, 432a3–14) and Mem. 1 (449b30–450a7).22 Theophrastus’ reading thus cannot be aligned with the approach, rightly criticized by Connell, “Nous Alone”, which would see the idea of nous from without as a support for substance dualism.23 The third occurrence of nous from without, at GA II.6, 744b21–22, can point in the same direction: nous is conceived here as the insight/knowledge of the householder governing his house from without, which is exactly the kind of relation nous must not have to each human being according to Theophrastus.24 This contrasting case is reminiscent of GA II.3 736b22–27.25 See Galen, Histor. philos. 105 and Ps.-Plutarch, Plac. philos. V.1.26 For Heraclides’ account of the soul as a light travelling through the Milky Way, see the testimonies 46–52 in Schütrumpf, Heraclides of Pontus; for a list of his writings, see DL 5.86–88. In antiquity Heraclides was often associated with the Peripatos, but this is a question of controversy. For a thorough assessment of Heraclides’ account of the soul, see Kupreeva, “Heraclides’ On Soul (?)”.27 This idea can be suggested by a certain reading of DA III.4 429b10–22. And it can be what Theophrastus has ultimately in mind when criticising the “captious” reading of Aristotle as implying that “nous is not even itself”.28 See Strato’s idea of nous/dianoia as the senses peeping out from the sense organs (Sextus M 7.349–350, Tertulian, De Anima 14.4–5, Plutarch, On the Intelligence of Animals 961a = 61, 59, 62 Sharples).29 For a criticism of this assumption, see Mansfeld, “Theodoret”, 183; cf. Mansfeld and Runia, Aëtiana V, 1526–1536.30 See Primavesi, “Stollen von Skepsis”, and Rashed, Ptolémée “al-Gharîb”.31 See Philo of Alexandria, Opif. Mundi 67.9–13; see also Somn. 1.30–31.32 The debate has been helpfully reconstructed, especially by Rashed, “A ‘new’ text” and Menn, “Atticus, Alexander, Porphyry”. In Sections V–VII, I draw on these reconstructions while showing what additional light is shed on the debate by the yet unrecognized Theophrastean background.33 See Simplicius, In Phys. 964.14–23 with Rashed, Commentaire perdu, 369–74.34 See Proclus, In Tim. III 234.9–26.35 For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the author of De Intellectu as ‘Alexander’; and I refer to the person whose views Alexander is reporting here simply as ‘the teacher’. For the notorious issue of authorship, the disputed question of the teacher’s identity, and the enigmatic doctrine of De Intellectu, see my “Thought ‘From Without’”.36 See Eusebius, PE XV.9.13–14. One author to think of in this connection is Plutarch of Chaeronea who is the first Platonist known to us to productively use the notion of nous from without, albeit without any explicit reference to Aristotle (see De genio Socratis 589A–B).37 For one possible way of saving Theophrastus from this kind of objection, see my “Human Ontogeny”.38 For a detailed discussion, I refer the reader to my “Thought ‘From Without’”.39 See Themistius, InDA 108.1–6 (307A FHS&G) – with Priscianus, Metaphrasis 27.8–14 (307C FHS&G) – for the aporia and Priscianus, Metaphrasis 29.12–15 (311 FHS&G) for the solution.40 See Themistius, InDA 108.25–27 (320A FHS&G).41 See also e.g. Caston, “Aristotle’s argument”, 171–72.42 The closest he ever comes to such a mention is at DA I.4 408b18–30, but this is part of his critical discussion of predecessors and can be interpreted in various ways.43 For a detailed discussion, I refer the reader to Geoffroy, “Tradition arabe” and Davidson, Intellect, 18–29 (see 83–94).44 Alexander seems to have taken Aristotle’s claim that “the passive nous is perishable” (430a24–25), quite understandably, as a confirmation of his own view. In the same context, Themistius uses the notion of nous from without also earlier at 37.25–28. For Themistius’ discussion of DA III.5 430a23–25 and his interlocutors, see my “Themistius against Porphyry”.45 After quoting Theophrastus, he uses Strato for the same purpose, see Simplicius, In Phys. 965.7–18 (41 Sharples).46 See especially InDA 517.34–520.20, and also 535.4–5, 535.32–536.5, 537.38–39, 538.7–10, 539.9–10, 540.10–12, 541.13–17, 542.1–5, 584.34–585.2.47 See InGA 84.20–30, where nous from without is introduced as the ultimate goal of the human capacity for thought understood, like in Alexander and his teacher, as a “preparedness”. It is less clear how Philoponus understands nous from without at 85.27–33 and 87.11–12 (cf. InDA 10.24–27).48 See InDA 160.18–27. Not surprisingly, he is commenting on DA I.4 408b18–30 here (see note 42).