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The Personality of Public Authorities 公共当局的人格
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09499-z
Manish Oza
{"title":"The Personality of Public Authorities","authors":"Manish Oza","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09499-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09499-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141346765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Liberty, Secrecy, and the Right of Assessment 自由、保密和评估权
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-05-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09504-5
Daniele Santoro, Manohar Kumar
{"title":"Liberty, Secrecy, and the Right of Assessment","authors":"Daniele Santoro, Manohar Kumar","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09504-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09504-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article we argue that governmental practices of secrecy threaten the epistemic dimension of rights. We defend the view that possessing a right entitles its holder to the largest extent of available knowledge of the circumstances that may impede the enjoyment of that right. We call this the ‘epistemic entitlement’ of rights. Such an entitlement holds in ideal conditions once full transparency is assumed. However, under non-ideal conditions secrecy is a fact that should be accounted for. We argue that, under such conditions, interference due to secrecy is legitimate when the circumstances under which it occurs are open to assessment by the right-holder. We call this the ‘right of assessment’. It ensures the ex-post fulfillment of the epistemic entitlement under non-ideal conditions of partial compliance where full transparency is unattainable due to the fact of secrecy. The right of assessment shields against arbitrary interference by imposing an obligation on the government to provide justification for any interference in the sphere of fundamental rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140934729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lawful, but not Really: The Dual Character of the Concept of Law 合法，但并非真正合法：法律概念的双重特性
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09501-8
Brian Flanagan, Guilherme de Almeida
{"title":"Lawful, but not Really: The Dual Character of the Concept of Law","authors":"Brian Flanagan, Guilherme de Almeida","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09501-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09501-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Disagreement on law’s relationship to morality has long been driven by disagreement about our ordinary concept. Until recently, however, there had been no systematic investigation of lay intuitions. In this paper, we advance this nascent effort. Across two studies (N = 697), our findings reveal that most people consider law to be more than a matter of political circumstance alone. Contrary to the expectations of most contemporary philosophers, morality (both substantive and procedural) emerges as a key influence on judgments of legal validity: many people say that conduct prohibited by immoral statutes is <i>not</i> truly illegal, and that immoral conduct which was never explicitly prohibited <i>is</i> truly illegal. This suggests that people often treat law as a dual character concept that, like the concepts of scientist or of artist, features autonomous concrete and abstract dimensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140625239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Tort Law and Contractualism 侵权法和契约主义
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09498-0
Peter Chau
{"title":"Tort Law and Contractualism","authors":"Peter Chau","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09498-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09498-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>How can tort law be justified? There are well-known difficulties with the three traditional theories of tort law dominating the literature (namely, economic theory, corrective justice theory, and civil recourse theory). Recently, some have turned to moral contractualism in search of tort law’s foundation. One of the most prominent attempts was made by Gregory Keating. Keating’s account, however, has been subjected to powerful objections. In a recent paper, John Oberdiek, through a sympathetic critique of Keating’s account, develops a new version of contractualist tort theory that is alleged to be at once superior to the three traditional theories of tort law and immune to the objections to Keating’s account. The aim of my paper is to critically assess Oberdiek’s account; I will argue that, while Oberdiek’s account does improve upon Keating’s in some important respects, it is ultimately unsatisfactory.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140629263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Finding Leviathan in Hegel: The Private Rule of Law and its Limits 在黑格尔中寻找利维坦：私法规则及其限制
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09497-1
Paul Gowder
{"title":"Finding Leviathan in Hegel: The Private Rule of Law and its Limits","authors":"Paul Gowder","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09497-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09497-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper uses Gerald Postema’s <i>Law’s Rule</i> to take up one of the most controversial questions in rule of law scholarship: whether the ideal can provide the basis for criticizing the state alone, or private individuals and entities exercising power over others as well. An account of the characteristics of states in virtue of which the rule of law licenses control over their power is developed, followed by an examination of some cases in which non-state holders of power over others might take on some of those characteristics. Under such circumstances, there are rule of law reasons to demand state control of private power.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Metaphysics Matters: The Case of Property Law 形而上学为何重要？财产法案例
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-024-09495-3
Ben Ohavi
{"title":"Why Metaphysics Matters: The Case of Property Law","authors":"Ben Ohavi","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09495-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09495-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Are property rights absolute? This paper attempts to reframe this question by drawing on insights from the field of social ontology. My main claim is that, even if we accept the most extreme view of the absoluteness of property rights, there are some non-normative conceptual limitations to these rights. The conceptual limitations are based on two claims about the nature of property rights and their subject matter, namely objects in the world: (1) property law regulates relations between persons through the use of objects, and not relations between persons and objects; (2) even when owned, objects retain some of their ‘independent’, unowned, existence. Taken together, these claims confine property law to the <i>institutional</i> meaning that is given to objects, which is distinct from their <i>social</i> and <i>natural</i> meanings. Since property law defines objects in a certain way, it makes space for other social considerations but without the need to qualify property rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140589884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strong Political Liberalism 强烈的政治自由主义
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-023-09491-z
Henrik D. Kugelberg
{"title":"Strong Political Liberalism","authors":"Henrik D. Kugelberg","doi":"10.1007/s10982-023-09491-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09491-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Public reason liberalism demands that political decisions be publicly justified to the citizens who are subjected to them. Much recent literature emphasises the differences between the two main interpretations of this requirement, justificatory and political liberalism. In this paper, I show that both views share structural democratic deficits. They fail to guarantee political autonomy, the expressive quality of law, and the justification to citizens, because they allow collective decisions made by incompletely theorised agreements. I argue that the result can only be avoided by changing public reason’s role in collective decision-making. Instead of incompletely theorised agreements, we should demand agreement both on the public reasons themselves and on the other premises that justify political decisions. In this way, it is always possible to point to a procedure-independent reason that justifies democratic decisions, and the reasoning of the state is public and contestable. Finally, I explain how this, in turn, implies that only political liberalism can be rescued—by accepting what I will call strong political liberalism. Modifying justificatory liberalism in the necessary way will inevitably open the door to an objectionable form of perfectionism.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139920117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reply to Allen 答复 Allen
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-023-09490-0
Matthew Kotzen
{"title":"Reply to Allen","authors":"Matthew Kotzen","doi":"10.1007/s10982-023-09490-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09490-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139957629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Ownership 公共所有权
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-023-09488-8
Avihay Dorfman
{"title":"Public Ownership","authors":"Avihay Dorfman","doi":"10.1007/s10982-023-09488-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09488-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The two questions I seek to address in these pages are what is public property and why does it matter. Public property, like property more generally, is a powerful legal arrangement of allocating control and use rights with respect to resources. Unlike private property, public property does not establish normative powers with which private individuals can shape their practical affairs in and around social spheres such as housing, work, commerce, and worship. Rather, its distinctive value lies in extending autonomous agency to the construction of public spaces and resources. Public property places individuals in a position of collective self-government, manifested in the following two particular ways: first, expressing the ideas and commitments that the political community as a whole affirms; and second, exerting control over the construction and direction of the resources that make up the environment they occupy.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139769925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Paternalism at a Distance 远距离家长制
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
Law and Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10982-023-09487-9
Jonathan Turner
{"title":"Paternalism at a Distance","authors":"Jonathan Turner","doi":"10.1007/s10982-023-09487-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-023-09487-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I argue that the distance between state and citizen gives state paternalism a <i>pro tanto</i> advantage over paternalism between individuals. <i>Pace</i> Jonathan Quong, the state neither denies nor diminishes my moral status by acting on a justified negative judgment about my rational or volitional capacities. Nor does its failure to paternalize on the basis of detailed information about individuals constitute a source of disrespect. Rather, the <i>less</i> discriminating nature of general legislation both reduces the risk of social stigmatization and avoids a problematic dynamic with the paternalizee. But paternalistic policies may give us reason to be concerned about superiority or contempt in policy-makers towards the citizens at whom they are directed. Governments must remain ‘faceless’ enough for paternalism to operate at a distance, but they must reassure the governed that the judgment that they can do better for them does not conceal the attitude that they are better than them.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139769848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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