{"title":"Why Metaphysics Matters: The Case of Property Law","authors":"Ben Ohavi","doi":"10.1007/s10982-024-09495-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Are property rights absolute? This paper attempts to reframe this question by drawing on insights from the field of social ontology. My main claim is that, even if we accept the most extreme view of the absoluteness of property rights, there are some non-normative conceptual limitations to these rights. The conceptual limitations are based on two claims about the nature of property rights and their subject matter, namely objects in the world: (1) property law regulates relations between persons through the use of objects, and not relations between persons and objects; (2) even when owned, objects retain some of their ‘independent’, unowned, existence. Taken together, these claims confine property law to the <i>institutional</i> meaning that is given to objects, which is distinct from their <i>social</i> and <i>natural</i> meanings. Since property law defines objects in a certain way, it makes space for other social considerations but without the need to qualify property rights.</p>","PeriodicalId":51702,"journal":{"name":"Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-024-09495-3","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Are property rights absolute? This paper attempts to reframe this question by drawing on insights from the field of social ontology. My main claim is that, even if we accept the most extreme view of the absoluteness of property rights, there are some non-normative conceptual limitations to these rights. The conceptual limitations are based on two claims about the nature of property rights and their subject matter, namely objects in the world: (1) property law regulates relations between persons through the use of objects, and not relations between persons and objects; (2) even when owned, objects retain some of their ‘independent’, unowned, existence. Taken together, these claims confine property law to the institutional meaning that is given to objects, which is distinct from their social and natural meanings. Since property law defines objects in a certain way, it makes space for other social considerations but without the need to qualify property rights.
期刊介绍：
Law and Philosophy is a forum for the publication of work in law and philosophy which is of common interest to members of the two disciplines of jurisprudence and legal philosophy. It is open to all approaches in both fields and to work in any of the major legal traditions - common law, civil law, or the socialist tradition. The editors of Law and Philosophy encourage papers which exhibit philosophical reflection on the law informed by a knowledge of the law, and legal analysis informed by philosophical methods and principles.
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