{"title":"The Samaritan’s Curse: moral individuals and immoral groups","authors":"K. Basu","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000067","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I revisit the question of how and in what sense can individuals comprising a group be held responsible for morally reprehensible behaviour by that group. The question is tackled by posing a counterfactual: what would happen if selfish individuals became moral creatures? A game called the Samaritan’s Curse is developed, which sheds light on the dilemma of group moral responsibility, and raises new questions concerning ‘conferred morality’ and self-fulfilling morals, and also forces us to question some implicit assumptions of game-theory.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"132 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000067","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45538573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conscientious objection in firms","authors":"Sandrine Blanc","doi":"10.1017/S026626712000022X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712000022X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article asks whether firms should exempt employees when they object to elements of their work that go against their conscience. Fairness requires that we follow the rules of an organization we have joined voluntarily only if these rules express mutual advantage. In corporations, I argue that subordination and exemption provides for mutual advantage better than subordination plus right of exit. This is because agents want to protect their conscientious convictions, even in hierarchical organizations geared towards efficient preference satisfaction. Thus exemptions should be granted in unforeseeable circumstances, provided the costs are limited.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"222 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026626712000022X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45778137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Life as a Trust Game: a comment on The Option Value of Life","authors":"G. Ponthiere","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000055","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Burri (2020), a major reason why suicide is often irrational lies in the option value of life. Remaining alive is valuable because this allows for a larger menu of options, and the possibility of committing suicide in the future adds further value to the act of remaining alive now. In this note, I represent life as a trust game played by two selves – the young self and the old self – and I argue that the possibility to commit suicide in the future can encourage committing suicide now, against what the theory of the option value of life predicts.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"300 - 308"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000055","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45622216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 1 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0266267121000018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267121000018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0266267121000018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41601027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"EAP volume 37 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s026626712100002x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626712100002x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"b1 - b5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s026626712100002x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46500981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What’s in, what’s out? Towards a rigorous definition of the boundaries of benefit-cost analysis","authors":"Dan Acland","doi":"10.1017/S0266267120000486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000486","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is typically defined as an implementation of the potential Pareto criterion, which requires inclusion of any impact for which individuals have willingness to pay (WTP). This definition is incompatible with the exclusion of impacts such as rights and distributional concerns, for which individuals do have WTP. I propose a new definition: BCA should include only impacts for which consumer sovereignty should govern. This is because WTP implicitly preserves consumer sovereignty, and is thus only appropriate for ‘sovereignty-warranting’ impacts. I compare the high cost of including non-sovereignty-warranting impacts to the relatively low cost of excluding sovereignty-warranting impacts.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"26 11","pages":"34 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267120000486","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41296534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Principle of Merit and the capital-labour split","authors":"Jeppe von Platz","doi":"10.1017/S0266267120000450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000450","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Some meritocratic defenders of capitalism rely on the principle that cooperators should receive a share of the product commensurate with their contribution. However, such defences of capitalism fail due to a dilemma. Either they rely on an understanding of contribution that arguably will be reflected by the capital-labour split in suitably idealized capitalist economies, but cannot serve as a plausible standard of merit; or they rely on an interpretation of contribution that is a plausible standard of merit, but which won’t tend to be reflected by the capital-labour split in capitalist economies.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267120000450","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41987739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning","authors":"H. Duijf","doi":"10.1017/S0266267120000413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267120000413","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"413 - 440"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267120000413","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43624122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Good reasons for losers: lottery justification and social risk","authors":"Kai P. Spiekermann","doi":"10.1017/S0266267121000043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267121000043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many goods are distributed by processes that involve randomness. In lotteries, randomness is used to promote fairness. When taking social risks, randomness is a feature of the process. The losers of such decisions ought to be given a reason why they should accept the outcome. Surprisingly, good reasons demand more than merely equal ex ante chances. What is also required is a true statement of the form: ‘the result could easily have gone the other way and you could have been the winner’. This rules in standard lotteries but rules out many lotteries based on merely epistemic probability.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"38 1","pages":"108 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0266267121000043","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43620609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price gouging and the duty of easy rescue","authors":"Elizabeth Brake","doi":"10.1017/S026626712000036X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626712000036X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What, if anything, is wrong with price gouging? Its defenders argue that it increases supply of scarce necessities; critics argue that it is exploitative, inequitable and vicious. In this paper, I argue for its moral wrongness and legal prohibition, without relying on charges of exploitation, inequity or poor character. What is fundamentally wrong with price gouging is that it violates a duty of easy rescue. While legal enforcement of such duties is controversial, a special case can be made for their legal enforcement in this context. This account distinguishes, morally, price gouging by corporations from that of individual entrepreneurs.","PeriodicalId":51643,"journal":{"name":"Economics and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"329 - 352"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S026626712000036X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45910830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}