Social Epistemology最新文献

{"title":"Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility: Mutually Supporting Virtues","authors":"Jonathan Matheson","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRecently, more attention has been paid to the nature and value of the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy. One underexplored issue concerns how epistemic autonomy is related to other intellectual virtues. Plausibly, epistemic autonomy is closely related to a number of intellectual virtues like curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual perseverance and intellectual courage to name just a few. Here, however, I will examine the relation between epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility. I will argue that epistemic autonomy and intellectual humility bear an interesting relationship to one another in that they are interconnected and mutually supporting intellectual virtues. In Sections 2 and 3 I will provide a brief overview of the predominant accounts of intellectual humility (Section 2) and epistemic autonomy (Section 3) in the literature. With an understanding of these intellectual virtues in hand, we will examine their relationship of mutual support in Section 4. Section 5 will explore a challenge to this relationship coming from the epistemology of disagreement, and Section 6 concludes.KEYWORDS: Intellectual humilityepistemic autonomyintellectual virtuedisagreement Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Ebels-Duggan (Citation2014), Grasswick (Citation2018), Matheson and Lougheed (Citation2021), Roberts and Wood (Citation2007), and Zagzebski (Citation2013, Citation2015).2. However, see Wright (Citationforthcoming).3. See also Roberts and Cleveland (Citation2016) and Tangney (Citation2009) for similar accounts.4. See also Porter and Schumann (Citation2018).5. Samuelson et al. (Citation2015) have a similar view. They characterize intellectual humility as ‘holding a belief with the merited firmness’ and as ‘believing in accordance with the evidence without claiming to know more (or less) than what the evidence merits’. A somewhat similar view is defended by Alan Hazlett (Citation2012). Hazlett’s view concerns proper meta-beliefs. On his account, intellectual humility is ‘a disposition not to adopt epistemically improper higher-order epistemic attitudes, and to adopt (in the right way, in the right situations) epistemically proper higher-order attitudes’ (220). See also Gregg and Mahadevan (Citation2014) who see intellectual humility as a realistic assessment of one’s epistemic capabilities and Lavelock et al. (Citation2017) who claim that intellectual humility, ‘involves having an accurate view of self, evidenced by honest self-evaluation and willingness to accept one’s strengths and weaknesses’.6. Battaly notes that a deficiency of intellectual interdependence need not come with an excess of epistemic autonomy. Instead, subjects may simply give up on projects whenever it would be appropriate to think with others.7. Nathan King (Citation2021) also gives an account of the virtue of epistemic autonomy along these same lines. According to King, epistemic autonomy requires thinking ","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135864102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Epistemic Inclusion as the Key to Benefiting from Cognitive Diversity in Science","authors":"Vlasta Sikimić","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2258831","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2258831","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout scientific history, there have been cases of mainstream science dismissing novel ideas of less prominent researchers. Nowadays, many researchers with different social and academic backgrounds, origins and gender identities work together on topics of crucial importance. Still, it is questionable whether the privileged groups consider the views of underprivileged colleagues with sufficient attention. To profit from the diversity of thoughts, the scientific community first has to be open to minority viewpoints and epistemically include them in mainstream research. Moreover, the idea of inclusive science poses stronger requirements than the paradigm of open science. We argue that the concept of integration of different opinions is insufficient because the process of integration assumes adjusting oneself to the majority view and fitting into the dominant paradigm while contributing only with smaller amendments. Epistemic inclusion, on the other hand, means dynamically changing the research paradigm during the interaction with diverse methods and hypotheses. The process of inclusion preserves marginalized views and increases epistemic justice.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135864980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"No-Regret Learning Supports Voters’ Competence","authors":"Petr Spelda, Vit Stritecky, John Symons","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2252763","url":null,"abstract":"Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intra-Group Epistemic Injustice: Jewish Identity, Whiteness, and Zionism","authors":"Dana Grabelsky","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2245773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2245773","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this paper, I work towards a conceptualization of a new form of epistemic injustice – one that occurs within groups, as opposed to across groups – which I call ‘intra-group epistemic injustice’. Specifically, I focus on a case that occurs within the Jewish community, regarding what I and others see as the silencing of anti-Zionist Jews by Zionist Jews, via a conflation of Jewish identity with Zionism. Anti-Zionist Jews are accused by Zionist Jews of being ‘self-hating Jews’ or perhaps not even Jews at all, and as such, the former’s contributions to discussions of what it means to be Jewish are preemptively disregarded by the latter. Consequently, the harm of this epistemic injustice is that it effectively issues a denial of one’s identity as a Jew, which may amount to a nearly complete denial of one’s self.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticesocial identityJudaism, Zionism Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Even its categorization as a religion is subject to debate. See Leora Batnitzsky, ‘How Judaism Became a Religion’ (2011).2. Except perhaps in the case of Black American Jews, for whom the memory of slavery is much more recent.3. This internalization of stereotypes plays an important role in Tobi’s (Citation2023) parallel account of intra-group epistemic injustice as well. While we approach the concept from different perspectives (mine Jewish, and his post-colonial), there are important similarities, like the internalization of stereotypes just mentioned, which are worth analyzing in future writing on this subject.4. Another problematic source of support for Israel comes from evangelical Christian Zionists, who are only instrumentally invested in the Jews’ return to Israel to the extent that it fulfills the biblical prophecy required for the return of Christ. It is debatable whether this is a true instance of philosemitism, but I would argue that it functions similarly.5. I’m speaking here of political Zionism specifically, though of course there were other emergent strands of Zionist thought that did not require the establishment of a Jewish state, for which I do not have the space to go into here.6. Patricia Cohen, ‘Outspoken Political Scientist Denied Tenure at DePaul’, The New York Times, June 11, 2007.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDana GrabelskyDana Grabelsky is a doctoral candidate in philosophy at CUNY Graduate Center. She works primarily in social and political philosophy, with a focus on related issues in social epistemology and philosophy of language. Additionally, she has interests in philosophy of art (bad movies in particular).","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136072989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Other Oriented Hermeneutical Injustice, Affected Ignorance, or Human Ignorance?","authors":"J. M. Dieterle","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2248044","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTPaul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case.KEYWORDS: Epistemic injusticehermeneutical injusticeepistemology of ignorancenon-human animals Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.Notes1. As Medina notes, Fricker acknowledges performatively-based epistemic injustices in (Citation2007, 160).2. Lopez (Citationforthcoming) argues that although non-human animals cannot be the subjects of testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, they can be the subjects of another kind of epistemic injustice. Lopez focuses on skill or ‘know-how’ knowledge, which both human and non-human animals possess. Non-human animals have interests in acquiring true beliefs about their environment, other members of their species, etc., and when this acquisition is disrupted, they can suffer from epistemic injustice. Lopez argues that this kind of epistemic injustice does not require that one must be invested in being recognized as a knower. Thus the harm here will be decidedly different from that Fricker discusses.3. Since I am attempting to determine whether Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice can be expanded to include other-oriented hermeneutical injustice, I use Fricker’s account of what it means to be harmed in one’s capacity as a knower. But see Lopez (Citationforthcoming) for an argument that there are kinds of epistemic injustice that do not require that one be invested in being recognized as a knower. Importantly, hermeneutical injustice is not one of them.4. Mills notes that white ignorance is not confined to whites. See (Citation2007, 22ff).5. There are connections between white ignorance and testimonial injustice, too. Testimonial injustices can be the result of the biases and misunderstandings that are endemic to white ignorance.6. The case is based on Enduring Love, a novel by Ian McEwen.7. In Fricker (Citation2016), Fricker discusses the differences between white ignorance and hermeneutical injustice. She argues that there are two primary differences: (1) white ignorance is usually epistemically culpable but hermeneutical injustice is not; (2) white ignorance does not generally involve a lack of concepts, but hermeneutical in","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136072672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cognitive Diversity or Cognitive Polarization? On Epistemic Democracy in a Post-Truth World","authors":"Esther K. H. Ng","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2248926","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2248926","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Pessimism over a democracy’s ability to produce good outcomes is as longstanding as democracy itself. On one hand, democratic theorists consider democracy to be the only legitimate form of government on the basis that it alone promotes or safeguards intrinsic values like freedom, equality, and justice. On the other, skepticism toward the ordinary citizen’s cognitive capacities remains a perennial concern. Qualms about the epistemic value of democracy have only been made more pertinent by a fundamental problem of deep epistemic disagreement which underlies the post-truth phenomenon. I argue that the democratic theorists who have sought to defend democracy on epistemic grounds have thus far neglected such deep and intractable disagreements. Without addressing this oversight, the epistemic democrat will find that collective decision-making processes quickly become paralyzed and will not be able to yield the epistemic benefits they promise. Hence, the work for epistemic democrats is to recognize and take into account the ramifications of epistemic disagreements so as to make a stronger case for epistemic democracy.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43380029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Limited Role of Social Sciences and Humanities in Interdisciplinary Funding: What are Its Effects?","authors":"Anita Välikangas","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2245769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2245769","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48216693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Human Prejudice is so Persistent: A Predictive Coding Analysis","authors":"Tzu-wei Hung","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2237942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2237942","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although the relationship between prejudice and predictive coding has attracted more attention recently, many important issues remain to be investigated, such as why prejudice is so persistent and how to accommodate seemingly conflicting studies. In this paper, we offer an integrated framework to explain the functional-computational mechanism of prejudice. We argue that this framework better explains (i) why prejudice is somewhat immune to revision, (ii) how inconsistent processing (e.g. one’s moral belief and biased emotional reaction) may occur, (iii) the dispute over the content of ‘alief’ (unconscious belief), and (iv) conflicting data reported in disinformation studies. Finally, we briefly review the main intervention strategies and offer recommendations.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48868264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"‘Islamic Epistemology’ in a Modern Context: Anatomy of an Evolving Debate","authors":"Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky, M. Moniruzzaman","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2227945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2227945","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48406407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reflexive Research Practice in Women’s Prison Research in Uganda","authors":"M. Kiconco","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2023.2237921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2237921","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43849136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}