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Journal of Theoretical Politics最新文献

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Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters 多维政治中的信息化竞选：天真选民的作用
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-12-06 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061153
Satoshi Kasamatsu, Daiki Kishishita
{"title":"Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters","authors":"Satoshi Kasamatsu, Daiki Kishishita","doi":"10.1177/09516298211061153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061153","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to investigate the possibility that electoral campaigning transmits truthful information in a situation where campaigning has a direct persuasive effect on a subset of the electorate called “naïve voters.” To this end, we construct a multi-sender signaling game in which an incumbent and a challenger decide whether to focus on policy or ability in electoral campaigning, and a media outlet then decides whether to gather news. Voters are divided into sophisticated and naïve voters. We demonstrate that a candidate's strategy regarding their issues of focus (campaign messages) can signal his or her private information. Specifically, negative campaigning against the incumbent's ability signals the incumbent's low ability in all separating equilibria. It is also noteworthy that separating equilibria exist only when sophisticated and naïve voters coexist. This implies that a fraction of naïve voters has a non-monotonic effect on the possibility of transmitting truthful information.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"78 - 106"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43257987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage 客户主义与发展：选票购买与赞助
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-10-16 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061515
V. Shchukin, Cemal Eren Arbatlı
{"title":"Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage","authors":"V. Shchukin, Cemal Eren Arbatlı","doi":"10.1177/09516298211061515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211061515","url":null,"abstract":"Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"34 1","pages":"3 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44308858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare 论行政和立法权力的分离：行政独立、自由和社会福利
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211043234
J. Fox, Mattias Polborn
{"title":"On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare","authors":"J. Fox, Mattias Polborn","doi":"10.1177/09516298211043234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043234","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"430 - 454"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46254663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Solving the guardianship dilemma by war 通过战争解决监护困境
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-09-27 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211043235
Jacque Gao
{"title":"Solving the guardianship dilemma by war","authors":"Jacque Gao","doi":"10.1177/09516298211043235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043235","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a new theory of how dictators can solve the guardianship dilemma. I study a dynamic game to show that the dictator may build a large army and deal with the guardianship dilemma by resorting to international conflicts. Specifically, when a military revolt is imminent, the dictator can obtain enough resources to buy off the military by attacking and ultimately defeating his international opponent. The framework thus shows that a weakly institutionalized polity may either have a small military or have a large military and be more aggressive on the international stage.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"455 - 474"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42694644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Indirect accountability of political appointees 政治任命人员的间接问责
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211027229
Christopher Li
{"title":"Indirect accountability of political appointees","authors":"Christopher Li","doi":"10.1177/09516298211027229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211027229","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the indirect accountability of political appointees. The appointee’s quality is uncertain, and voters hold the politician accountable for the appointee’s performance. The politician has better information about the appointee than voters do, but electoral concerns induce the politician to make inefficient retention decisions. Specifically, there is over-retention of appointees relative to the social optimum. If the quality of candidates for appointment is low, then improving the pool of candidates can help reduce distortions and, in fact, it is in the interest of the politician to do so. I also show that more public information about the appointee reduces over-retention.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"383 - 396"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211027229","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46376854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Biased politicians and independent agencies 有偏见的政客和独立机构
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-04-13 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211003129
Amy Pond
{"title":"Biased politicians and independent agencies","authors":"Amy Pond","doi":"10.1177/09516298211003129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211003129","url":null,"abstract":"Some agencies derive legitimacy from their political independence: for example, political meddling in monetary policy is problematic, as politicians favor short-term electoral goals over long-term economic stability. Nevertheless, the process of agency reform, even for agencies that are thought to be independent, is seldom onerous and often follows standard legislative procedures. Furthermore, citizens frequently lack expertise to hold policymakers accountable for new bureaucratic policies. Why then do politicians abstain from exercising influence through agency reform? This article delineates an informational cost to agency reform. In issue areas where politicians are frequently biased and citizens cannot perfectly observe the quality of agency reforms, citizens assume that reforms serve the politicians’ self-interest and punish politicians for any reform at all. Agency independence then comes more from informational challenges than from institutional design. This article develops a formal model to explain when agencies are reformed and when they retain their independence.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"279 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211003129","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44635655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Poor people’s beliefs and the dynamics of clientelism 穷人的信仰和庇护主义的动态
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-04-13 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211003661
Miquel Pellicer, E. Wegner, Lindsay J. Benstead, Ellen Lust
{"title":"Poor people’s beliefs and the dynamics of clientelism","authors":"Miquel Pellicer, E. Wegner, Lindsay J. Benstead, Ellen Lust","doi":"10.1177/09516298211003661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211003661","url":null,"abstract":"Why do some poor people engage in clientelism whereas others do not? Why does clientelism sometimes take traditional forms and sometimes more instrumental forms? We propose a formal model of clientelism that addresses these questions focusing primarily on the citizen’s perspective. Citizens choose between supporting broad-based redistribution or engaging in clientelism. Introducing insights from social psychology, we study the interactions between citizen beliefs and values, and their political choices. Clientelism, political inefficacy, and inequality legitimation beliefs reinforce each other leading to multiple equilibria. One of these resembles traditional clientelism, with disempowered clients that legitimize social inequalities. Community connectivity breaks this reinforcement mechanism and leads to another equilibrium where clientelism takes a modern, instrumental, form. The model delivers insights on the role of citizen beliefs for their bargaining power as well as for the persistence and transformation of clientelism. We illustrate the key mechanisms with ethnographic literature on the topic.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"300 - 332"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211003661","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47246964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Skill, power and marginal contribution in committees 技能、权力和委员会的边际贡献
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984849
Ruth Ben-Yashar, S. Nitzan, Tomoya Tajika
{"title":"Skill, power and marginal contribution in committees","authors":"Ruth Ben-Yashar, S. Nitzan, Tomoya Tajika","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984849","url":null,"abstract":"Power is an important basic concept in Political Science and Economics. Applying an extended version of the uncertain dichotomous choice model proposed, the objective of this paper is to clarify the relationship between two different types of power a voter may have: skill-dependent (s-d) power and marginal contribution (mc). It is then shown that, under the optimal committee decision rule, inequality in skills may result in higher inequality of the two types of power and that the distribution of the second type of power (mc) can be even more unequal than the distribution of the first type of s-d power. Using simulations, and assuming evenly spread skills, this possibility is proved to be robust. The significance of the finding is due to the effect of power on reward, whether it is defined in terms of status or in terms of monetary payment.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"225 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984849","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45121749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics 身份政治下的选举竞争
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984847
Leyla D. Karakas, Devashish Mitra
{"title":"Electoral competition in the presence of identity politics","authors":"Leyla D. Karakas, Devashish Mitra","doi":"10.1177/0951629820984847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984847","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of cultural identity on electoral and policy outcomes when voters are “behavioral.” Building on the evidence that voters assess political or economic events through the lens of their partisan identifications, we analyze an election between two office-motivated candidates in which voters over-reward or under-punish the candidate that shares their cultural identity. Focusing on issues with cultural as well as distributional implications for voters such as immigration and the cultural divide based on nativism as the source of identity politics, we find that the candidates’ equilibrium policies are always preferred by the electorally dominant cultural group to the policy that would be optimal if policies only had distributional consequences. We also show that candidates do not necessarily target their own cultural bases in equilibrium. Furthermore, stronger identity politics increases policy polarization. Our findings contribute to the debates on the decoupling of voting behavior from economic interests, and the rise of immigration, trade protectionism, or engagement with global governing institutions as electoral issues that can shift historical voting patterns.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"169 - 197"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629820984847","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46435495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Erratum to ‘Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats’ “不要孵化信使”的勘误?论限制官僚政治活动的可取性
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/09516298211003127
Jean Guillaume Forand, Gergely Ujhelyi
{"title":"Erratum to ‘Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats’","authors":"Jean Guillaume Forand, Gergely Ujhelyi","doi":"10.1177/09516298211003127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211003127","url":null,"abstract":"Erratum to ‘Don’t hatch the messenger? On the desirability of restricting the political activity of bureaucrats’ by Jean Guillaume Forand (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada) and Gergely Ujhelyi (Department of Economics, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA). Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics 2021, Vol. 33(1) 95139, https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0951629820984848. The article was first published online January 19, 2021. SAGE Publishing regrets that the following errors were introduced by the publisher during the copy-editing process.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"33 1","pages":"274 - 276"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/09516298211003127","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42720841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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