政治任命人员的间接问责

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI:10.1177/09516298211027229

Christopher Li

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文探讨了政治任命人员的间接问责制。被任命者的素质是不确定的，选民要求政治家对被任命者的表现负责。政治家比选民更了解被任命者，但选举的考虑促使政治家做出低效的留任决定。具体来说，相对于社会最优，被任命者的保留过多。如果候选人的素质较低，那么增加候选人的数量可以帮助减少扭曲现象，事实上，这样做符合政治家的利益。我还表明，关于被任命者的更多公开信息可以减少过度留任。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Indirect accountability of political appointees

This paper explores the indirect accountability of political appointees. The appointee’s quality is uncertain, and voters hold the politician accountable for the appointee’s performance. The politician has better information about the appointee than voters do, but electoral concerns induce the politician to make inefficient retention decisions. Specifically, there is over-retention of appointees relative to the social optimum. If the quality of candidates for appointment is low, then improving the pool of candidates can help reduce distortions and, in fact, it is in the interest of the politician to do so. I also show that more public information about the appointee reduces over-retention.

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来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.