International Interactions最新文献

{"title":"Making sense of violence in semi-technologized conventional civil war: Evidence from nineteenth-century Japan","authors":"Y. Kubota, Gaku Ito, Masataka Harada","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2180501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2180501","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While existing studies highlight features of violence in conventional civil wars, they overlook how war technology is linked to the tactics of armed forces. To shed light on the understudied phenomenon of semi-technologized regular forces in a civil war, this article explores why and how violence is executed by such forces. To do so, we examine patterns of violence in the Boshin War that took place in Japan between 1868 and 1869. Our analyses of novel geocoded event data demonstrate that violent incidents occurred in strategically important locations but in ways that differed from conventional and guerrilla wars. Armed forces were unable to operate as technologically sophisticated forces do in modern conventional civil war due to limited logistics capabilities. Avoiding encounters in less accessible areas, the forces tended to fight in and contest areas that allowed them to establish relationships with local civilians. Additionally, violence against civilians was more likely to occur on the front lines where armed forces and civilians interacted because the former relied on the latter to convey provisions, arms, and ammunition. Unlike in conventional civil wars, military battles and one-sided violence were not unrelated to each other. With these findings, we address temporal, regional, and typological biases in civil war studies. Si bien los estudios existentes enfatizan las características de la violencia en las guerras civiles convencionales, estos estudios pasan por alto cómo se vincula la tecnología de guerra con las tácticas de las fuerzas armadas. Este artículo analiza, con el fin de arrojar luz sobre el poco estudiado fenómeno de las fuerzas regulares «semi-tecnologizadas» en una guerra civil, por qué y de qué manera estas fuerzas ejercen esta violencia. Para ello, estudiamos los patrones de violencia en la Guerra Boshin que tuvo lugar en Japón entre 1868 y 1869. Los análisis que realizamos de nuevos datos de eventos geocodificados demuestran que los incidentes violentos tuvieron lugar en lugares estratégicamente importantes, pero de maneras que diferían de las guerras convencionales y de las guerras de guerrillas. Las fuerzas armadas no pudieron operar de la misma manera que lo harían las fuerzas tecnológicamente sofisticadas en la guerra civil convencional moderna debido a las limitadas capacidades logísticas. Las fuerzas armadas evitaban encuentros en áreas menos accesibles y tendían a luchar y a disputar áreas que les permitieran establecer relaciones con civiles locales. Además, era más probable que la violencia contra civiles tuviera lugar en las líneas del frente donde las fuerzas armadas y los civiles interactuaban debido a que las fuerzas armadas dependían de los civiles para transportar provisiones, armas y municiones. En contraposición a las guerras civiles convencionales, las batallas militares y la violencia unilateral no eran independientes una de la otra. Con estas conclusiones, abordamos los sesgos temporales, regi","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"401 - 423"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42909566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"IMF: International Migration Fund","authors":"Merih Angin, Albana Shehaj, Adrian J. Shin","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2172002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2172002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Existing models of international organizations focus on the strategic and commercial interests of major shareholders to explain why some countries secure better deals from international organizations. Focusing on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that the Fund’s major shareholders pressure the IMF to minimize short-term adjustment costs in the borrowing country when they host a large number of the country’s nationals. Stringent loan packages often exacerbate short-term economic distress in the borrowing country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Analyzing all IMF programs from 1978 to 2014, we assess our hypothesis that IMF borrowers with larger diasporas in the major IMF shareholder countries tend to secure better arrangements from the IMF. Our findings show that when migration pressures on the G5 countries increase, borrowing countries receive larger loan disbursements and fewer conditions. Los modelos existentes de organizaciones internacionales se centran en los intereses estratégicos y comerciales de los principales accionistas para explicar por qué algunos países obtienen mejores tratos por parte de las organizaciones internacionales. Centrándonos en el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), argumentamos que los principales accionistas del Fondo presionan al FMI para que minimice los costes de ajuste a corto plazo en el país prestatario cuando acogen a un gran número de ciudadanos de ese país. Los severos paquetes de préstamos suelen exacerbar las dificultades económicas a corto plazo en el país prestatario, lo que a su vez provoca que más personas emigren a países donde residen otros de sus compatriotas. Analizando todos los programas del FMI desde 1978 hasta 2014, evaluamos nuestra hipótesis de que los prestatarios del FMI con mayores diásporas en los principales países accionistas del FMI tienden a obtener mejores acuerdos por parte del FMI. Nuestras conclusiones muestran que cuando aumentan las presiones migratorias en los países del G5, los países prestatarios reciben mayores desembolsos de préstamos y con menos condiciones. Les modèles actuels d’organisations internationales se focalisent sur les intérêts stratégiques et commerciaux des actionnaires majoritaires pour expliquer pourquoi certains pays obtiennent de meilleurs accords auprès des organisations internationales. En nous concentrant sur le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), nous affirmons que ses actionnaires majoritaires appliquent une certaine pression pour réduire les coûts d’ajustement à court terme du pays emprunteur, quand un grand nombre de ressortissants de ce pays vit chez eux. Les prêts aux conditions strictes aggravent souvent la détresse économique à court terme dans le pays emprunteur. Cette situation renforce ensuite fréquemment l’immigration vers les pays où des compatriotes résident. Après l’analyse de tous les programmes du FMI de 1978 à 2014, nous évaluons notre hypothèse : quand le","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"86 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46717136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations","authors":"L. Ferry","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2156996","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2156996","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How do indebted governments restructure their debts with private creditors? What explains variation in indebted states’ negotiating behavior? Existing explanations of debt restructuring have largely treated creditors as a profit-maximizing monolith; Yet creditors have different exposures, ties to borrowers, and roles in the international banking system. Inter-creditor disputes are common. In this paper, I argue that because institutional norms dictate burden sharing, the makeup of the creditor group matters for indebted states’ negotiating behavior. The requirement of near-consensus decision-making allows almost any creditor to hold up negotiations. It limits the outcome to what the most reluctant creditors will agree to. Debtor governments are aware of compositional issues and where coordination is most difficult ex-ante, they can use more coercive behaviors to bring reluctant creditors into the fold. I focus on publicly issued declarations of default as one such tool. Using existing data on public moratoriums alongside original data on creditor composition, I find that governments are more likely to publicly announce default as the number of creditors involved in a restructuring increases. The findings imply that who the government is bargaining against matters to how they choose to bargain.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"31 - 58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59365516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"High-level visit and national security policy: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Taiwan","authors":"A. Wang, Charles K. S. Wu, Yao‐Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2162512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2162512","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Great powers often use high-level visits to reassure weaker states. The literature on public diplomacy shows that these visits can bring a number of advantages while overlooking their potential impact on increasing support for the great power’s security agenda and confidence in the host country’s defense policy and military. This note employed a quasi-experiment in Taiwan, in which three high-profile US Senators visited Taiwan unexpectedly during a one-week national survey (n = 1,500) in June 2021. Propensity score matching and regression discontinuity analysis showed that the visit significantly increased Taiwanese respondents’ confidence in their own military, the government’s security policy, and support for the security policy favored by the US (strengthening the Taiwanese military). Limitations, scope conditions, and suggestions for future work were also discussed. Las grandes potencias suelen utilizar las visitas de alto nivel para tranquilizar a los Estados más débiles. La literatura sobre diplomacia pública muestra que estas visitas pueden aportar una serie de ventajas, al tiempo que pasa por alto su impacto potencial en el aumento del apoyo a la agenda de seguridad de la gran potencia y de la confianza en la política de defensa y el ejército del país anfitrión. Esta nota empleó un cuasi-experimento en Taiwán, en el que tres senadores estadounidenses de alto perfil visitaron Taiwán inesperadamente durante una encuesta nacional de una semana (n = 1500) en junio de 2021. El pareamiento por puntaje de propensión y el análisis de regresión discontinua mostraron que la visita aumentó significativamente la confianza de los encuestados taiwaneses en su propio ejército, la política de seguridad del gobierno y el apoyo a la política de seguridad propugnada por Estados Unidos (fortalecimiento del ejército taiwanés). También se debatieron las limitaciones, las condiciones del ámbito de aplicación y las sugerencias para futuros trabajos. Généralement, les grandes puissances emploient les visites officielles pour réassurer les États plus faibles. La littérature sur la diplomatie politique montre que ces visites peuvent apporter quantité d’avantages, mais omet l’effet potentiel de renforcement du soutien au programme de sécurité de la grande puissance et de la confiance dans la politique de défense et l’armée du pays hôte. Cette note s’appuie sur une quasi-expérience à Taïwan, au cours de laquelle trois importants sénateurs américains ont effectué une visite inattendue à Taïwan, lors d’un sondage national d’une semaine (n = 1 500) en juin 2021. L’appariement sur le score de propension et l’analyse de la régression sur discontinuité ont montré que la visite a fortement renforcé la confiance des Taïwanais interrogés en leur propre armée, la politique de sécurité du gouvernement et le soutien à la politique de sécurité que préféraient les États-Unis (renforcement de l’armée taïwanaise). Nous nous sommes également intéressés aux limites, aux condi","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"132 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42823138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Repression and backlash protests: Why leader arrests backfire","authors":"F. Schulte, C. Steinert","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2149513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2149513","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study investigates how different targets of state-sanctioned arrests shape the likelihood of collective action. We hypothesize that leader arrests are especially likely to result in backlash protests. Leader arrests symbolize the suppression of social collectives, they create collective grievances, and constitute focal points for mobilization. Building on a global sample of arrests of cultural identity group members, we qualitatively traced for each arrest whether it sparked a backlash protest. Drawing on coarsened exact matched models, we find that protests are significantly more likely following leader arrests. In contrast, mass arrests are not significantly linked to backlash protests. Additional tests show that organizational membership does not drive this findings, whereas the symbolic value of leaders is linked to protest outbreaks. Our findings cast doubt on the narrow focus on quasi-constant structural variables and make the case for the disaggregation of repression and the importance of triggering events.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42264427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sanctions, aid, and voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly","authors":"David Lektzian, G. Biglaiser","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2155151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2155151","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper investigates the effects of U.S. economic sanctions on UN General Assembly voting patterns. Using panel data for 123 developing countries from 1990 to 2014, and employing an instrumental variables approach to account for potential endogeneity, we find that U.S.-imposed sanctions generally lead to a decline in voting coincidence between the U.S. and target countries when the sanctioned country receives low U.S. aid. However, in instances where the U.S. sanctions countries dependent on U.S. foreign aid, we find targets are increasingly more likely to vote with the U.S. This is because sanctions send a credible signal of the U.S.’s willingness to carry out punishment and cancel future aid to countries that publicly oppose it. Our research shows how sanctions alone tend to pull countries apart while, together with aid dependence, have the potential to bring countries in line with the U.S.’s position on issues, adding nuance to the sanctions literature. Este artículo investiga los efectos de las sanciones económicas por parte de Estados Unidos en los patrones de voto de la Asamblea General de la ONU. Utilizando datos de panel de 123 países en vías de desarrollo entre 1990 y 2014, y empleando un enfoque de variables instrumentales para tener en consideración la posible endogeneidad, comprobamos que las sanciones impuestas por Estados Unidos conllevan generalmente una disminución de la coincidencia de votos entre Estados Unidos y los países objetivo cuando el país sancionado recibe poca ayuda por parte de Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, en los casos en los que Estados Unidos impone sanciones a los países que dependen de la ayuda exterior estadounidense, observamos que los países objetivo son cada vez más propensos a votar conforme a Estados Unidos. Esto se debe a que las sanciones envían una señal creíble de la voluntad de Estados Unidos de llevar a cabo un castigo y cancelar la ayuda futura a los países que se les oponen públicamente. Nuestra investigación muestra cómo las sanciones por sí solas tienden a separar a los países, mientras que, junto con la dependencia de la ayuda, tienen el potencial de hacer que los países se alineen con la posición de Estados Unidos respecto a determinados temas, lo que añade matices a la literatura sobre las sanciones. Le présent article s’intéresse aux effets des sanctions économiques des États-Unis sur les schémas de vote de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies. À l’aide de données de panel de 123 pays en voie de développement entre 1990 et 2014 et de la méthode des variables instrumentales pour prendre en compte la potentielle endogénéité, nous observons que les sanctions imposées par les États-Unis conduisent généralement à une baisse de la coïncidence des votes entre les États-Unis et les pays cibles quand le pays sanctionné reçoit peu d’aides américaines. Néanmoins, quand les pays sanctionnés par les États-Unis dépendent de l’aide financière américaine, nous remarquons que les cibles ont plus s","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"59 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41856828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Strong, the Weak, and the Honored: Examining the decline in honored alliances post-1945","authors":"Soyoung Lee","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2135513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2135513","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The rate at which states defend their allies in war has dropped from 81% during 1816–1944 to 7% in 1945–2016. I attribute the decline in honored alliances to a dramatic shift in the military capability of alliances. Contrary to the popular belief that alliances have become stronger after 1945, I find that the post-1945 international system also witnessed a significant increase in the number of weaker alliances. This bimodal distribution of alliances produced a pattern where alliances were either violated upon being attacked or never attacked in the first place, leading to a decline in the rate at which alliances were honored. I support my argument using alliance data over two centuries. This research advances our understanding of military alliances by documenting a polarization of alliances in terms of their military capability post-1945 and by providing an explanation for an empirical puzzle—a sharp decline in the rate of honored alliances after 1945. El porcentaje en que los Estados defienden a sus aliados en una guerra ha descendido del 81% durante el periodo de 1816-1944 al 7% durante el periodo de 1945-2016. Atribuimos el deterioro de las alianzas de honor a un cambio drástico en la capacidad militar de las alianzas. En contra de la creencia popular de que las alianzas se han fortalecido después de 1945, observamos que el sistema internacional posterior a 1945 también ha sido testigo de un aumento significativo del número de alianzas más débiles. Esta distribución bimodal de las alianzas produjo un patrón en el que las alianzas fueron vulneradas al ser atacadas o nunca llegaron a ser atacadas, lo que condujo a un descenso en la tasa de cumplimiento de las alianzas. Apoyamos nuestro argumento en los datos sobre las alianzas a lo largo de dos siglos. Esta investigación profundiza nuestra comprensión de las alianzas militares al documentar una polarización de las alianzas en términos de su capacidad militar después de 1945 y al proporcionar una explicación para un rompecabezas empírico: una fuerte disminución en la tasa de alianzas de honor después de 1945. Le taux auquel les États défendent leurs alliés lors de guerres est passé de 81 % durant la période 1816-1944 à 7 % de 1945 à 2016. J’attribue ce déclin du respect des alliances à un changement radical de leurs capacités militaires. Contrairement à la croyance populaire selon laquelle les alliances se sont renforcées depuis 1945, selon moi, le système international a depuis cette date été le témoin d’une augmentation importante des alliances plus fragiles. Cette distribution bimodale des alliances a généré un schéma dans lequel les alliances étaient soit violées lors d’attaques, soit ne subissaient jamais d’attaques, ce qui a conduit à une diminution du taux de respect des alliances. J’étaye mon propos à l’aide de données sur les alliances collectées durant plus de deux siècles. Cet article de recherche vise à affiner notre compréhension des alliances militaires, en documentant une ","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"114 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46537997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introducing the Warring-States Japan Battle Data","authors":"N. Anderson","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2149514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2149514","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article introduces the “Warring-States Japan Battle Data,” a new dataset covering 2,889 battles occurring within Japan during its Warring-States period, from 1467 to 1600. The dataset contains fifteen variables covering various features of the battles, including the date, location, participants, initiators, and victors, among others. This article introduces the sources of the data, describes the collection procedures and coding rules, presents basic descriptive statistics of key variables of interest, and applies the battle data to an important question in the political violence and international relations literature: whether conflict “contagiously” diffuses across time and space. The data introduced here should be of interest to scholars of international relations, civil conflict, early modern East Asia, and Japanese history, among others.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"147 - 162"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44111978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local competitive authoritarianism and post-conflict violence. An analysis of the assassination of social leaders in Colombia","authors":"Juan Albarracín, Juan Pablo Milanese, I. H. Valencia, Jonas Wolff","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross-sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout—that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts. La amenaza de la continuación de la violencia es una de las principales preocupaciones en las sociedades en posconflicto. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre la violencia en el posconflicto analizando un fenómeno específico que ha caracterizado a Colombia desde la firma del acuerdo de paz de 2016: el asesinato de líderes sociales. Partiendo de las explicaciones que enfatizan la debilidad del Estado, las economías ilícitas y el papel de los actores armados ilegales, argumentamos que el asesinato de líderes sociales también responde a los esfuerzos de las élites locales para sostener los órdenes autoritarios competitivos locales frente a las amenazas a su poder por parte de los actores sociopolíticos movilizados en torno a la implementación local del acuerdo de paz. Utilizando un conjunto de datos de municipios colombianos, observamos que los asesinatos de líderes sociales son más probables y más frecuentes en municipios con niveles intermedios de fragmentación partidista y bajos niveles de participación electoral, es decir, en municipios con competencia electoral restringida. Además, se correlaciona una mayor proporción de votos a los partidos de izquierda, un indicador de la presencia de contendientes a las élites locales, con una mayor probabilidad de que ocurran asesinatos, así como un mayor número de casos. Como conclusión, este artículo sugiere que la naturaleza de los órdenes políticos locales constituye una dimensión clave que determina las microdinámicas de la violencia y la represión en contextos de posconflicto. Le risque de la poursuite des violences est une préoccupat","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"49 1","pages":"237 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42231972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reputation or interaction: What determines cooperation on economic sanctions?","authors":"Dawid Walentek","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organizations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation positively mediate its effect through repeated interaction. Este artículo analiza la cooperación en materia de sanciones económicas multilaterales. A pesar de la escasa eficacia y de la violación de las sanciones, las sanciones económicas multilaterales son una herramienta popular de la política exterior. Exploramos un enfoque decisivo de las sanciones y desarrollamos un marco de teoría del juego en el que los Estados de origen se enfrentan a un problema de acción colectiva cuando coordinan la coerción multilateral. Indicamos que la cooperación puede lograrse mediante repetidas interacciones y mediante la reputación. Comprobamos empíricamente los dos mecanismos con los datos sobre la amenaza y la imposición de sanciones económicas (TIES, por su sigla en inglés), así como la adhesión a regímenes sancionadores anteriores y los datos del proyecto Correlates of War sobre la pertenencia a organizaciones internacionales. Nuestros resultados indican que la reputación es un fuerte predictor de la cooperación en materia de coerción económica multilateral. El efecto de la interacción repetida se ve condicionado por la reputación; los Estados con mala reputación median positivamente su efecto a través de la interacción repetida. Le présent article s’intéresse à la coopération dans le cadre de sanctions économiques multilatérales. Malgré qu’elles soient peu efficaces et souvent violées, les sanctions économiques multilatérales restent un outil largement utilisé en politique étrangère. Nous nous intéressons à l’approche instrumentale des sanctions et développons un cadre de théorie des jeux dans lequel les États exportateurs sont confrontés au problème de l’action collective lors de la coordination de coercition multilatérale. Selon nous, la coopération est possible au moyen d’interactions répétées et grâce à la réputation. Nous testons empiriquement ces deux mécanismes à l’aide des données TIES sur les sanctions économiques et le respect des régimes de sanctions imposés par le passé, mais aussi des données du projet Correlates of War sur l’adhésion aux organisations internationales. Nos résultats indiquent","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"48 1","pages":"1121 - 1143"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42654534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}