Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences最新文献_第8页

“Where lies the grail? AI, common sense, and human practical intelligence” “圣杯在哪里?”人工智能、常识和人类实用智能”

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09942-x

William Hasselberger, Micah Lott

{"title":"“Where lies the grail? AI, common sense, and human practical intelligence”","authors":"William Hasselberger, Micah Lott","doi":"10.1007/s11097-023-09942-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09942-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The creation of machines with intelligence comparable to human beings—so-called \"human-level” and “general” intelligence—is often regarded as the Holy Grail of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. However, many prominent discussions of AI lean heavily on the notion of human-level intelligence to frame AI research, but then rely on conceptions of human cognitive capacities, including “common sense,” that are sketchy, one-sided, philosophically loaded, and highly contestable. Our goal in this essay is to bring into view some underappreciated features of the practical intelligence involved in ordinary human agency. These features of practical intelligence are implicit in the structure of our first-person experience of embodied and situated agency, deliberation, and human interaction. We argue that spelling out these features and their implications reveals a fundamental distinction between two forms of intelligence in action, or what we call “efficient task-completion” versus “intelligent engagement in activity.” This distinction helps us to see what is missing from some widely accepted ways of thinking about human-level intelligence in AI, and how human common sense is actually tied, conceptually, to the ideal of practical wisdom, or good (normative) judgment about how to act and live well. Finally, our analysis, if sound, also has implications for the important ethical question of what it means to have AI systems that are aligned with human values, or the so-called “value alignment” problem for artificial intelligence.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"185 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135863520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Animal navigation without mental representation 没有心理表征的动物导航

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09940-z

Bas van Woerkum

引用次数: 0

Correction: A marriage of convenience - defending explanatory integration of phenomenology with mechanism. In response to Williams 更正:一种便利的婚姻——捍卫现象学与机制的解释性整合。作为对威廉姆斯的回应

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-04 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09941-y

Marek Pokropski

引用次数: 0

Anticipating and enacting worlds: moods, illness and psychobehavioral adaptation 预测和模拟世界:情绪、疾病和心理行为适应

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09934-x

Matthew Crippen

引用次数: 0

An analysis of conceptual ambiguities in the debate on the format of concepts 对概念格式辩论中概念歧义的分析

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09938-7

Renato Raia

{"title":"An analysis of conceptual ambiguities in the debate on the format of concepts","authors":"Renato Raia","doi":"10.1007/s11097-023-09938-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09938-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is a debate in philosophy and cognitive science over whether concepts – the building blocks of thought—are couched in a perceptual modality or are amodally represented. The empirical evidence so far collected seems not to have adjudicated this question yet, as reinterpretation of the same set of evidence by both supporters of modalism and amodalism have been provided. I offer a critique of such reinterpretations, arguing that they ultimately derive from theoretical problems in the definition of a modal representation. In particular, I will review three criteria which have been offered to distinguish amodal concepts from modal ones: the isomorphism criterion, the neural location criterion, and the input specificity criterion. I will explain how these criteria often lack theoretical clarity, making it possible in most cases to propose a parsimonious explanation of the same set of data from both an amodalist and a modalist perspective. As a result, it becomes impossible to empirically discriminate between the two interpretations. My conclusion is that the main problem with the discussed criteria is that they frame the question on the format of concept as an either/or debate, by overlooking more interesting empirical questions.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Methodological reductionism or methodological dualism? In search of a middle ground 方法论还原论还是方法论二元论?寻找一个中间地带

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09939-6

Morten Overgaard

引用次数: 0

The pre-intentional, existential feelings, and existential dispositions 前意向，存在情感，和存在倾向

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09937-8

Devin Fitzpatrick

引用次数: 0

Gesture, meaning, and intentionality: from radical to pragmatist enactive theory of language 手势、意义和意向性:从激进的语言行为理论到实用主义的语言行为理论

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-23 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09936-9

Guido Baggio

{"title":"Gesture, meaning, and intentionality: from radical to pragmatist enactive theory of language","authors":"Guido Baggio","doi":"10.1007/s11097-023-09936-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09936-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article argues in favour of a pragmatist enactive interpretation of the emergence of the symbolic and contentful mind from a basic form of social communicative interaction in which basic cognitive capacities are involved. Through a critical overview of Radical Enactivists (RECers)’ view about language, the article focuses on Mead’s pragmatist behavioural theory of meaning that refers to the gestural conversation as the origin of the evolution of linguistic conversation. The article develops as follows. After exposing the main elements of REC’s theory of cognition and language that involve the construction of a theory of natural signs (teleosemiotics) and basic directionality (Ur-intentionality), some critical points of Hutto and Myin’s proposal will be highlighted. To foster a continuist perspective of language, the behavioural theory of meaning and language that Mead develops from the notion of gesture will be analysed. His theory is akin to REC and could augment the bare bones of REC’s sketched perspective, helping to include Ur-intentionality in a broader non-dualistic phylogenetic and ontogenetic theory of symbolic language from gestural communication, thus helping to overcome the distinction between a content-less intentionality and a content-involving intentionality, i.e., a semantic propositional intentionality. Furthermore, a recent revival of Mead’s theory testifies to its up-to-date relevance to explain the innate social dimension of human and non-human animals, and the human communicative capacity through the conditioning of bio-social canons and structures.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135967309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Methodological considerations for the mechanistic explanation of illusory representations in the context of psychopathology 精神病理学背景下幻觉表征的机制解释的方法学考虑

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09935-w

Farshad Nemati

引用次数: 0

Mental measurement and the introspective privilege 心理测量和内省特权

1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09931-0

Michael Pauen

{"title":"Mental measurement and the introspective privilege","authors":"Michael Pauen","doi":"10.1007/s11097-023-09931-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09931-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to a long-standing belief, introspection provides privileged access to the mind, while objective methods, which we denote as “extrospection”, suffer from basic epistemic deficits. Here we will argue that neither an introspective privilege exists nor does extrospection suffer from such deficits. We will focus on two entailments of an introspective privilege: first, such a privilege would require that introspective evidence prevails in cases of conflict with extrospective information. However, we will show that this is not the case: extrospective claims can prevail in cases of conflict. These conflicts are resolved by an inference to the explanation that best accounts for the available evidence. This explanation may speak in favor of extrospection. Second, given an introspective privilege, the development of extrospective measurement techniques should be restricted by the accuracy of introspective reports. We will argue that this problem is part of a more general issue that comes up with the establishment of measurement in the natural sciences. We will identify three strategies that have proven successful in dealing with the problem in the natural sciences. It will turn out that all these strategies are available for extrospective measurement as well. Consequently, the insufficiencies of introspective reports do not impose a limit on the accuracy of extrospective measurement methods. We conclude that neither an introspective privilege nor basic extrospective deficits exist. This does not mean that extrospection will ever replace introspection. Rather, both approaches provide independent and indispensable forms of epistemic access to the mind.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135155342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0