{"title":"Slurs in quarantine","authors":"Bianca Cepollaro, Simone Sulpizio, Claudia Bianchi, Isidora Stojanovic","doi":"10.1111/mila.12492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12492","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate experimentally whether the perceived offensiveness of slurs survives when they are reported, by comparing Italian slurs and insults in <i>base utterances</i> (Y is an S), <i>direct speech</i> (X said: “Y is an S”), <i>mixed quotation</i> (X said that Y is “an S”), and <i>indirect speech</i> (X said that Y is an S). For all strategies, reporting decreases the perceived offensiveness without removing it. For slurs, but not insults, <i>indirect speech</i> is perceived as more offensive than <i>direct speech</i>. Our hypothesis is that, because slurs constitute hate speech, speakers employ quotation marks to signal their dissociation from slur use.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138515479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How words matter: A psycholinguistic argument for meaning revision","authors":"Steffen Koch","doi":"10.1111/mila.12494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12494","url":null,"abstract":"Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"26 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Core morality? Or merely core agents and social beings? A response to Spelke's <i>what babies know</i>","authors":"J. Kiley Hamlin","doi":"10.1111/mila.12487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12487","url":null,"abstract":"Spelke's What babies know describes the remarkably sophisticated mental lives of infants through the theoretical framework of core knowledge. To Spelke, young infants possess six independent core domains, two of which allow them to reason about the social world: the core agent and the core social being systems. Critically, Spelke argues that these core systems fail to communicate prior to 10 months, resulting in an inability to understand social goals. In this commentary, I review evidence that, contrary to Spelke's claims, young infants show robust understanding of social goals and intentions, consistent with claims of an early emerging moral core.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"10 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135821696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Core knowledge, language learning, and the origins of morality and pedagogy: Reply to reviews of <i>What babies know</i>","authors":"Elizabeth S. Spelke","doi":"10.1111/mila.12490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12490","url":null,"abstract":"The astute reviews by Hamlin and by Revencu and Csibra provide compelling arguments and evidence for the early emergence of moral evaluation, communication, and pedagogical learning. I accept these conclusions but not the reviewers' claims that infants' talents in these domains depend on core systems of moral evaluation or pedagogical communication. Instead, I suggest that core knowledge of people as agents and as social beings, together with infants' emerging understanding of their native language, support learning about people as moral agents, moral patients, communicators, and teachers. These issues are open, however, and our competing views invite further testing.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"40 14","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135869097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology","authors":"Kris Goffin, Gerardo Viera","doi":"10.1111/mila.12489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12489","url":null,"abstract":"According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"24 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins","authors":"Muhammad Ali Khalidi","doi":"10.1111/mila.12486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12486","url":null,"abstract":"In this response to three critiques of my book, Cognitive ontology , I expand on some of its main themes. First, I demarcate the domain of cognition to support my claim that it is properly investigated from Marr's computational level. Then, I defend the claim that cognitive kinds ought to be individuated externalistically, by contrast with neural kinds, which are often individuated internalistically. This implies that the relationship between the cognitive sciences is one of delivering mutual constraints, which is a more productive research strategy than the search for “neural correlates” of cognitive constructs.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Kinding memory: Commentary on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's <i>Cognitive ontology</i>","authors":"Sarah K. Robins","doi":"10.1111/mila.12477","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12477","url":null,"abstract":"My commentary focuses on Khalidi's defense of episodic memory as a cognitive kind. His argument relies on merging two distinct accounts of episodic memory—the phenomenal and the etiological. I suggest that Khalidi's framework can be used to carve the contemporary memory literature differently. On this view, the phenomenal account supports constructive episodic simulation as a cognitive kind, the etiological account supports event memory as a cognitive kind, and episodic memory ceases to be. The question for Khalidi is, then, how to evaluate this alternative proposal—and more broadly how to adjudicate between competing and overlapping accounts of cognitive kinds.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135884716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computation as the boundary of the cognitive","authors":"Daniel Weiskopf","doi":"10.1111/mila.12479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12479","url":null,"abstract":"Khalidi identifies cognition with Marrian computation. He further argues that Marrian levels of inquiry should be interpreted ontologically as corresponding to distinct semi‐closed causal domains. But this counterintuitively places the causal domain of representations outside of cognition proper. A closer look at Khalidi's account of concepts shows that these allegedly separate Marrian domains are more tightly integrated than he allows. Theories of concepts converge on algorithmic‐representational models rather than computational ones. This suggests that we should reject the wholesale identification of cognition with computation.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"46 37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135884883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Who's in and who's out of the cognitive kinding game? Comments on Muhammad Ali Khalidi's <i>Cognitive ontology: Taxonomic practices in the mind‐brain sciences</i>","authors":"Jacqueline A. Sullivan","doi":"10.1111/mila.12475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12475","url":null,"abstract":"Muhammad Ali Khalidi contends that because cognitive science casts a wider net than neuroscience in searching for the causes of cognition, it is in the superior position to discover “real” cognitive kinds. I argue that while Khalidi identifies appropriate norms for individuating cognitive kinds, these norms ground his characterization of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, rather than the other way around. If we instead treat Khalidi's norms not as descriptively accurate characterizations of taxonomic practices in cognitive science, but as a set of best practices for kinding cognition, is cognitive science in and neuroscience definitively out of the cognitive kinding game?","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135885165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Names are not (always) predicates","authors":"Laura Delgado","doi":"10.1111/mila.12484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12484","url":null,"abstract":"A main selling point of predicativism is that, in addition to accounting for predicative uses of proper names, it can successfully account for their referential uses while treating them as predicates, thus providing a uniform semantics for proper names. The strategy is to postulate an unpronounced determiner that is realised with names when they appear to function as singular terms, making them effectively a concealed determiner phrase. I argue against the thesis that names are really predicates in referential uses. I discuss four different environments where names do not behave like the determiner phrases that are thought to embed them.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":"238 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136034022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}