{"title":"That's not what you said! Semantic constraints on literal speech","authors":"Sarah A. Fisher","doi":"10.1111/mila.12508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12508","url":null,"abstract":"According to some philosophers, a sentence's semantics can fail to constitute a complete propositional content, imposing mere constraints on such a content. Recently, Daniel Harris has begun developing a formal constraint semantics. He claims that the semantic values of sentences constrain what speakers can literally say with them—and what hearers can know about what was said. However, that claim is undermined by his conception of semantics as the study of a psychological module. I argue instead that semantic constraints should be understood as properties of public languages.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140149989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fear beyond danger","authors":"Frédérique de Vignemont","doi":"10.1111/mila.12506","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12506","url":null,"abstract":"Many agree that the more we feel that we can handle a given situation, the less afraid we are. But why? Is the situation no longer dangerous or is fear a response to more than danger? Here I analyze situations in which one reacts in cold blood to danger and argue that the formal object of fear is not the dangerous, but the unsafe. The unsafe indicates not only how the world is, but also how it can be handled. Safety, and its negative counterpart, are characterized by their duality, both evaluative (is the snake dangerous?) and agentive (is it under control?).","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140075262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alethic modality is deontic","authors":"Qiong Wu","doi":"10.1111/mila.12504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12504","url":null,"abstract":"According to one view of alethic modality, alethic modality is deontic modality with respect to thoughts or language. To say that something is necessary is to prescribe norms on how we must think or use language. This view has been argued to have many philosophical advantages over the traditional view that takes alethic modality to describe things in the world. In this article, I argue that the deontic view also enjoys a wide range of empirical support from linguistics and psychology.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140047068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mathew Henderson, Patrick G. Grosz, Kirsty E. Graham, Catherine Hobaiter, Pritty Patel‐Grosz
{"title":"Shared semantics: Exploring the interface between human and chimpanzee gestural communication","authors":"Mathew Henderson, Patrick G. Grosz, Kirsty E. Graham, Catherine Hobaiter, Pritty Patel‐Grosz","doi":"10.1111/mila.12500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12500","url":null,"abstract":"Striking similarities across ape gestural repertoires suggest shared phylogenetic origins that likely provided a foundation for the emergence of language. We pilot a novel approach for exploring possible semantic universals across human and nonhuman ape species. In a forced‐choice task, <jats:italic>n</jats:italic> = 300 participants watched 10 chimpanzee gesture forms performed by a human and chose from responses that paralleled inferred meanings for chimpanzee gestures. Participants agreed on a single meaning for nine gesture forms; in six of these the agreed form‐meaning pair response(s) matched those established for chimpanzees. Such shared understanding suggests apes' (including humans') gesturing shares deep evolutionary origins.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139981241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth","authors":"Neri Marsili","doi":"10.1111/mila.12476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12476","url":null,"abstract":"According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Generic cognition: A neglected source of context sensitivity","authors":"Mahrad Almotahari","doi":"10.1111/mila.12491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12491","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relationship between the claim that generics articulate psychologically primitive generalizations and the claim that they exhibit a unique form of context sensitivity? This article maintains that the two claims are compatible. It develops and defends an overlooked form of contextualism grounded in the idiosyncrasies of system 1 thought.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139588136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The acquisition of generics","authors":"James Ravi Kirkpatrick","doi":"10.1111/mila.12499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12499","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that the primary acquisition of genericity in early child speech poses a problem for standard quantificational approaches to generics and instead motivates the claim that generics give voice to an innate, default mode of generalising. This article argues that analogous puzzles involving the acquisition of A-quantifiers undermine the empirical support for a purely cognition-based approach to generics. Instead, these acquisition puzzles should be solved by generalising the core insight of the cognitive defaults theory to these expressions, reconciling formal semantic approaches with the role that cognitive development plays on lexical competence.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139420923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science","authors":"Kristin Andrews","doi":"10.1111/mila.12498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12498","url":null,"abstract":"The marker approach is taken as best practice for answering the <i>distribution question</i>: Which animals are conscious? However, the methodology can be used to increase confidence in animals many presume to be unconscious, including <i>C. elegans</i>, leading to a trilemma: accept the worms as conscious; reject the specific markers; or reject the marker methodology for answering the distribution question. I defend the third option and argue that answering the distribution question requires a secure theory of consciousness. Accepting the hypothesis <i>all animals are conscious</i> will promote research leading to secure theory, which is needed to create reliable consciousness tests for animals and AIs. Rather than asking the distribution question, we should shift to the <i>dimensions question</i>: How are animals conscious?","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139375046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pictorial syntax","authors":"Kevin J. Lande","doi":"10.1111/mila.12497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12497","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly assumed that images, whether in the world or in the head, do not have a privileged analysis into constituent parts. They are thought to lack the sort of syntactic structure necessary for representing complex contents and entering into sophisticated patterns of inference. I reject this assumption. “Image grammars” are models in computer vision that articulate systematic principles governing the form and content of images. These models are empirically credible and can be construed as literal grammars for images. Images can have rich syntactic structure, though of a markedly different form than sentences in language.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139080087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hunger, homeostasis, and desire","authors":"Mohan Matthen","doi":"10.1111/mila.12496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12496","url":null,"abstract":"Hunger is a psychological state that serves physiological energy homeostasis. I argue that it is a <i>pure underived desire to eat</i> and examine its role in homeostasis. After scene-setting explanations of homeostasis and desire, I argue that hunger is a close phenomenological match with underived desire. Then, I show why desire is an apt instrument for energy homeostasis. Finally, I argue that energy homeostasis is a multi-factorial future-regarding behavioural strategy. Hunger is a special purpose sensory state that serves only to implement the strategy. Thus, it is a <i>sensory desire</i>. I conclude by reflecting on the credibility of this desire.","PeriodicalId":51472,"journal":{"name":"Mind & Language","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138716937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}