{"title":"Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties","authors":"Justin Mendelow","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2243622","url":null,"abstract":": Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom’s characterisation of the structural/non -structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboo m’s characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties – either alone or in combination with structural properties – necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45064200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Case Against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology","authors":"Allison Aitken","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2226687","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2226687","url":null,"abstract":"There ’ s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, M ā dhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Ś r ī gupta (seventh – eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Ś r ī gupta ’ s ‘ neither-one-nor-many argument ’ against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of uni fi ed consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44584639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics","authors":"Christian Alafaci","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2231953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2231953","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46507723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metaphysical Emergence","authors":"Elanor Taylor","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2243966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2243966","url":null,"abstract":"Reinhard Brandt and many others, that Kant’s anthropology is in fact ‘integrated’ into his critical philosophy (see 246, 15, 252–53), though she remains silent about the details of this integration. A systematic thinker who uses different disciplines to generate different kinds of knowledge is not necessarily a thinker who integrates pragmatic anthropology into critical philosophy. And Waldow’s own discussion of what she calls ‘Kant’s dual-aspect account of character’ (239) would appear to speak more in favor of segregation rather than integration. Despite Kant’s pronouncement in the Preface to Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View that pragmatic anthropology deals with what humans as free-acting beings make of themselves, or can and should make of themselves, Waldow claims that ‘methodologically, Kant here [viz., in his Anthropology] remains descriptive,’ and that ‘this makes it difficult to see in which sense we are in fact dealing with humans as freely acting agents’ (245). Overall, Experience Embodied is a nuanced and perceptive account of several important but underappreciated aspects of early modern philosophy, and I particularly hope that other authors will further developWaldow’s emphasis on its moral dimension. Yet another virtue of the book is its extensive list of contemporary references. A great deal of excellent work has been done by younger early modern scholars in recent years, and it is nice to see these different efforts brought together in one accessible list. On the negative side, Waldow’s key points are sometimes made a bit too abstractly. But this is after all a philosophy book.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49493208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Well-Being Measurements and the Linearity Assumption: A Response to Wodak","authors":"Cristian Larroulet Philippi","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2227642","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49297130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Determinism, Death, and Meaning","authors":"J. Baillie","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2217194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2217194","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48468445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good","authors":"B. Reece","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2217185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2217185","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47697540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities","authors":"A. Zimmerman","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2220352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2220352","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41916460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}