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The Architectonic of Reason: Purposiveness and Systematic Unity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 理性的建筑:康德《纯粹理性批判》的合意性与系统统一性
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2264849
I.S. Blecher
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引用次数: 0
Multidimensional Adjectives 多维的形容词
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2277923
Justin D’Ambrosio, Brian Hedden
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引用次数: 0
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability 相干性作为联合可满足性
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-29 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2269963
Samuel Fullhart, Camilo Martinez
{"title":"Coherence as Joint Satisfiability","authors":"Samuel Fullhart, Camilo Martinez","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2269963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2269963","url":null,"abstract":"According to many philosophers, rationality is, at least in part, a matter of one’s attitudes cohering with one another. Theorists who endorse this idea have devoted much attention to formulating v...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71417453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reasons First 原因第一
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2265397
Errol Lord
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引用次数: 0
A Defence of Ontological Innocence: Response to Barker 为本体论清白辩护:对巴克的回应
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2269942
Jonas Werner
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引用次数: 0
Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge? 为什么证明是获得数学知识的唯一途径？
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-15 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2233540
Marc Lange
{"title":"Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?","authors":"Marc Lange","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2233540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2233540","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes an account of why proof is the only way to acquire knowledge of some mathematical proposition’s truth. Admittedly, non-deductive arguments for mathematical propositions can be s...","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71435273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Plato’s Sun-Like Good: Dialectic in the Republic 柏拉图太阳般的善:《理想国》中的辩证法
2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-12 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2256768
Rick Benitez
{"title":" <i>Plato’s Sun-Like Good: Dialectic in the</i> Republic","authors":"Rick Benitez","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2256768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2256768","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135830539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Perception and Disjunctive Belief: A New Problem for Ambitious Predictive Processing 知觉与析取信念:野心预测加工的新问题
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-09-07 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2251035
Assaf Weksler
{"title":"Perception and Disjunctive Belief: A New Problem for Ambitious Predictive Processing","authors":"Assaf Weksler","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2251035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2251035","url":null,"abstract":"Perception can’t have disjunctive content. Whereas you can think that a box is blue or red, you can’t see a box as being blue or red. Based on this fact, I develop a new problem for the ambitious predictive processing theory, on which the brain is a machine for minimizing prediction error, which approximately implements Bayesian inference. I describe a simple case of updating a disjunctive belief given perceptual experience of one of the disjuncts, in which Bayesian inference and predictive coding pull in opposite directions, with the former implying that one’s confidence in the belief should increase, and the latter implying that it should decrease. Thus, predictive coding fails to approximately implement Bayesian inference across the interface between belief and perception.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44964969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Meaning of Terrorism 恐怖主义的意义
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639
A. Schwenkenbecher
{"title":"The Meaning of Terrorism","authors":"A. Schwenkenbecher","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2227639","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47035021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter 论“应当简化论”的怀疑论
IF 1 2区 哲学
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-08-16 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527
James L. D. Brown
{"title":"On Scepticism About Ought Simpliciter","authors":"James L. D. Brown","doi":"10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2023.2225527","url":null,"abstract":"Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter . This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic ’ s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal o ff ers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative.","PeriodicalId":51459,"journal":{"name":"AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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