Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.082120-0130r
Zachary Barnett-Howell, Jeremy Foltz
{"title":"Determinants of Migration: Cotton Strikes and Income Shocks in Mali","authors":"Zachary Barnett-Howell, Jeremy Foltz","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.082120-0130r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.082120-0130r","url":null,"abstract":"How do transitory income shocks affect household migration decisions in low-income countries? We study how income losses from a cotton strike affecting Malian districts differentially changed agricultural household migration choices. The short duration and geographic specificity of the strike allows us to cleanly identify the long-run impact of a sudden change in household income on migration choices. We show that a drop in income precipitated by the strike reduced household migration rates by approximately 32% over a six-year period. A randomized inference placebo test corroborates the validity of our result. We demonstrate that not having cash on hand is a binding constraint to labor migration for poor populations.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44855402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.052721-0056
Amy W. Ando, Collin M. Reeser
{"title":"Homeowner Willingness to Pay for a Pre-flood Agreement for a Post-flood Buyout","authors":"Amy W. Ando, Collin M. Reeser","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.052721-0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.052721-0056","url":null,"abstract":"Homeowner buyout programs promote climate adaptation efforts by removing homes from floodplains. We estimate homeowner willingness to pay (WTP) for a novel agreement in which they precommit to relocating if a flood severely damages their home in exchange for an expedited buyout process. We find nearly all respondents identified positive WTP to enroll in this program, with average WTP about $600. Factors like flood risk and expectation of neighbors’ responses significantly affect WTP. If the pre-flood agreement is available only if the homeowner has flood insurance, only 68% of homeowners were willing to accept the agreement.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46549804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.060120-0074r2
Yicong Luo, B. Swallow, W. Adamowicz
{"title":"Using Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept to Value Farmland Preservation under Ambiguous Property Rights and Preference Uncertainty","authors":"Yicong Luo, B. Swallow, W. Adamowicz","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.060120-0074r2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.060120-0074r2","url":null,"abstract":"We use a paired-sample binary choice experiment to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) values when land is converted from agriculture to developed uses in Alberta, Canada. Validated principles for stated preference are followed in scenario design, elicitation format, experimental design, and ancillary questions. Preference uncertainty is addressed through alternative calibration of uncertain responses. Reliability and incentive compatibility measures indicate that respondents found both WTP and WTA scenarios to be plausible and incentive compatible. WTA-WTP value gaps are smaller than most previous studies, with consequentiality increasing WTA, WTP, and the gap between WTA and WTP.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43686686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-01-28DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.102920-0166r
Daniel A. Brent, Joseph Cook, Allison Lassiter
{"title":"The Effects of Eligibility and Voluntary Participation on the Distribution of Benefits in Environmental Programs: An Application to Green Stormwater Infrastructure","authors":"Daniel A. Brent, Joseph Cook, Allison Lassiter","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.102920-0166r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.102920-0166r","url":null,"abstract":"Many cities provide incentives for private landowners to install green stormwater infrastructure (GSI) to reduce stormwater runoff and deliver benefits of urban greening. We analyze how participation in a GSI subsidy program affects the spatial distribution of urban greening. The distributional effects manifest in two stages: program eligibility and participation decisions. Eligibility, determined by hydrological factors, is positively correlated with wealthier and Whiter areas. In eligible areas, the wealthiest households and least White neighborhoods have lower participation rates. The findings highlight the importance of considering eligibility and participation in balancing the joint goals of environmental quality and environmental justice.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48785412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0102
Roger H. von Haefen, F. Lupi
{"title":"How Does Congestion Affect the Evaluation of Recreational Gate Fees? An Application to Gulf Coast Beaches","authors":"Roger H. von Haefen, F. Lupi","doi":"10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0102","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how congestion influences the welfare, revenue-raising, and distributional implications of gate fees at outdoor recreational sites. A simple conceptual framework decomposes the effects of gate fees into three components, which are then quantified in an application to Gulf Coast beaches. Simulation results suggest that when congestion is a disamenity, the deadweight loss from gate fees declines, the revenue raised grows, and leakage to untaxed sites is less. Congestion feedbacks do not substantively change our distributional analysis, which implies that gate fees are regressive, do not disproportionately affect minorities, and privilege local recreators at the expense of overnight visitors.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44563169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.2.082020-0129r1
Z. R. Luther, S. Swinton, B. Deynze
{"title":"Potential Supply of Midwest Cropland for Conversion to In-Field Prairie Strips","authors":"Z. R. Luther, S. Swinton, B. Deynze","doi":"10.3368/le.98.2.082020-0129r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.2.082020-0129r1","url":null,"abstract":"Prairie strips planted into crop fields offer multiple environmental benefits. This study estimates the willingness of U.S. farmers to convert 5% of their largest corn-soybean field to prairie strips in exchange for payment. Using stated preference results to estimate land supply, we find that 20% of farmers are willing to adopt prairie strips at payments equivalent to average Conservation Reserve Program rental rates, corresponding to potential conversion of 90,000 acres on 1.8 million acres of cropland. Farmers are likelier to adopt in smaller fields and when they perceive that prairie strips will benefit environmental quality or agricultural productivity.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46186680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101
Nathan W. Chan, Matthew J. Kotchen
{"title":"Funding Public Goods through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods","authors":"Nathan W. Chan, Matthew J. Kotchen","doi":"10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.3.082721-0101","url":null,"abstract":"We examine dedicated taxes (i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision) in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax generally cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending in part on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46301858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.3.082621-0099
H. Banzhaf, V. Smith
{"title":"Bundling Private Complements to Finance Public Goods","authors":"H. Banzhaf, V. Smith","doi":"10.3368/le.98.3.082621-0099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.3.082621-0099","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. National Park Service and other agencies argue that our recreation lands face a crisis of deferred maintenance. This article evaluates two proposals for funding public lands: increasing gate fees and taxing recreational gear. It analyzes the joint welfare effects of such taxes and the services supported by the revenue. It shows that when the taxed goods and the public service are weak complements, there is a simple, sufficient statistic determining whether the joint effect increases welfare for both consumers and sellers: the quantity demanded for the taxed good increases. We illustrate these results with data for recreational services.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46393230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.3.083121-0105
F. Lupi, Roger H. von Haefen, L. Cheng
{"title":"Distributional Effects of Entry Fees and Taxation for Financing Public Beaches","authors":"F. Lupi, Roger H. von Haefen, L. Cheng","doi":"10.3368/le.98.3.083121-0105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.3.083121-0105","url":null,"abstract":"We use a multisite general population demand model to assess welfare and distributional effects of entrance pricing and taxation to finance Great Lakes beach management. We compare revenue resulting from uniform entry (i.e., gate) fees across sites to additional state income tax generating equivalent revenues. We present empirical demand elasticities with respect to total prices, including entry fees and elasticities with respect only to fees. We find that demand is price elastic for total trips and individual sites, with individual sites being significantly more elastic. Over a broad range of entry fees, total trip and site demands are fee elastic.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42958018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2021-12-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.3.090821-0108
M. Walls, Matthew Ashenfarb
{"title":"Efficiency and Equity of an Outdoor Recreation Equipment Tax to Fund Public Lands","authors":"M. Walls, Matthew Ashenfarb","doi":"10.3368/le.98.3.090821-0108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.3.090821-0108","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the efficiency and equity implications of a federal excise tax on outdoor recreation equipment for funding U.S. public lands. Using microdata on consumer expenditure, we estimate a two-stage quadratic almost ideal demand system for recreation equipment and simulate the effects of a 5% tax. The tax generates a modest welfare loss as a share of tax revenues raised: $0.04 for every $1 of revenue. It is approximately proportional to income across the entire income distribution, but households in the lowest-income quintile pay more as a share of income than do households in the other four income quintiles.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43759290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}