{"title":"When Energy Issues Are Land Use Issues: Estimating Preferences for Utility-Scale Solar Energy Siting","authors":"Vasundhara Gaur, Corey Lang, Gregory Howard, Ruth Quainoo","doi":"10.3368/le.99.3.111221-0130r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.99.3.111221-0130r1","url":null,"abstract":"Although solar energy receives broad support in general, utility-scale solar arrays can be contentious because at the siting stage, it becomes a land use issue replete with potential disamenities and trade-offs. We conduct a choice experiment survey to estimate preferences for attributes of utility-scale solar arrays in Rhode Island, United States. Our results suggest that the largest indicator of solar development approval is prior land use, with residents willing to pay an additional $10–$21 in monthly utility bills for developments in commercial, industrial, brownfield, and covered landfill areas, and $13–$49 to avoid developments on farm and forest land.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42195434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-09-19DOI: 10.3368/le.030521-0025r
Lusi Xie, W. Adamowicz
{"title":"Temporal Reliability of Contingent Behavior Trip Data in Kuhn-Tucker Recreation Demand Models","authors":"Lusi Xie, W. Adamowicz","doi":"10.3368/le.030521-0025r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.030521-0025r","url":null,"abstract":"Contingent behavior (CB) trip data, eliciting intended trip decisions with hypothetical scenarios, has been popular in recreation demand models. Unlike other stated preference methods, the temporal reliability of CB data has not been examined in recreation demand models, especially in a Kuhn-Tucker (KT) framework. This article assesses the temporal reliability of CB trip data collected over three years in KT models. We find that coefficient and welfare estimates are largely reliable over time. Our findings add confidence in using CB trip data to model demands within and beyond recreation contexts and provide insight into the broader application of KT models.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42326011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-09-19DOI: 10.3368/le.112421-0140r
Brenna Jungers, J. Abbott, P. Lloyd‐Smith, W. Adamowicz, D. Willard
{"title":"À la carte Management of Recreational Resources","authors":"Brenna Jungers, J. Abbott, P. Lloyd‐Smith, W. Adamowicz, D. Willard","doi":"10.3368/le.112421-0140r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.112421-0140r","url":null,"abstract":"Externalities from recreation scale at the extensive and intensive margins of resource interaction. Recreators have differentiated demands for these margins, so unbundling the prices of access and intensive depletion could improve on traditional management. We use choice experiment data from U.S. Gulf of Mexico recreational headboat anglers to estimate structural models of trip and red snapper retention demand, then simulate aggregate harvest across a range of trip and harvest tag prices. In our simulations, the red snapper harvest tag market equilibrates at $15 per tag and generates $760,000 in management revenues per year while more efficiently allocating harvest.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46706477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-08-27DOI: 10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1
Mark D. Agee, T. Crocker
{"title":"Three-Stage Tradable Set-Aside Requirements, Interdependent Values, and Biodiversity Production on Private Lands","authors":"Mark D. Agee, T. Crocker","doi":"10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.98.4.090919-0130R1","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a static three-stage incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, execution-contingent mechanism for a regulator to allocate biodiversity-protection responsibilities across a landscape mosaic with multiple value-interdependent owners. The mechanism motivates owners to truthfully report their opportunity costs of protection to the regulator and comply with their assigned habitat protection responsibilities.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47881649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.081821-0095r
Alexander Daminger, Kristof Dascher
{"title":"Homeowner Subsidy Repeal and Housing Recentralization","authors":"Alexander Daminger, Kristof Dascher","doi":"10.3368/le.081821-0095r","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.081821-0095r","url":null,"abstract":"Subsidizing homeownership decentralizes cities, as Muth (1967) suggested over half a century ago. This article focuses on the related question of whether repealing a homeownership subsidy recentralizes cities. This question is relevant today, given the ubiquity of homeownership subsidies. We provide a first quasi-experimental test of a subsidy repeal’s spatial effects by examining Germany’s 2005 homeownership subsidy reform. We find that repealing the subsidy contributed to recentralizing Germany’s cities. Since recentralization helps abate carbon dioxide emissions, repealing a homeownership subsidy also helps mitigate climate change.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45393937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.030521-0024r1
Dietrich H. Earnhart, L. Friesen
{"title":"Certainty of Punishment versus Severity of Punishment","authors":"Dietrich H. Earnhart, L. Friesen","doi":"10.3368/le.030521-0024r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.030521-0024r1","url":null,"abstract":"According to the standard enforcement model, key deterrence components are punishment certainty and severity. Theory predicts the relative efficacy of certainty versus severity, but empirical and experimental evidence are mixed. Our study is the first to systematically compare the effects of certainty and severity in the environmental protection context. Our empirics examine wastewater discharged by chemical manufacturing facilities permitted under the Clean Water Act. We find that when enforcement certainty and severity are high, both components effectively deter pollution, with certainty being more effective. In contrast, certainty and severity increases prove counterproductive when certainty and severity are low.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48358203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.061121-0060r1
Sharaban T. Anica, L. Elbakidze
{"title":"Financial Assistance and Environmental Compliance","authors":"Sharaban T. Anica, L. Elbakidze","doi":"10.3368/le.061121-0060r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.061121-0060r1","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System compliance and the Clean Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRF) for wastewater treatment plants in nine states between 2010 and 2018, we examine (1) the effect of noncompliance on the distribution and size of awarded CWSRF loans, and (2) the effects of the CWSRF provision and award size on postfunding compliance. We observe that funded facilities have poorer compliance records than the unfunded ones and that funded facilities decrease violations within two years after receiving financial support. On average, a $50 million CWSRF loan decreases violations by one count within two postfunding years.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47612527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-08-22DOI: 10.3368/le.080721-0091r1
Lars Isenhardt, S. Seifert, S. Hüttel
{"title":"Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions","authors":"Lars Isenhardt, S. Seifert, S. Hüttel","doi":"10.3368/le.080721-0091r1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.080721-0091r1","url":null,"abstract":"Rights of first refusals (RFRs) granted to tenants in land privatization auctions enable them to purchase their leased land by accepting the highest bid. RFRs may deter bidders and incentivize non–right holders to adjust their bidding. We conjecture that tenant favoritism with RFRs reduces competition and thus sales prices at the expense of the public sellers. To test the conjectures, we compile a data set of land auctions by two privatization agencies in eastern Germany, one favoring tenants along with an RFR, between 2007 and 2018. Double robust matching results indicate RFR-related reductions in the number of bidders and prices.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49125776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-06-23DOI: 10.3368/le.062620-0093R1
Xuqi Chen, Zhifeng Gao, Xiang Bi
{"title":"Measuring Heterogeneous Preferences for Adaptation Strategies in Response to Sea Level Rise: Evidence from Miami-Dade County","authors":"Xuqi Chen, Zhifeng Gao, Xiang Bi","doi":"10.3368/le.062620-0093R1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.062620-0093R1","url":null,"abstract":"Despite mounting threats from rising sea levels, adaptation to sea level rise (SLR) is often challenged by limited funding and understanding of residents’ preferences. Using an online choice experiment, we investigate residents’ preference for three SLR adaptation strategies: building seawalls, replenishing the beach, and installing stormwater pumps in Miami-Dade County. We control the preference, scale, and alternative heterogeneity using generalized multinomial logit models with error components. Results show that residents prefer additional adaptation strategies to the status quo, and valuations of adaptation attributes are correlated with residents’ sociodemographics. Accounting for alternative heterogeneity also significantly improves model performance.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44560576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Land EconomicsPub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.3368/le.040721-0036R
T. Nguyen, D. Kling, Steven J. Dundas, S. Hacker, Daniel K. Lew, P. Ruggiero, K. Roy
{"title":"Quality over Quantity: Nonmarket Values of Restoring Coastal Dunes in the U.S. Pacific Northwest","authors":"T. Nguyen, D. Kling, Steven J. Dundas, S. Hacker, Daniel K. Lew, P. Ruggiero, K. Roy","doi":"10.3368/le.040721-0036R","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3368/le.040721-0036R","url":null,"abstract":"We design a choice experiment to examine public preferences for coastal dune ecosystem restoration in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. Dunes are a public good whose natural state is now rare. Respondents are asked to choose among hypothetical projects that vary by project size, restoration quality, recreation access, flooding risk, and cost. Restoration quality is defined as closeness to the natural ecosystem. We find that increasing restoration quality results in significantly higher welfare gains than increasing the size of restoration area. Maintaining recreation access is preferred, and programs with recreation restrictions yield positive willingness to pay only if accompanied by the highest restoration quality.","PeriodicalId":51378,"journal":{"name":"Land Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48584912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}