农地拍卖中的租客偏袒与优先购买权

IF 1.3 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Land Economics Pub Date : 2022-08-22 DOI:10.3368/le.080721-0091r1

Lars Isenhardt, S. Seifert, S. Hüttel

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引用次数: 3

摘要

在土地私有化拍卖中授予租户的首次拒绝权使他们能够通过接受最高出价来购买租赁土地。RFR可能会阻止投标人，并激励非权利持有人调整其投标。我们推测，租户对RFR的偏袒减少了竞争，从而降低了以公共卖家为代价的销售价格。为了检验这些猜测，我们汇编了2007年至2018年间德国东部两个私有化机构的土地拍卖数据集，其中一个机构有利于租户和RFR。双重稳健匹配结果表明，与RFR相关的投标人数量和价格减少。

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Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions

Rights of first refusals (RFRs) granted to tenants in land privatization auctions enable them to purchase their leased land by accepting the highest bid. RFRs may deter bidders and incentivize non–right holders to adjust their bidding. We conjecture that tenant favoritism with RFRs reduces competition and thus sales prices at the expense of the public sellers. To test the conjectures, we compile a data set of land auctions by two privatization agencies in eastern Germany, one favoring tenants along with an RFR, between 2007 and 2018. Double robust matching results indicate RFR-related reductions in the number of bidders and prices.

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来源期刊

Land Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Land Economics is dedicated to the study of land use, natural resources, public utilities, housing, and urban land issues. Established in 1925 by the renowned economist and founder of the American Economic Association, Richard T. Ely at the University of Wisconsin, Land Economics has consistently published innovative, conceptual, and empirical research of direct relevance to economists. Each issue brings the latest results in international applied research on such topics as transportation, energy, urban and rural land use, housing, environmental quality, public utilities, and natural resources.