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Information control in the hold‐up problem 滞留问题中的信息控制
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12295
Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan
{"title":"Information control in the hold‐up problem","authors":"Anh Nguyen, Teck Yong Tan","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12295","url":null,"abstract":"We study the use of information control to mitigate hold‐up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold‐up risks.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12295","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47936667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-10-28 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12241
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12241","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12241","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42523999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies 宣传信号、歧视和积极的歧视政策
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-10-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2637975
Marc Gürtler, Oliver Gürtler
{"title":"Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies","authors":"Marc Gürtler, Oliver Gürtler","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2637975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2637975","url":null,"abstract":"The current paper studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability. The model can account for both statistical and taste-based discrimination. A positive discrimination policy lowers the promotion standard for the workers who are discriminated against. This is beneficial for the workers in the middle of the ability distribution because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place. Instead, workers of either high or low ability generally suffer from the policy because the policy does not change their promotion probability but weakens the positive signal of being promoted and strengthens the negative signal of not being promoted. We also show that the policy may increase or decrease efficiency and that it may aggravate wage inequality.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2637975","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49337898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation 统计证据与稳健诉讼问题
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-10-10 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12302
Jesse Bull, Joel Watson
{"title":"Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation","authors":"Jesse Bull, Joel Watson","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12302","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is sufficiently strong relative to the “face‐value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justified.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12302","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45897409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Reputation and adverse selection: theory and evidence from eBay 声誉与逆向选择:来自eBay的理论与证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-27 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12297
M. Saeedi
{"title":"Reputation and adverse selection: theory and evidence from eBay","authors":"M. Saeedi","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12297","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12297","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45473751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Foreign competition and the durability of US firm investments 外国竞争与美国企业投资的持久性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12286
Philippe Fromenteau, Jan Schymik, Jan Tscheke
{"title":"Foreign competition and the durability of US firm investments","authors":"Philippe Fromenteau, Jan Schymik, Jan Tscheke","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12286","url":null,"abstract":"How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? We study if firms have an incentive to shift investments toward more short‐term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Based on a stylized firm investment model, we derive a within‐firm estimator using variation across investments with different durabilities. Exploiting the Chinese World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, we estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of US firm investments. Firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures toward investments with a shorter durability. This effect is larger for firms with lower total factor productivity.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12286","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45486083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Stare decisis and judicial log-rolls: a gains-from-trade model 判决书和司法卷宗:一种贸易收益模式
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12288
C. Cameron, L. Kornhauser, Giri Parameswaran
{"title":"Stare decisis\u0000 and judicial log-rolls: a gains-from-trade model","authors":"C. Cameron, L. Kornhauser, Giri Parameswaran","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12288","url":null,"abstract":"The practice of horizontal stare decisis requires that judges occasionally decide cases \"incorrectly''. What sustains this practice? Given a heterogeneous bench, we show that the increasing differences in dispositions property of preferences generates gains when judges trade dispositions over the case space. These gains are fully realized by implementing a compromise rule – stare decisis. Absent commitment, we provide conditions that sustain the compromise in a repeated game. When complete compromises become unsustainable, partial compromises still avail. Moreover, judges may prefer to implement partial compromises even when perfect ones are sustainable. Thus, stare decisis is consistent with a partially-settled-partially-contested legal doctrine.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12288","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42483587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Sequential innovation, patent policy, and the dynamics of the replacement effect 顺序创新、专利政策与替代效应的动态
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12287
Álvaro Parra
{"title":"Sequential innovation, patent policy, and the dynamics of the replacement effect","authors":"Álvaro Parra","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12287","url":null,"abstract":"I study how patent policy—characterized by patent length and forward protection—affects Research and Development (R&D) dynamics, leadership persistence, and market structure. Firms’ R&D investments increase as the patent’s expiration date approaches. Through forward protection, followers internalize the leader’s replacement effect. In protective systems, this internalization is substantial, reversing Arrow’s traditional result: followers invest less than leaders at every moment of the patent’s life. I study the policy that maximizes innovative activity. Overly protective policies decrease innovation pace through two mechanisms: delaying firms’ investments toward the end of the patent’s life and decreasing the number of firms performing R&D.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12287","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46723624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Competitive cross‐subsidization 竞争性交叉补贴
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12293
Zhijun Chen, P. Rey
{"title":"Competitive cross‐subsidization","authors":"Zhijun Chen, P. Rey","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12293","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes competitive pricing policies by multiproduct firms facing heterogeneous buying patterns. We show that cross-subsidization arises when firms have comparative advantages on different products but are equally efficient overall: Firms earn a profit from multi-stop shoppers by charging positive margins on their strong products but, as price competition for one-stop shoppers drives total margins down to zero, they price weaker products below cost. Banning below-cost pricing leads to higher profits and higher prices for one-stop shoppers, and may reduce consumer surplus as well as total social welfare.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12293","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41781607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger 1997年波音-麦道合并的动态效率
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12291
Yonghong An, Wei Zhao
{"title":"Dynamic efficiencies of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger","authors":"Yonghong An, Wei Zhao","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12291","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 Boeing‐McDonnell Douglas merger in the medium‐sized, wide‐body aircraft industry. We find that the merger led to lower prices. To explain the price drop, we develop a dynamic oligopoly game with learning‐by‐doing. We quantify the welfare effects of the merger by incorporating both increased market power and merger efficiencies from accelerated learning‐by‐doing. Our dynamic analysis indicates that net consumer surplus increased by as much as $5.14 billion, whereas a static model ignoring efficiencies of learning‐by‐doing predicts a $0.92 billion loss.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12291","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46454342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
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