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IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-08-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12239
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引用次数: 0
Valuing product innovation: genetically engineered varieties in US corn and soybeans 重视产品创新：美国玉米和大豆的转基因品种
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-09 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12290
F. Ciliberto, G. Moschini, Edward D. Perry
{"title":"Valuing product innovation: genetically engineered varieties in US corn and soybeans","authors":"F. Ciliberto, G. Moschini, Edward D. Perry","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12290","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a discrete-choice model of differentiated products for U.S. corn and soybean seed demand to study the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties. Using a unique dataset spanning the period 1996-2011, we find that the welfare impact of the GE innovation is significant. In the last five years of the period analyzed, our preferred counterfactual indicates that total surplus due to GE traits was $5.18 billion per year, with seed manufacturers appropriating 56% of this surplus. The seed industry obtained more surplus from GE corn, whereas farmers received more surplus from GE soybeans.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12290","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44437926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Using disaster‐induced closures to evaluate discrete choice models of hospital demand 使用灾害导致的关闭来评估医院需求的离散选择模型
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12421
Ted Rosenbaum
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引用次数: 11
When is upstream collusion profitable? 上游勾结什么时候有利可图？
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-06-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12271
Dingwei Gu, Zhiyong Yao, Wen Zhou, Rangrang Bai
{"title":"When is upstream collusion profitable?","authors":"Dingwei Gu, Zhiyong Yao, Wen Zhou, Rangrang Bai","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12271","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long-term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two externalities, the collusion will raise the joint profit of all firms in the two industries and is therefore profitable for the upstream after compensation of downstream firms.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12271","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49025689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Competitive differential pricing 竞争性差别定价
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-05-11 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12363
Yongmin Chen, Jianpei Li, M. Schwartz
{"title":"Competitive differential pricing","authors":"Yongmin Chen, Jianpei Li, M. Schwartz","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12363","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly makes that differ in costs of service. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions on demand properties—cross/own elasticities and curvature—for differential pricing by symmetric firms to raise aggregate consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals intuitively why differential pricing is generally beneficial though not always—including why profit can fall, unlike for monopoly—and why it is more beneficial than oligopoly third-degree price discrimination. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, differential pricing can reduce profit or consumer surplus even with ‘simple’ demands such as linear.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12363","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41381089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-26 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12237
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12237","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12237","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46293178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The price effects of cross‐market mergers: theory and evidence from the hospital industry 跨市场并购的价格效应：来自医院行业的理论和证据
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-10 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12270
Leemore S. Dafny, Katherine Ho, Robin S. Lee
{"title":"The price effects of cross‐market mergers: theory and evidence from the hospital industry","authors":"Leemore S. Dafny, Katherine Ho, Robin S. Lee","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12270","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the effect of mergers between firms whose products are not viewed as direct substitutes for the same good or service, but are bundled by a common intermediary. Focusing on hospital mergers across distinct geographic markets, we show that such combinations can reduce competition among merging hospitals for inclusion in insurers' networks, leading to higher prices (or lower‐quality care). Using data on hospital mergers from 1996–2012, we find support that this mechanism operates within state boundaries: cross‐market, within‐state hospital mergers yield price increases of 7%–9 % for acquiring hospitals, whereas out‐of‐state acquisitions do not yield significant increases.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12270","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42164692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 69
Transfers of corporate control in firms with noncontrolling blockholders 非控股大股东公司控制权的转移
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12276
S. Stepanov
{"title":"Transfers of corporate control in firms with noncontrolling blockholders","authors":"S. Stepanov","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12276","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12276","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42189878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Pretrial negotiations under optimism 乐观的审前谈判
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12273
S. Vasserman, Muhamet Yildiz
{"title":"Pretrial negotiations under optimism","authors":"S. Vasserman, Muhamet Yildiz","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12273","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47235546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition 专利池、垂直整合和下游竞争
IF 2.3 3区 经济学
Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12266
Markus Reisinger, E. Tarantino
{"title":"Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition","authors":"Markus Reisinger, E. Tarantino","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12266","url":null,"abstract":"Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12266","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44460530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
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