{"title":"Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation","authors":"Jesse Bull, Joel Watson","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12302","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is sufficiently strong relative to the “face‐value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justified.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1756-2171.12302","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Rand Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12302","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is sufficiently strong relative to the “face‐value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justified.
期刊介绍:
The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.