{"title":"Konjunkturschlaglicht: Auswirkungen des Haushaltsurteils","authors":"Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, D. Groll","doi":"10.2478/wd-2024-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":510322,"journal":{"name":"Wirtschaftsdienst","volume":"37 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139633120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finanzierung von Staatsaufgaben: nachhaltige Finanzpolitik und Schuldenbremse","authors":"R. Kurz","doi":"10.2478/wd-2024-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Multiple crises and ecological transformation are driving an intense debate about government credit financing and its restriction by the constitutional debt brake. The Board of Academic Advisors at the BMWK has presented a proposal on how more flexibility would be possible without undermining the indispensable disciplining function of the debt brake. The Board recommends a selective relaxation of the debt brake linked to conditions that are virtually impossible to fulfil (net investment, independent institution, no inflationary effects). Therefore, regarding the fact that the Board has formulated a justification for the debt brake: As long as there is no practicable reform proposal, there is no reason to change the constitution.","PeriodicalId":510322,"journal":{"name":"Wirtschaftsdienst","volume":"50 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139639227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Konsens oder Agreeing to Disagree?: Die Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Synthese in der Wirtschaftspolitik","authors":"","doi":"10.2478/wd-2024-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Discussions in the field of economics can take different forms to reach consensus or dissent among those involved. According to which rules and procedures is it possible to reach a consensus in economic policy advice? And in which cases is an all-round consensus undesirable? Based on a panel discussion at the annual conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Regensburg in September 2023, the following two articles reflect on consensus building and “agreeing to disagree” in the context of the work of two statutory policy advisory bodies in Germany, the German Council of Economic Experts and the Joint Economic Forecast Project Group.","PeriodicalId":510322,"journal":{"name":"Wirtschaftsdienst","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139632889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Das Haushaltsurteil und die Zukunft der Schuldenbremse","authors":"","doi":"10.2478/wd-2024-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/wd-2024-0006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of 15 November 2023 on the second supplementary budget for 2021 has thrown the federal government’s budget planning into disarray. The supplementary budget was deemed incompatible with the debt brake. The judgement impacts not only the 2023 budget, but also subsequent budgets. It raises many questions about the future financing of government spending. Was the budget judgement foreseeable? How can the federal government draw up a constitutionally compliant budget for 2024 and subsequent years? Is a reform of the debt brake necessary and possible? What could such a reform look like?","PeriodicalId":510322,"journal":{"name":"Wirtschaftsdienst","volume":"190 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139637869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}