Environmental and Resource Economics最新文献_第3页

What Drives Carbon Emissions in German Manufacturing: Scale, Technique or Composition? 是什么驱动了德国制造业的碳排放？规模、技术还是构成？

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00894-7

Elisa Rottner, Kathrine von Graevenitz

引用次数: 0

Forest Mitigates Short-Term Health Risk of Air Pollution: Evidence from China 森林能减轻空气污染对健康造成的短期危害：来自中国的证据

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00889-4

Shilei Liu, J. Qi, Jintao Xu, Yuanyuan Yi, Peng Yin, Maigeng Zhou

引用次数: 0

Green Parties and the Quest for Biodiversity: The Political Economy of Fiscal Commitments in OECD Economies 绿色政党与生物多样性的追求：经合组织经济体财政承诺的政治经济学

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00890-x

Helmut Herwartz, Bernd Theilen

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引用次数: 0

Consumption Feedback and Water Saving: A Field Intervention Evaluation in the Metropolitan Area of Milan 消费反馈与节水：米兰市区实地干预评估

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00884-9

Stefano Clò, Tommaso Reggiani, Sabrina Ruberto

{"title":"Consumption Feedback and Water Saving: A Field Intervention Evaluation in the Metropolitan Area of Milan","authors":"Stefano Clò, Tommaso Reggiani, Sabrina Ruberto","doi":"10.1007/s10640-024-00884-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00884-9","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates whether informative feedback on consumption can nudge water saving. We launched a five-month online information campaign which involved around 1,000 households located in the province of Milan (Italy) with a smart meter. A group of households received monthly reports via email on their per capita daily average water consumption, including a social comparison component. The Intention to Treat (ITT) analysis shows that, compared to a benchmark group, the units exposed to the intervention reduced their per capita water consumption by around 6% (25.8 liters per day or 6.8 gallons). Being able to observe the email opening rate, we find that the ITT effect is mainly driven by complying units. Through an Instrumental Variable approach, we estimated a Local Average Treatment Effect equal to 54.9 liters per day of water saving. A further Regression Discontinuity Design analysis shows that different feedback on consumption class size differentially affected water saving at the margin. We also found that the additional water saving increased with the number of monthly reports, though it did not persist two months after the campaign expired.","PeriodicalId":501498,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and Resource Economics","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141573777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences 自我强化的国际环境协议与利他主义偏好

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00885-8

Mark Schopf

{"title":"Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences","authors":"Mark Schopf","doi":"10.1007/s10640-024-00885-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-024-00885-8","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions in the standard two-stage game of self-enforcing international environmental agreements with identical countries. Altruism implies that each country values, to some extent, every other country’s welfare when deciding on its coalition membership and emissions policy. In the Nash [Stackelberg] game, the fringe [coalition] countries exploit the altruism of the coalition [fringe] countries so that altruism decreases [increases] the coalition size. In any case, global emissions and global welfare are close to the non-cooperative values. However, altruism narrows the gap between the individually optimal emissions and the socially optimal emissions, so altruism increases global welfare. The effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions crucially depends on its modelling: If altruism affects the membership decision but not the policy decision, or if each coalition country is more altruistic toward other coalition countries than toward fringe countries, altruism can stabilise large coalitions up to the grand coalition. Finally, altruism can stabilise small coalitions but destabilises large coalitions with asymmetric countries.","PeriodicalId":501498,"journal":{"name":"Environmental and Resource Economics","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141507622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Economic Dynamics After a Flood: Evidence from Satellite Data 洪水过后的经济动态：卫星数据提供的证据

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00887-6

Dino Collalti

引用次数: 0

Identifying On-Site and Off-Site Drivers of Land Degradation in Advanced Economies: A Spatial Approach for Italy 识别先进经济体土地退化的现场和非现场驱动因素：意大利的空间方法

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00888-5

Emma Bruno, R. Salvia, G. Quaranta, Pavel Cudlín, G. Punzo, Luca Salvati

引用次数: 0

Temperature and Cognitive Performance: Evidence from Mental Arithmetic Training 温度与认知能力：心算训练的证据

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00881-y

Benjamin Krebs

引用次数: 0

Climate, Technology and Value: Insights from the First Decade with Mass-Consumption of Electric Vehicles 气候、技术与价值：电动汽车大规模消费头十年的启示

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00872-z

Gøril L. Andreassen, Jo Thori Lind

引用次数: 0

To Abate, or Not to Abate? The Arising of the Win–Win Solution Under Time Consistent Emission Taxation 减税，还是不减税？时间一致性排放税下双赢方案的出现

Environmental and Resource Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10640-024-00879-6

Elettra Agliardi, Luca Lambertini

引用次数: 0