{"title":"Indexical utility: another rationalization of exponential discounting","authors":"Wolfgang Spohn","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000129","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about time preferences, the phenomenon that the very same things are usually considered the less valuable the farther in the future they are obtained. The utilities of those things are discounted at a certain rate. The paper presents a novel normative argument for exponential discount rates, whatever their empirical adequacy. It proposes to take indexical utility seriously, i.e. utilities referring to indexical propositions (that speak of ‘I’, ‘now’, etc.) as opposed to non-indexical propositions. Economic focus is only on the latter, while the former are neglected. The potential ignorance of when is now generates a difference between indexical and non-indexical utility that can be exploited for a novel argument in favour of exponential discount rates.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140205092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What calibrating variable-value population ethics suggests","authors":"Dean Spears, H. Orri Stefánsson","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000026","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Variable-Value axiologies avoid Parfit’s <span>Repugnant Conclusion</span> while satisfying some weak instances of the <span>Mere Addition</span> principle. We apply calibration methods to two leading members of the family of Variable-Value views conditional upon: first, a very weak instance of Mere Addition and, second, some plausible empirical assumptions about the size and welfare of the intertemporal world population. We find that such facts calibrate these two Variable-Value views to be nearly totalist, and therefore imply conclusions that should seem repugnant to anyone who opposes Total Utilitarianism only due to the Repugnant Conclusion.</p>","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140150100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The entrepreneurial theory of ownership","authors":"Sergei Sazonov","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000087","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a theory of ownership that is rooted in Israel Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship – The Entrepreneurial Theory of Ownership. Its central idea is that natural resources are not available to us automatically as other approaches to justice implicitly assume. Before we can use a resource, we need to do preparatory work in the form of making an entrepreneurial judgement on it. This fact, as I argue, makes it possible to put private ownership as a natural right on a firm normative ground and answer many traditional challenges to private property.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140150111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Non-Archimedean population axiologies","authors":"Calvin Baker","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000099","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Non-Archimedean population axiologies – also known as lexical views – claim (i) that a sufficient number of lives at a very high positive welfare level would be better than any number of lives at a very low positive welfare level and/or (ii) that a sufficient number of lives at a very low negative welfare level would be worse than any number of lives at a very high negative welfare level. Such axiologies are popular because they can avoid the (Negative) Repugnant Conclusion and satisfy the adequacy conditions given in the central impossibility result in population axiology due to Gustaf Arrhenius. I provide a novel argument against them which appeals to the way that good and bad lives can intuitively outweigh one other.</p>","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140057713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Manipulation in politics and public policy","authors":"Keith Dowding, Alexandra Oprea","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000063","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many philosophical accounts of manipulation are blind to the extent to which actual people fall short of the rational ideal, while prominent accounts in political science are under-inclusive. We offer necessary and sufficient conditions – Suitable Reason and Testimonial Honesty – distinguishing manipulative from non-manipulative influence; develop a ‘hypothetical disclosure test’ to measure the <span>degree</span> of manipulation; and provide further criteria to assess and compare the morality of manipulation across cases. We discuss multiple examples drawn from politics and from public policy with particular attention to recent debates about the ethics and politics of nudge.</p>","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140047597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic problems in Hayek’s defence of free markets","authors":"Jonathan Benson","doi":"10.1017/s0266267124000105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000105","url":null,"abstract":"Friedrich von Hayek’s classical liberalism argued that free markets allow individuals the greatest opportunity to achieve their ends. This paper develops an internal critique of this claim. It argues that once externalities are introduced, the forms of economic knowledge Hayek thought to undermine government action and orthodox utilitarianism also rule out relative welfarist assessments of more or less regulated markets. Given the pervasiveness of externalities in modern economies, Hayek will frequently be unable to make comparative welfarist claims, or he must relax his epistemic assumptions and allow for greater government action than his classical liberalism would wish to accept.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139951471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to be absolutely fair Part II: Philosophy meets economics","authors":"Stefan Wintein, Conrad Heilmann","doi":"10.1017/s026626712300041x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626712300041x","url":null,"abstract":"In the article ‘How to be absolutely fair, Part I: the Fairness formula’, we presented the first theory of comparative and absolute fairness. Here, we relate the implications of our Fairness formula to economic theories of fair division. Our analysis makes contributions to both philosophy and economics: to the philosophical literature, we add an axiomatic discussion of proportionality and fairness. To the economic literature, we add an appealing normative theory of absolute and comparative fairness that can be used to evaluate axioms and division rules. Also, we provide a novel definition and characterization of the <jats:italic>absolute priority rule</jats:italic>.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139753425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to be absolutely fair Part I: The Fairness formula","authors":"Stefan Wintein, Conrad Heilmann","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000408","url":null,"abstract":"We present the first comprehensive theory of fairness that conceives of fairness as having two dimensions: a comparative and an absolute one. The comparative dimension of fairness has traditionally been the main interest of Broomean fairness theories. It has been analysed as satisfying competing individual claims in proportion to their respective strengths. And yet, many key contributors to Broomean fairness agree that ‘absolute’ fairness is important as well. We make this concern precise by introducing the <jats:italic>Fairness formula</jats:italic> and the <jats:italic>absolute priority rule</jats:italic> and analyse their implications for comparative fairness.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139753357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The view from Manywhere: normative economics with context-dependent preferences","authors":"Guilhem Lecouteux, Ivan Mitrouchev","doi":"10.1017/s0266267123000391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267123000391","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of <jats:italic>self-determination</jats:italic>, according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension of Sugden’s opportunity criterion and an application of Sen’s positional views in his theory of justice. Our proposition is consistent with Muldoon’s and Gaus’ approaches of public reason in social contract theory, which account for the diversity of perspectives in non-ideal worlds.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139053343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Till Grüne-Yanoff, Caterina Marchionni, Tatu Nuotio
{"title":"The relevance of mechanisms and mechanistic knowledge for behavioural interventions: the case of household energy consumption","authors":"Till Grüne-Yanoff, Caterina Marchionni, Tatu Nuotio","doi":"10.1017/s026626712300038x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s026626712300038x","url":null,"abstract":"We argue that behavioural public policies (BPP) should be categorized by the kind of mechanism through which they operate, not by the kind of treatment they implement. Reviewing the energy consumption BPP literature, we argue (i) that BPPs are currently categorized by treatment; (ii) that treatment-based categories are subject to <jats:italic>mechanistic heterogeneity</jats:italic>: there is substantial variation of mechanisms within each treatment type; and (iii) that they also display <jats:italic>mechanistic overlap</jats:italic>: there is substantial overlap between mechanisms across treatment types. Consequently, current categorizations of BPPs do not reveal the conditions of their efficacy and should be revised to better reflect mechanistic information.","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138522809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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