{"title":"Decision under normative uncertainty","authors":"Franz Dietrich, Brian Jabarian","doi":"10.1017/s0266267121000201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267121000201","url":null,"abstract":"<p>While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely <span>Ex-Ante</span> Expectationalism, <span>Ex-Post</span> Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.</p>","PeriodicalId":501336,"journal":{"name":"Economics & Philosophy","volume":"105 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138522498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}