arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory最新文献_第5页

Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formation over Graphs 图上联盟形成中的个体稳定动力学

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: arxiv-2408.11488

Angelo FanelliLAMSADE, Laurent GourvèsLAMSADE, Ayumi IgarashiUTokyo, Luca MoscardelliUd'A

{"title":"Individually Stable Dynamics in Coalition Formation over Graphs","authors":"Angelo FanelliLAMSADE, Laurent GourvèsLAMSADE, Ayumi IgarashiUTokyo, Luca MoscardelliUd'A","doi":"arxiv-2408.11488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.11488","url":null,"abstract":"Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose\u0000players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In\u0000this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various\u0000notions of stability, has attracted a lot of attention. However, the natural\u0000process by which players, starting from any feasible state, strive to reach an\u0000equilibrium after a series of unilateral improving deviations, has been less\u0000studied. We investigate the convergence of dynamics towards individually stable\u0000outcomes under the following perspective: what are the most general classes of\u0000preferences and graph topologies guaranteeing convergence? To this aim, on the\u0000one hand, we cover a hierarchy of preferences, ranging from the most general to\u0000a subcase of additively separable preferences, including individually rational\u0000and monotone cases. On the other hand, given that convergence may fail in\u0000graphs admitting a cycle even in our most restrictive preference class, we\u0000analyze acyclic graph topologies such as trees, paths, and stars.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Constraint Programming Approach to Fair High School Course Scheduling 公平高中课程安排的约束编程方法

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: arxiv-2408.12032

Mitsuka Kiyohara, Masakazu Ishihata

{"title":"A Constraint Programming Approach to Fair High School Course Scheduling","authors":"Mitsuka Kiyohara, Masakazu Ishihata","doi":"arxiv-2408.12032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.12032","url":null,"abstract":"Issues of inequity in U.S. high schools' course scheduling did not previously\u0000exist. However, in recent years, with the increase in student population and\u0000course variety, students perceive that the course scheduling method is unfair.\u0000Current integer programming (IP) methods to the high school scheduling problem\u0000(HSSP) fall short in addressing these fairness concerns. The purpose of this\u0000research is to develop a solution methodology that generates feasible and fair\u0000course schedules using student preferences. Utilizing principles of fairness,\u0000which have been well studied in market design, we define the fair high school\u0000scheduling problem (FHSSP), a novel extension to the HSSP, and devise a\u0000corresponding algorithm based on integer programming to solve the FHSSP. We\u0000test our approach on a real course request dataset from a high school in\u0000California, USA. Results show that our algorithm can generate schedules that\u0000are both feasible and fair. In this paper, we demonstrate that our IP algorithm\u0000not only solves the HSSP and FHSSP in the United States but has the potential\u0000to be applied to various real-world scheduling problems. Additionally, we show\u0000the feasibility of integrating human emotions into mathematical modeling.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197545","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Technical Report: Coopetition in Heterogeneous Cross-Silo Federated Learning 技术报告：异构跨ilo 联合学习中的合作竞争

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: arxiv-2408.11355

Chao Huang, Justin Dachille, Xin Liu

{"title":"Technical Report: Coopetition in Heterogeneous Cross-Silo Federated Learning","authors":"Chao Huang, Justin Dachille, Xin Liu","doi":"arxiv-2408.11355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.11355","url":null,"abstract":"In cross-silo federated learning (FL), companies collaboratively train a\u0000shared global model without sharing heterogeneous data. Prior related work\u0000focused on algorithm development to tackle data heterogeneity. However, the\u0000dual problem of coopetition, i.e., FL collaboration and market competition,\u0000remains under-explored. This paper studies the FL coopetition using a dynamic\u0000two-period game model. In period 1, an incumbent company trains a local model\u0000and provides model-based services at a chosen price to users. In period 2, an\u0000entrant company enters, and both companies decide whether to engage in FL\u0000collaboration and then compete in selling model-based services at different\u0000prices to users. Analyzing the two-period game is challenging due to data\u0000heterogeneity, and that the incumbent's period one pricing has a temporal\u0000impact on coopetition in period 2, resulting in a non-concave problem. To\u0000address this issue, we decompose the problem into several concave sub-problems\u0000and develop an algorithm that achieves a global optimum. Numerical results on\u0000three public datasets show two interesting insights. First, FL training brings\u0000model performance gain as well as competition loss, and collaboration occurs\u0000only when the performance gain outweighs the loss. Second, data heterogeneity\u0000can incentivize the incumbent to limit market penetration in period 1 and\u0000promote price competition in period 2.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"171 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Minimizing Rosenthal's Potential in Monotone Congestion Games 单调拥堵博弈中的罗森塔尔势能最小化

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: arxiv-2408.11489

Vittorio BilòLAMSADE, Angelo FanelliLAMSADE, Laurent GourvèsLAMSADE, Christos TsoufisLAMSADE, Cosimo Vinci

引用次数: 0

Multiwinner Temporal Voting with Aversion to Change 厌恶变化的多赢家时空投票

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-20 DOI: arxiv-2408.11017

Valentin Zech, Niclas Boehmer, Edith Elkind, Nicholas Teh

引用次数: 0

Price Competition Under A Consider-Then-Choose Model With Lexicographic Choice 有词典选择的 "先考虑后选择 "模式下的价格竞争

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: arxiv-2408.10429

Siddhartha Banerjee, Chamsi Hssaine, Vijay Kamble

{"title":"Price Competition Under A Consider-Then-Choose Model With Lexicographic Choice","authors":"Siddhartha Banerjee, Chamsi Hssaine, Vijay Kamble","doi":"arxiv-2408.10429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.10429","url":null,"abstract":"The sorting and filtering capabilities offered by modern e-commerce platforms\u0000significantly impact customers' purchase decisions, as well as the resulting\u0000prices set by competing sellers on these platforms. Motivated by this practical\u0000reality, we study price competition under a flexible choice model:\u0000Consider-then-Choose with Lexicographic Choice (CLC). In this model, a customer\u0000first forms a consideration set of sellers based on (i) her willingness-to-pay\u0000and (ii) an arbitrary set of criteria on items' non-price attributes; she then\u0000chooses the highest-ranked item according to a lexicographic ranking in which\u0000items with better performance on more important attributes are ranked higher.\u0000We provide a structural characterization of equilibria in the resulting game of\u0000price competition, and derive an economically interpretable condition, which we\u0000call gradient dominance, under which equilibria can be computed efficiently.\u0000For this subclass of CLC models, we prove that distributed gradient-based\u0000pricing dynamics converge to the set of equilibria. Extensive numerical\u0000experiments show robustness of our theoretical findings when gradient dominance\u0000does not hold.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market 在线广告市场的联合拍卖

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: arxiv-2408.09885

Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yahui Lei, Bingzhe Wang, Zhicheng Zhang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang

{"title":"Joint Auction in the Online Advertising Market","authors":"Zhen Zhang, Weian Li, Yahui Lei, Bingzhe Wang, Zhicheng Zhang, Qi Qi, Qiang Liu, Xingxing Wang","doi":"arxiv-2408.09885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.09885","url":null,"abstract":"Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In\u0000the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store\u0000owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their\u0000stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise\u0000their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used\u0000advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers\u0000simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising\u0000model termed Joint Auction, allowing brand suppliers and stores to\u0000collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs.\u0000However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this\u0000novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network\u0000architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that\u0000can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee near dominant strategy incentive\u0000compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are\u0000conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint\u0000auction significantly improves platform revenue compared to the known\u0000baselines.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Control by Adding Players to Change or Maintain the Shapley-Shubik or the Penrose-Banzhaf Power Index in Weighted Voting Games Is Complete for NP^PP 在加权投票博弈中通过增加玩家来改变或维持沙普利-舒比克或彭罗斯-班扎夫力量指数的控制对于 NP^PP 是完全的

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: arxiv-2408.09953

Joanna Kaczmarek, Jörg Rothe

{"title":"Control by Adding Players to Change or Maintain the Shapley-Shubik or the Penrose-Banzhaf Power Index in Weighted Voting Games Is Complete for NP^PP","authors":"Joanna Kaczmarek, Jörg Rothe","doi":"arxiv-2408.09953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.09953","url":null,"abstract":"Weighted voting games are a well-known and useful class of succinctly\u0000representable simple games that have many real-world applications, e.g., to\u0000model collective decision-making in legislative bodies or shareholder voting.\u0000Among the structural control types being analyzing, one is control by adding\u0000players to weighted voting games, so as to either change or to maintain a\u0000player's power in the sense of the (probabilistic) Penrose-Banzhaf power index\u0000or the Shapley-Shubik power index. For the problems related to this control,\u0000the best known lower bound is PP-hardness, where PP is \"probabilistic\u0000polynomial time,\" and the best known upper bound is the class NP^PP, i.e., the\u0000class NP with a PP oracle. We optimally raise this lower bound by showing\u0000NP^PP-hardness of all these problems for the Penrose-Banzhaf and the\u0000Shapley-Shubik indices, thus establishing completeness for them in that class.\u0000Our proof technique may turn out to be useful for solving other open problems\u0000related to weighted voting games with such a complexity gap as well.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities 为具有部分可转让效用的锦标赛制定公平且不受策略影响的锦标赛规则

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-19 DOI: arxiv-2408.10346

David Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue

{"title":"Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities","authors":"David Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue","doi":"arxiv-2408.10346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/arxiv-2408.10346","url":null,"abstract":"A tournament on $n$ agents is a complete oriented graph with the agents as\u0000vertices and edges that describe the win-loss outcomes of the $binom{n}{2}$\u0000matches played between each pair of agents. The winner of a tournament is\u0000determined by a tournament rule that maps tournaments to probability\u0000distributions over the agents. We want these rules to be fair (choose a\u0000high-quality agent) and robust to strategic manipulation. Prior work has shown\u0000that under minimally fair rules, manipulations between two agents can be\u0000prevented when utility is nontransferable but not when utility is completely\u0000transferable. We introduce a partially transferable utility model that\u0000interpolates between these two extremes using a selfishness parameter\u0000$lambda$. Our model is that an agent may be willing to lose on purpose,\u0000sacrificing some of her own chance of winning, but only if the colluding pair's\u0000joint gain is more than $lambda$ times the individual's sacrifice. We show that no fair tournament rule can prevent manipulations when $lambda\u0000< 1$. We computationally solve for fair and manipulation-resistant tournament\u0000rules for $lambda = 1$ for up to 6 agents. We conjecture and leave as a major\u0000open problem that such a tournament rule exists for all $n$. We analyze the\u0000trade-offs between ``relative'' and ``absolute'' approximate strategyproofness\u0000for previously studied rules and derive as a corollary that all of these rules\u0000require $lambda geq Omega(n)$ to be robust to manipulation. We show that for\u0000stronger notions of fairness, non-manipulable tournament rules are closely\u0000related to tournament rules that witness decreasing gains from manipulation as\u0000the number of agents increases.","PeriodicalId":501316,"journal":{"name":"arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Worst- and Average-Case Robustness of Stable Matchings: (Counting) Complexity and Experiments 稳定匹配的最差和平均情况稳健性：（计数）复杂性与实验

arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: arxiv-2408.09160

Kimon Boehmer, Niclas Boehmer

引用次数: 0