技术报告:异构跨ilo 联合学习中的合作竞争

Chao Huang, Justin Dachille, Xin Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在跨ilo 联合学习(FL)中,企业在不共享异构数据的情况下协作训练共享的全局模型。之前的相关工作主要集中在解决数据异构问题的算法开发上。然而,合作竞争的双重问题,即 FL 合作和市场竞争,仍未得到充分探讨。本文采用两期动态博弈模型研究 FL 合作竞争问题。在第一阶段,在位公司训练一个本地模型,并以选定的价格向用户提供基于模型的服务。在第 2 期,一家新公司进入,两家公司决定是否进行 FL 合作,然后以不同的价格向用户销售基于模型的服务。由于数据的异质性,分析两期博弈具有挑战性,而且在位者第一期的定价会对第二期的合作竞争产生时间影响,从而导致一个非曲线问题。为了解决这个问题,我们将问题分解成若干个凹子问题,并开发了一种算法来实现全局最优。在三个公共数据集上的数值结果显示了两个有趣的见解。首先,FL 训练会带来模型性能增益和竞争损失,只有当性能增益大于竞争损失时,才会出现协作。其次,数据异质性会激励在位者在第一阶段限制市场渗透,在第二阶段促进价格竞争。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Technical Report: Coopetition in Heterogeneous Cross-Silo Federated Learning
In cross-silo federated learning (FL), companies collaboratively train a shared global model without sharing heterogeneous data. Prior related work focused on algorithm development to tackle data heterogeneity. However, the dual problem of coopetition, i.e., FL collaboration and market competition, remains under-explored. This paper studies the FL coopetition using a dynamic two-period game model. In period 1, an incumbent company trains a local model and provides model-based services at a chosen price to users. In period 2, an entrant company enters, and both companies decide whether to engage in FL collaboration and then compete in selling model-based services at different prices to users. Analyzing the two-period game is challenging due to data heterogeneity, and that the incumbent's period one pricing has a temporal impact on coopetition in period 2, resulting in a non-concave problem. To address this issue, we decompose the problem into several concave sub-problems and develop an algorithm that achieves a global optimum. Numerical results on three public datasets show two interesting insights. First, FL training brings model performance gain as well as competition loss, and collaboration occurs only when the performance gain outweighs the loss. Second, data heterogeneity can incentivize the incumbent to limit market penetration in period 1 and promote price competition in period 2.
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