SynthesePub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9
Marek Pokropski, Piotr Suffczynski
{"title":"First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models","authors":"Marek Pokropski, Piotr Suffczynski","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3
Cain Todd
{"title":"Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery","authors":"Cain Todd","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines two phenomena that are usually treated separately but which resemble each other insofar as they both raise questions concerning the difference, if there is one, between so-called ‘real’ and ‘as if’ emotions: affective memory and imagined emotion. The existence of both states has been explicitly denied, and there are very few positive accounts of either. I will argue that there are no good grounds for scepticism about the existence of ‘as if’ emotions, but also that the existing positive accounts of them are all explanatorily inadequate. Comparing the two phenomena directly, I contend, allows us to defend the existence of both by showing how they essentially involve the same ‘affective bodily imagery’. The final part of the paper offers an original, empirically informed account of the nature of this imagery, the role it plays in ‘as if’ emotions, and how it may help illuminate some important connections between memory, imagination, and emotion.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2
Margarida Hermida
{"title":"Thought experiments, sentience, and animalism","authors":"Margarida Hermida","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136317958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z
Sarah Arnaud
{"title":"First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach","authors":"Sarah Arnaud","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"17 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1
Don Ross
{"title":"Scientific metaphysics and social science","authors":"Don Ross","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"18 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136262364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04378-x
Duncan Pritchard
{"title":"Hinge commitments and trust","authors":"Duncan Pritchard","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04378-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04378-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty , our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the ‘hinge’ role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"10 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04348-3
Manuel Almagro, David Bordonaba-Plou, Neftalí Villanueva
{"title":"Retraction in public settings","authors":"Manuel Almagro, David Bordonaba-Plou, Neftalí Villanueva","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04348-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04348-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several recent studies (see Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo, 2015; Marques, 2018; Kneer, 2021a) address linguistic retraction from an experimental perspective. In these studies, speakers’ intuitions regarding the mandatory nature of retraction are tested. Pace MacFarlane, competent speakers (of English) do not consider retraction to be obligatory. This paper examines two methodological features of the above-mentioned studies: they do not take into consideration the difference between public and private contexts; neither do they incorporate the distinction between evaluative and descriptive statements. In this paper, we report the results of two studies conducted to empirically test the hypothesis that retraction is, above all, a public phenomenon. Our findings show that context exerts a significant effect on speakers’ attitudes toward retraction.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"38 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0
Leonard Dung
{"title":"Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks","authors":"Leonard Dung","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How can one build AI systems such that they pursue the goals their designers want them to pursue? This is the alignment problem . Numerous authors have raised concerns that, as research advances and systems become more powerful over time, misalignment might lead to catastrophic outcomes, perhaps even to the extinction or permanent disempowerment of humanity. In this paper, I analyze the severity of this risk based on current instances of misalignment. More specifically, I argue that contemporary large language models and game-playing agents are sometimes misaligned. These cases suggest that misalignment tends to have a variety of features: misalignment can be hard to detect, predict and remedy, it does not depend on a specific architecture or training paradigm, it tends to diminish a system’s usefulness and it is the default outcome of creating AI via machine learning. Subsequently, based on these features, I show that the risk of AI alignment magnifies with respect to more capable systems. Not only might more capable systems cause more harm when misaligned, aligning them should be expected to be more difficult than aligning current AI.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
SynthesePub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04331-y
Seyed Mohammad Yarandi
{"title":"On the zetetic significance of peer disagreement","authors":"Seyed Mohammad Yarandi","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04331-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04331-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"27 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136382101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}