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Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition 拒绝扩展认知的道德叙事:对扩展认知的两个规范性论点的批判
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8
Guido Cassinandri, Marco Fasoli
{"title":"Rejecting the extended cognition moral narrative: a critique of two normative arguments for extended cognition","authors":"Guido Cassinandri, Marco Fasoli","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04397-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) and Vold’s (2018) ‘argument from assessment of capacities’ (AAC) and Clowes (2013), Farina and Lavazza’s (2022a) ‘cognitive diminishment argument’ (CDA). The AAC states that we should embrace EXT over EMB since the former is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks, thus avoiding their marginalisation. The CDA states that EMB implies a morally undesirable picture of the agent in terms of cognitive diminishment. In Sect. 3, we clarify and criticise the underlying assumptions of the AAC and CDA: the “cognitive credit assumption”, the “marginalisation assumption” and, more generally, an ableist conception of disabled agency. In Sect. 3.1, we discuss the role of moto-perceptual skills and metacognitive credit involved in complex cases of tool-use, to demonstrate that the EXT-MN is uninformative in addressing these cases. To conclude, in Sect. 4 we argue that AAC and CDA fail to present EXT as descriptively and normatively superior to EMB.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"42 11","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Expecting pain 希望痛苦
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04394-x
Frederique de Vignemont
{"title":"Expecting pain","authors":"Frederique de Vignemont","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04394-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04394-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"80 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135934353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A problem with the fixed past fixed 一个有固定过去的问题
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6
Jacek Wawer
{"title":"A problem with the fixed past fixed","authors":"Jacek Wawer","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04345-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A novel fatalistic argument that combines elements of modal, temporal, and epistemic logic to prove that the fixed past is not compatible with the open future has recently been presented by Lampert (Analysis 82(3):426–434, 2022). By the construction of a countermodel, it is shown that his line of reasoning is defective. However, it is also explained how Lampert’s argument could be corrected if it were supported with an extra premise regarding the temporal status of a priori knowledge. This additional assumption—which was tacit in the original presentation—is shown to be the weakest link, and it is argued that, despite Lampert’s assurance, it can be plausibly rejected in a roughly Ockhamist framework. Thus, it is concluded that the fixed past poses no threat to the open future; however, a few different lessons about knowledge, necessity, and time are drawn from careful reflection on this novel argument.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"12 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135935479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity 冷热共情的差距和真实性的基础
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2
Grace Helton, Christopher Register
{"title":"Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity","authors":"Grace Helton, Christopher Register","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04311-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"29 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On Husserl’s Twin Earth 论胡塞尔的孪生地球
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04294-0
Ilpo Hirvonen
{"title":"On Husserl’s Twin Earth","authors":"Ilpo Hirvonen","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04294-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04294-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In a 1911 research manuscript, Husserl puts forth an idea that resembles Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment presented in the 1970s. In this paper, I study Husserl’s “Twin Earth” passage and assess various readings of it to determine whether Husserl is better understood as an internalist or an externalist. I define internalism as the view that content depends solely on internal factors to the subject, whereas I distinguish between two versions of externalism: weak externalism, according to which content can also depend on other subjects’ conceptions, and strong externalism, which maintains that content can also depend on the real world. Only strong externalism maintains what McGinn calls “the philosophical significance of externalism” because it entails realism about the world. I argue that Husserl is better understood as an externalist when it comes to the “Twin Earth” passage, but the more precise question regarding weak and strong externalism requires further evidence. This additional evidence concerns Husserl’s concepts of the identity of sense (Sinnesidentität) and worldly meaning (weltlicher Sinn). In evaluating externalist Husserl interpretations, I classify Smith’s externalist interpretation as weak, whereas I take Crowell’s externalist interpretation to be ambivalent. Crowell’s excellent but somewhat embryonic interpretation leaves the dependence relation between content and the real world ambiguous. I clarify this relation by assessing McGinn’s argument for the philosophical significance of externalism from the Husserlian viewpoint. Although this study is historical, it also serves a systematic purpose because the externalist interpretation of Husserl calls into question central issues in phenomenology and externalism.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"4 2-3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135272529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models 神经科学动态机制解释的第一人称约束:偏头痛和癫痫模型的案例
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9
Marek Pokropski, Piotr Suffczynski
{"title":"First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models","authors":"Marek Pokropski, Piotr Suffczynski","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04396-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery 情感记忆，想象的情感和身体意象
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3
Cain Todd
{"title":"Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery","authors":"Cain Todd","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines two phenomena that are usually treated separately but which resemble each other insofar as they both raise questions concerning the difference, if there is one, between so-called ‘real’ and ‘as if’ emotions: affective memory and imagined emotion. The existence of both states has been explicitly denied, and there are very few positive accounts of either. I will argue that there are no good grounds for scepticism about the existence of ‘as if’ emotions, but also that the existing positive accounts of them are all explanatorily inadequate. Comparing the two phenomena directly, I contend, allows us to defend the existence of both by showing how they essentially involve the same ‘affective bodily imagery’. The final part of the paper offers an original, empirically informed account of the nature of this imagery, the role it plays in ‘as if’ emotions, and how it may help illuminate some important connections between memory, imagination, and emotion.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135325409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thought experiments, sentience, and animalism 思想实验，感觉和动物主义
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2
Margarida Hermida
{"title":"Thought experiments, sentience, and animalism","authors":"Margarida Hermida","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04349-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136317958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach 第一人称视角和自闭症的科学探究:走向综合方法
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z
Sarah Arnaud
{"title":"First-person perspectives and scientific inquiry of autism: towards an integrative approach","authors":"Sarah Arnaud","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04384-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"17 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136234804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scientific metaphysics and social science 科学的形而上学和社会科学
1区 哲学
Synthese Pub Date : 2023-10-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1
Don Ross
{"title":"Scientific metaphysics and social science","authors":"Don Ross","doi":"10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04358-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, philosophers have developed an extensive literature on social ontology that applies methods and concepts from analytic metaphysics. Much of this is entirely abstracted from, and unconcerned with, social science. However, Epstein (2015) argues explicitly that analytic social metaphysics, provided its account of ontological ‘grounding’ is repaired in specific ways, can rescue social science from explanatory impasses into which he thinks it has fallen. This version of analytic social ontology thus directly competes with radically naturalistic alternatives, in a way that helps to clarify what makes some metaphysics genuinely scientific (that is, part of the scientific enterprise and worldview). I consider this competition, marshal considerations against the value to social science of analytic metaphysics, and sketch a contrasting scientific metaphysics for understanding the implications of revisionist social ontology in unified scientific ontology.","PeriodicalId":49452,"journal":{"name":"Synthese","volume":"18 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136262364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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