Dynamic Games and Applications最新文献_第4页

Sequential Mergers and Delayed Monopolization in Triopoly 三强垄断中的顺序合并与延迟垄断

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00526-7

Didier Laussel

引用次数: 0

Partial Information Games and Competitive Advertising 部分信息游戏与竞争性广告

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-16 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00530-x

Vartika Singh, Veeraruna Kavitha

引用次数: 0

Rational Noncooperative Strategic Exploitation of Species in a Predator–Prey Ecosystem with Random Disturbances 随机干扰下捕食-食饵生态系统中物种的理性非合作策略开发

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-16 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00527-6

Christos Koulovatianos

引用次数: 0

Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games 非对称多人游戏中的内省动态

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8

Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal

{"title":"Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games","authors":"Marta C. Couto, Saptarshi Pal","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00525-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Evolutionary game theory and models of learning provide powerful frameworks to describe strategic decision-making in social interactions. In the simplest case, these models describe games among two identical players. However, many interactions in everyday life are more complex. They involve more than two players who may differ in their available actions and in their incentives to choose each action. Such interactions can be captured by asymmetric multiplayer games. Recently, introspection dynamics has been introduced to explore such asymmetric games. According to this dynamics, at each time step players compare their current strategy to an alternative strategy. If the alternative strategy results in a payoff advantage, it is more likely adopted. This model provides a simple way to compute the players’ long-run probability of adopting each of their strategies. In this paper, we extend some of the previous results of introspection dynamics for 2-player asymmetric games to games with arbitrarily many players. First, we derive a formula that allows us to numerically compute the stationary distribution of introspection dynamics for any multiplayer asymmetric game. Second, we obtain explicit expressions of the stationary distribution for two special cases. These cases are additive games (where the payoff difference that a player gains by unilaterally switching to a different action is independent of the actions of their co-players), and symmetric multiplayer games with two strategies. To illustrate our results, we revisit several classical games such as the public goods game.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135395100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Strategic Licensing Model Choice with Network Effects in a Dynamic Duopoly 动态双寡头市场中具有网络效应的战略许可模式选择

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00516-9

Fei Yan, Hong-Zhuan Chen, Sahin Telli, Zhi-Chao Zhang

引用次数: 0

HSVI Can Solve Zero-Sum Partially Observable Stochastic Games HSVI可以求解零和部分可观测随机对策

IF 1.5 4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00519-6

Aur'elien Delage, O. Buffet, J. Dibangoye, Abdallah Saffidine

引用次数: 0

Games and the Treatment Convexity of Cancer 游戏与癌症治疗的凸性

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00520-z

Péter Bayer, Jeffrey West

引用次数: 1

Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity 具有完全信息和不完全信息及可塑性的二人分类互动中的半康德偏好演化

4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y

Ingela Alger, Laurent Lehmann

{"title":"Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity","authors":"Ingela Alger, Laurent Lehmann","doi":"10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00521-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.","PeriodicalId":48933,"journal":{"name":"Dynamic Games and Applications","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136350138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players 二元行动和多参与者的合作困境

IF 1.5 4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-08-26 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00524-9

Jorge Peña, G. Nöldeke

引用次数: 2

Strategy Consensus of Networked Evolutionary Games with Time Invariant Delays 具有时不变延迟的网络进化博弈的策略一致性

IF 1.5 4区数学

Dynamic Games and Applications Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00522-x

Zhiru Wang, Shihua Fu, Jianjun Wang, Xiaoyu Zhao

引用次数: 0