具有完全信息和不完全信息及可塑性的二人分类互动中的半康德偏好演化

IF 1.8 4区 数学 Q2 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Ingela Alger, Laurent Lehmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要:我们对群体结构群体中两两互动中引导行为的偏好进化进行了建模。该模型使用长期进化理论来考察不同的互动场景,包括对伴侣类型识别的条件偏好表达。我们将该模型应用于半康德偏好在适合度水平上的进化,它结合了自利和康德利益,如果伴侣也采取这种行为,则根据自身适合度的后果来评估自己的行为。我们寻求康德系数的收敛、稳定和不可破坏的值,即康德利益的权重,一个在0和1之间变化的数量特征。我们考虑了三种情况:(a)信息不完整;(b)信息完全,可塑性不完全;(c)完全信息和完全可塑性,个体不仅识别其互动伙伴的类型(完全信息),而且有条件地在其上表达康德系数(完全可塑性)。对于(a),康德系数通常演变为等于相互作用的个体之间的中性亲缘系数;对于(b),它演变为一个取决于人口统计学和相互作用假设的值,而对于(c),通常存在多种不可侵犯的类型,包括个体在与相同类型的个体相互作用时是纯康德的类型,以及在与不同类型的个体相互作用时应用在完全信息下不可侵犯的康德系数零相关性的类型。总的来说,我们的模型连接了几个概念,用于分析在不同的,有时是孤立的研究中强调的战略互动行为规则的演变。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity
Abstract We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner’s type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies.
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来源期刊
Dynamic Games and Applications
Dynamic Games and Applications MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
13.30%
发文量
67
期刊介绍: Dynamic Games and Applications is devoted to the development of all classes of dynamic games, namely, differential games, discrete-time dynamic games, evolutionary games, repeated and stochastic games, and their applications in all fields
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