The journal of law, economics, & organization最新文献

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Improving the signal quality of grades 提高车次信号质量
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-08-03 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad012
Adam Chilton, Peter Joy, Kyle Rozema, James Thomas
{"title":"Improving the signal quality of grades","authors":"Adam Chilton, Peter Joy, Kyle Rozema, James Thomas","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate how improving the signal quality of grades could enhance the matching of students to selective opportunities that are awarded early in academic programs. To do so, we develop methods to measure the signal quality of grades and to estimate the impact of changes to university policies on the identification of exceptional students for these opportunities. We focus on law schools, a setting where students are awarded important academic and professional opportunities after just one year of a three-year program. Using transcript data from a top law school over a 40-year period, we document large gains in identifying exceptional students if changes were made to certain personnel, course, and grading policies. Our findings provide motivation and a blueprint for how universities could leverage their internal records to ensure that fewer exceptional students miss out on selective opportunities.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136327145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Equity illusions 股本的幻想
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad017
Yifat Aran, Raviv Murciano-Goroff
{"title":"Equity illusions","authors":"Yifat Aran, Raviv Murciano-Goroff","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad017","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although equity-compensation grants for rank-and-file employees are common in startups and are considered an ingrained part of their business culture, little is known about how employees approach this form of compensation. We begin filling this gap by examining employees’ financial literacy regarding equity compensation and their willingness to forgo cash compensation for startup equity. Using a survey and a combination of natural language processing and machine learning techniques with conventional regression modeling, we find that employees commonly respond to economically irrelevant signals and misinterpret other important signals. The findings suggest that employees harbor a range of “market illusions” regarding startup equity that can lead to inefficiencies in the labor market, which sophisticated employers can legally exploit. The results raise questions about the protection of employees in their investor capacity in a market where highly sophisticated repeat players, such as venture capital investors, interact with unorganized and uninformed retail investors.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134919944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When does patent protection spur cumulative research within firms? 专利保护何时能刺激企业内部的累积研究?
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-06-20 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad006
Ashish Arora, Sharon Belenzon, Matt Marx, Dror Shvadron
{"title":"When does patent protection spur cumulative research within firms?","authors":"Ashish Arora, Sharon Belenzon, Matt Marx, Dror Shvadron","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We estimate the effect of patent protection on follow-on investments in corporate scientific research. We exploit a new method for identifying an exogenous reduction in the protection a granted patent provides. Using data on public, research-active firms between 1990 and 2015, we find that firms respond to a decrease in patent protection by reducing follow-on research, as measured by a drop in internal citations to an associated scientific article. We study this effect across firms with varying commercialization capabilities and across varying thickness levels of markets for technology. We find that the effect is stronger in technologies where patents are traded less frequently. Our findings are consistent with a stylized model whereby patent protection is a strategic substitute for commercialization capability. Our results imply that stronger patents encourage follow-on research, but also shift the locus of research from big firms toward smaller firms and startups (JEL D22, O31, O32, O34).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135090732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Labor provisions in trade agreements: recasting the protectionist debate 贸易协定中的劳工条款:重塑保护主义辩论
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-06-02 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad009
Desirée LeClercq, Raymond Robertson, Daniel Samaan
{"title":"Labor provisions in trade agreements: recasting the protectionist debate","authors":"Desirée LeClercq, Raymond Robertson, Daniel Samaan","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Labor provisions are integral to regional trade agreements (RTAs). Critics argue that they are a protectionist measure by reducing trade flows. Efforts to test that argument by employing various economic gravity models to trade agreements with labor provisions have failed to apply clear legal criteria and updated estimation methods. Drawing from the law of transnational contracts, we apply clear legal criteria to labor clauses and estimate a Poisson regression by pseudo maximum likelihood with high-dimensional fixed effects and controls for other “deep” agreement provisions associated with trade. We estimate the relationship between labor provisions and bilateral trade by classifying labor clauses found in all World Trade Organization-notified RTAs from the 1990s through February 2016. Contrary to previous efforts, our concise typology, updated estimation methods, and controls for additional trade-agreement variables find no robust evidence that labor provisions impact, much less reduce, trade flows (JEL F1, C5, F14, F66).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136041495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How informative is the text of securities complaints? 证券投诉书内容的信息量有多大?
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewad003
Adam B Badawi
{"title":"How informative is the text of securities complaints?","authors":"Adam B Badawi","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Much of the research in law and finance reduces complex texts down to a handful of variables. Legal scholars have voiced concerns that this dimensionality reduction loses important detail that is embedded in legal text. This article assesses this critique by asking whether text analysis can capture meaningful predictive information. It does so by applying text analysis and machine learning to a corpus of private securities class action complaints that contains over 90 million words. This analysis produces three primary findings: (1) the best performing models predict outcomes with an accuracy rate of about 70%, which is higher than baseline rates; (2) a hybrid model that uses both text and nontext components performs better than either of these two components alone; and (3) the predictions made by the machine learning models are associated with substantial abnormal returns in the days after cases get filed.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Leadership rotations and the convergence of subnational economic policies in China: evidence from provincial government work reports 中国领导轮岗与地方经济政策趋同:来自省级政府工作报告的证据
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-01-28 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac026
Jiaxuan Lu
{"title":"Leadership rotations and the convergence of subnational economic policies in China: evidence from provincial government work reports","authors":"Jiaxuan Lu","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines how China’s subnational leadership rotations have affected local governments’ policy choices. Utilizing the annual government work reports that outline provincial policy priorities, I find that shuffled leaders choose similar economic policies across different provinces, and this translates into similarities in several policy outcomes. I then show that such policy isomorphism has been driven mainly by convergence in which topics these reports cover, rather than by convergence in how the provincial leaders discuss a given policy issue. However, according to the event study estimates, this economic policy similarity may disappear soon after the shuffled leader leaves office, thus implying that the policy convergence might be transitory. One plausible explanation for these findings is that leadership rotations often indicate that the central government favors the policies implemented by these shuffled leaders, so they tend to replicate some of these policies after moving to the destination province. (JEL H11, H70)","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135694872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overcoming contractual incompleteness: the role of guiding principles 克服契约不完全性:指导原则的作用
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-01-24 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac027
David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart
{"title":"Overcoming contractual incompleteness: the role of guiding principles","authors":"David Frydlinger, Oliver Hart","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Transactions of any complexity between buyers and sellers are supported by long-term contracts and these contracts are inevitably incomplete. We propose an approach for overcoming contractual incompleteness based on the idea that most people are inclined to follow widely accepted social norms, such as being fair-minded and acting with integrity. We suggest that this tendency can be reinforced if these social norms are incorporated into a formal contract in the form of guiding principles. We develop a model in which guiding principles reduce shading behavior and discuss cases where the approach has been successfully applied in practice (JEL D23, D86, K12).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"234 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136083378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Approval regulation and learning, with application to timing of merger control 审批规则与学习,并在并购时机控制中的应用
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-01-09 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac025
Marco M. Ottaviani, A. L. Wickelgren
{"title":"Approval regulation and learning, with application to timing of merger control","authors":"Marco M. Ottaviani, A. L. Wickelgren","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyzes the optimal combination of ex ante and ex post regulation of an activity in a two-period model. Additional information about the sign and extent of the externality associated with the activity becomes available only once a private party undertakes the activity, but undoing the activity at that stage is costly. We characterize when the regulator should commit not to reevaluate the activity ex post. The case for ex post regulation is strengthened if the private party can signal its private information about the consequences of the activity, but it is weakened if the cost of undoing the activity can be manipulated.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135013227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Procurement and Supplier Job Creation: Insights from Auctions 公共采购和供应商创造就业:来自拍卖的见解
The journal of law, economics, & organization Pub Date : 2023-01-05 DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewac024
Stjepan Srhoj, Melko Dragojević
{"title":"Public Procurement and Supplier Job Creation: Insights from Auctions","authors":"Stjepan Srhoj, Melko Dragojević","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewac024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewac024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Public procurement contracts (PPCs) of goods, services, and works are about one-tenth of the global gross domestic product. Much research has been conducted on government spending and its aggregate effects, but the evidence is scarce at the micro-level. We exploit sealed-bid PPC auctions of construction works, discontinuity in bidders’ win margin, and firms’ daily employment variation to provide a causal estimate of winning a PPC on firms’ employment. Winning a PPC has a small positive impact on a firm’s short-run employment. We investigate mechanisms and heterogeneity that can explain the small initial magnitudes. We find no compelling evidence in favor of political connections, an information leakage channel, or PPC size as explanations for the small magnitude. Our investigation of a longer period shows that the impact phases out in less than a year. The lack of a long-term impact is due to runners-up winning more PPCs and runners-up substituting for more market revenue in the year after closely losing a PPC. Finally, the impacts are concentrated in construction firms that conduct most contracted work in-house. The final estimation shows the effect is 3.7 new employees per PPC with a public cost per job created at €58,600 (€49,800–€65,100).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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