{"title":"Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets","authors":"Traxler Christian, Dušek Libor","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"6 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135087255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Competition policy and the labor share","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad023","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135323016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Dean Lueck, Julio A Ramos Pastrana, Gustavo Torrens
{"title":"Campaign contributions, partisan politics, and environmental polarization in the US Congress","authors":"Dean Lueck, Julio A Ramos Pastrana, Gustavo Torrens","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad018","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Prior literature has shown strong and increasing polarization on environmental voting in the US Congress, with Democrats tending to support pro-environmental (“green”) legislation and Republicans opposing it. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we provide a causal estimate of the effect of partisanship on the importance of campaign contributions from brown industries received by US legislators. Electing a Republican rather than a Democrat for the House (Senate) leads to an increase of 96% (70%) in the importance of contributions from anti-environmental (“brown”) groups. We also find that greater dependence on brown groups is associated with less pro-environmental voting for legislators from both parties and the greater the importance of brown contributions the more (less) likely that a legislator breaks the party line when its party favors (opposes) pro-environmental legislation. Finally, we provide an analytical narrative of the rise and pattern of environmental polarization consistent with our empirical findings. (JEL D72, Q58)","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"First, do no harm, second, say sorry? Investigating the impact of a new tort reform","authors":"Philip DeCicca, Natalie Malak","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate the effect of so-called “apology laws” on physician procedure choice and birth outcomes. Advocates believe they may reduce litigation since a harmed person who receives an apology or explanation may be less likely to sue, all else equal. In the medical context, this could translate into a reduction in defensive medicine practiced. To investigate this possibility, we examine the impact of these laws on the use of C-sections, a common measure for gauging the practice of defensive medicine by OB/GYN physicians. We find consistent evidence that “partial” versions actually increase the use of C-sections, contrary to the intention of these laws. More specifically, we find it is older, presumably more established physicians who respond the most. Moreover, we also find some evidence that these particular laws also reduced the rate of preventable pregnancy complications, which suggests that the extra C-sections induced may not just represent defensive medicine (JEL I10, I18, K13).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135889018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership networks and labor income","authors":"Federico Huneeus, Borja Larrain, Mauricio Larrain, Mounu Prem","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We document a novel relationship between networks of firms linked through ownership (i.e., business groups) and labor income using matched employer–employee data for Chile. Business group affiliation is associated with higher wages, even after controlling for firm size and individual worker effects. The group premium is stronger for top workers; hence, group firms have higher wage dispersion. The premium remains present when comparing group firms and matched stand-alone firms, and in within-firm comparisons using transitions in and out of groups. Our results are consistent with workers reaching higher productivity and wages by leveraging their skills on the group’s organizational structure (JEL G32, J31).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136079940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The effect of privacy on market structure and prices","authors":"Daniel Bird, Zvika Neeman","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Protection of consumers’ privacy is often motivated by the fear that, without it, consumers may be exploited via personalized pricing. We explain how privacy may affect prices in search markets through a different channel, namely, the effect privacy has on market structure. If privacy is not protected, then in addition to consumer search, firms may engage in targeted advertising. We show that privacy protection reduces consumer surplus if firms price discriminates between the search and advertising markets. Absent such discrimination, privacy protection increases consumer surplus only if the advertising market is large and noncompetitive. We relate our results to the “privacy paradox.”","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Land use supervision and environmental pollution: multitasking bureaucrats and spillovers across regulations","authors":"Haichao Fan, Guanchun Liu, Huanhuan Wang, Xiaoxue Zhao","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article provides evidence on the strong spillover effects of land use regulations on environmental regulation enforcement in China. We find that the establishment of China’s Land Supervision Bureaus, which effectively reduced land use violations, led to a significant relaxation of environmental regulations by local officials and an increase in cities’ pollution intensity and overall pollution. In addition, the detrimental environmental effects of land use supervision are particularly strong among cities governed by officials with stronger promotion incentives. The results are consistent with a model in which multitasking local officials loosen environmental regulations to meet GDP growth targets in response to reduced industrial land supply. We further support the model by documenting land use supervision’s negative effect on new firm entries but significantly positive effect on incumbent firms’ outputs. (JEL D73, H77, P26, Q53, R52)","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135579604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adam Chilton, Christopher Cotropia, Kyle Rozema, David Schwartz
{"title":"Political ideology and judicial administration: evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"Adam Chilton, Christopher Cotropia, Kyle Rozema, David Schwartz","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the effect of political ideology on the administration of the judiciary by investigating how the chief judges of federal district courts set courthouse policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. To do so, we use novel data on the geographic boundaries of federal courts and on the contents of pandemic orders. We account for state and local conditions and policies by leveraging district courts in states that have multiple judicial districts and that have courthouses in multiple counties, and we isolate the effect of chief ideology by using simulations that difference out unobserved district-level effects. We find no consistent evidence that the ideology of chief judges influenced courthouse closures and the authorization of a law allowing for remote proceedings, but we find strong evidence that Republican-appointed chief judges were less likely to require masks and more likely to suspend in-person trials.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Direct Effect of Corporate Law on Entrepreneurship","authors":"Jorge Guzman","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract From 1946 to 1983, US states modernized their corporate law by adopting the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a compendium of legal best practices. Better corporate law increased entrepreneurship. After the adoption of the MBCA, the number of new local corporations increased by 26% on average, half of which was substitution from other firm types, and the rest was net-new firms. States that only partially adopted saw no benefit, and the largest increases were concentrated in regions with ex ante lower quality law. At the individual level, people in states adopting the MBCA also report higher self-employment levels, but not higher wage employment or labor force participation. Consistent with the MBCA increasing efficiency and decreasing regulatory capture, the effect was larger for women, black, and those located outside the central city.","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135770066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welcome to Waco! The impact of judge shopping on litigation","authors":"Christian Helmers, Brian J Love","doi":"10.1093/jleo/ewad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad019","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze the effect of judge shopping in patent litigation following the appointment of a former patent litigator as the sole district judge assigned to the Waco Division of the US District Court for the Western District of Texas (WDTX). We find that patent enforcers’ ability to select, with certainty, a judge widely regarded as patentee-friendly increased the number of cases filed, especially by non-practicing entities. We show that the increase in litigation was driven by both an influx of cases that would not have been filed but for the judge’s appointment and a geographic reallocation of cases that would have been filed regardless. Overall, judge shopping in the WDTX induced over a 33-month period an increase of around 460 patent cases that otherwise would not have been filed. (JEL: K41, O34).","PeriodicalId":485552,"journal":{"name":"The journal of law, economics, & organization","volume":"167 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135150613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}