Quarterly Journal of Economics最新文献

{"title":"The Micro-Level Anatomy of the Labor Share Decline*","authors":"Matthias Kehrig, Nicolas Vincent","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJAB002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJAB002","url":null,"abstract":"The labor share in U.S. manufacturing declined from 62 percentage points (ppts) in 1967 to 41 ppts in 2012. The labor share of the typical U.S. manufacturing establishment, in contrast, rose by over 3 ppts during the same period. Using micro-level data, we document five salient facts: (1) since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic reallocation of value added toward the lower end of the labor share distribution; (2) this aggregate reallocation is not due to entry/exit, to “superstars” growing faster or to large establishments lowering their labor shares, but is instead due to units whose labor share fell as they grew in size; (3) low labor share (LL) establishments benefit from high revenue labor productivity, not low wages; (4) they also enjoy a product price premium relative to their peers, pointing to a significant role for demand-side forces; and (5) they have only temporarily lower labor shares that rebound after five to eight years. This transient pattern has become more pronounced over time, and the dynamics of value added and employment are increasingly disconnected.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"136 1","pages":"1031-1087"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42342914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality*","authors":"Ellora Derenoncourt, Claire Montialoux","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJAA031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJAA031","url":null,"abstract":"The earnings difference between white and black workers fell dramatically in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This article shows that the expansion of the minimum wage played a critical role in this decline. The 1966 Fair Labor Standards Act extended federal minimum wage coverage to agriculture, restaurants, nursing homes, and other services that were previously uncovered and where nearly a third of black workers were employed. We digitize over 1,000 hourly wage distributions from Bureau of Labor Statistics industry wage reports and use CPS microdata to investigate the effects of this reform on wages, employment, and racial inequality. Using a cross-industry difference-in-differences design, we show that earnings rose sharply for workers in the newly covered industries. The impact was nearly twice as large for black workers as for white workers. Within treated industries, the racial gap adjusted for observables fell from 25 log points prereform to 0 afterward. We can rule out significant disemployment effects for black workers. Using a bunching design, we find no aggregate effect of the reform on employment. The 1967 extension of the minimum wage can explain more than 20% of the reduction in the racial earnings and income gap during the civil rights era. Our findings shed new light on the dynamics of labor market inequality in the United States and suggest that minimum wage policy can play a critical role in reducing racial economic disparities. JEL Codes: J38, J23, J15, J31","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJAA031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41502375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What You See Is All There Is*","authors":"B. Enke","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa012","url":null,"abstract":"News reports and communication are inherently constrained by space, time, and attention. As a result, news sources often condition the decision of whether to share a piece of information on the similarity between the signal and the prior belief of the audience, which generates a sample selection problem. This article experimentally studies how people form beliefs in these contexts, in particular the mechanisms behind errors in statistical reasoning. I document that a substantial fraction of experimental participants follows a simple “what you see is all there is” heuristic, according to which participants exclusively consider information that is right in front of them, and directly use the sample mean to estimate the population mean. A series of treatments aimed at identifying mechanisms suggests that for many participants, unobserved signals do not even come to mind. I provide causal evidence that the frequency of such incorrect mental models is a function of the computational complexity of the decision problem. These results point to the context dependence of what comes to mind and the resulting errors in belief updating.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":"1363-1398"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/qje/qjaa012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42119766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rational Inattention, Competitive Supply, and Psychometrics*","authors":"Andrew Caplin, Dániel Csaba, John Leahy, O. Nov","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa011","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a simple method of recovering attention costs from choice data. Our method rests on a precise analogy with production theory. Costs of attention determine consumer demand and consumer welfare, just as a competitive firm’s technology determines its supply curve and profits. We implement our recovery method experimentally, outline applications, and link our work to the broader literature on inattention and mistaken decisions.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":"1681-1724"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/qje/qjaa011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41432853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns*","authors":"Yuichiro Kamada, Takuo Sugaya","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa010","url":null,"abstract":"We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We show that this simple friction leads to rich and subtle campaign dynamics. We first demonstrate these effects in a series of canonical static models of elections that we extend to dynamic settings, including models with valence and a multi-dimensional policy space. We then present general principles that underlie the results from those models. In particular, we establish that candidates spend a long time using ambiguous language during the election campaign in equilibrium. ∗Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, e-mail: y.cam.24@gmail.com. Sugaya: Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA, 94305, e-mail: tsugaya@stanford.edu; We thank Ernesto Dal Bo, Itay Fainmesser, Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, Akitada Kasahara, Kei Kawai, Fuhito Kojima, David Laibson, John B. Londregan, Shih-En Lu, Francisco Mart́ınez-Mora, Adam H. Meirowitz, Stephen Morris, Kristopher Ramsay, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Ken Shepsle, Yuki Takagi, Satoru Takahashi, and the seminar participants at the Harvard University Department of Economics and Department of Government, the Princeton University Department of Economics and Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Yale University, the 21st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, and the Urrutia Elejalde Workshop on Information, Dynamics and Political Decision Making for helpful comments. In addition, Steven Callander and Josh Gottlieb read through the previous versions of this paper and gave us very detailed comments, which significantly improved the paper. We also thank the careful reading and suggestions by the Editor and the referees. Judith Levi provided a superb professional editorial assistance, which again significantly improved the paper. We thank Emily Her, Douglas Hong, Omair Butt, and especially Lingxuan Wu for their excellent research assistantship. This paper subsumes and supersedes part of our unpublished working paper “Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games” and its earlier version circulated as “Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies,” which Sugaya first presented at the 21st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory in 2010.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":"1725-1797"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/qje/qjaa010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42359704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimal Spatial Policies, Geography, and Sorting*","authors":"Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, C. Gaubert","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study optimal spatial policies in a quantitative trade and geography framework with spillovers and spatial sorting of heterogeneous workers. We characterize the spatial transfers that must hold in efficient allocations, as well as labor subsidies that can implement them. There exists scope for welfare-enhancing spatial policies even when spillovers are common across locations. Using data on U.S. cities and existing estimates of the spillover elasticities, we find that the U.S. economy would benefit from a reallocation of workers to currently low-wage cities. The optimal allocation features a greater share of high-skill workers in smaller cities relative to the observed allocation. Inefficient sorting may lead to substantial welfare costs.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":"959-1036"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/qje/qjaa001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42390325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Memory, Attention, and Choice*","authors":"P. Bordalo, N. Gennaioli, A. Shleifer","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjaa007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Building on a textbook description of associative memory (Kahana 2012), we present a model of choice in which a choice option cues recall of similar past experiences. Memory shapes valuation and decisions in two ways. First, recalled experiences form a norm, which serves as an initial anchor for valuation. Second, salient quality and price surprises relative to the norm lead to large adjustments in valuation. The model unifies many well-documented choice puzzles, including the attribution and projection biases, inattention to hidden attributes, background contrast effects, and context-dependent willingness to pay. Unifying these puzzles on the basis of selective memory and attention to surprise yields multiple new predictions.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/qje/qjaa007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42266749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions*","authors":"M. Backus, Thomas Blake, B. Larsen, S. Tadelis","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJAA003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJAA003","url":null,"abstract":"We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich, new dataset describing over 88 million listings from eBay's Best Offer platform, with back-and-forth bargaining occurring in over 25 million of these listings. We document patterns of behavior and relate them to \"rational\" and \"psychological\" theories of bargaining and find that bargaining patterns are consistent with elements of both approaches. Most notably, players with more bargaining strength typically receive better outcomes, and players exhibit equitable behavior by making offers that split-the-difference between negotiating positions. We are publicly releasing this new dataset to support additional empirical bargaining research.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"135 1","pages":"1319-1361"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2020-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJAA003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43903947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Advertising and Election Results","authors":"Jörg L. Spenkuch, D. Toniatti","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJY010","url":null,"abstract":"We study the persuasive effects of political advertising. Our empirical strategy exploits FCC regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of impressions across the borders of neighboring counties. Applying this approach to detailed data on television advertisement broadcasts and viewership patterns during the 2004–12 presidential campaigns, our results indicate that total political advertising has almost no impact on aggregate turnout. By contrast, we find a positive and economically meaningful effect of advertising on candidates’ vote shares. Taken at face value, our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the partisan difference in advertising raises the partisan difference in vote shares by about 0.5 percentage points. Evidence from a regression discontinuity design suggests that advertising affects election results by altering the partisan composition of the electorate.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"133 1","pages":"1981-2036"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJY010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43271819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning","authors":"Yeon-Koo Che, Johannes Hörner","doi":"10.1093/QJE/QJX044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJX044","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively. To improve the incentives for early exploration, the optimal design trades off fully transparent disclosure by selectively overrecommending the product (or “spamming”) to a fraction of users. Under the optimal scheme, the designer spams very little on a product immediately after its release but gradually increases its frequency; she stops it altogether when she becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the product. The recommender’s product research and intrinsic/naive users “seed” incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning. Potential applications for various Internet recommendation platforms and implications for review/ratings inflation are discussed.","PeriodicalId":48470,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Economics","volume":"5 2","pages":"871-925"},"PeriodicalIF":13.7,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/QJE/QJX044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41289395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}