{"title":"Beyond Dividing the Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory","authors":"Olivier Bochet, Manshu Khanna, Simon Siegenthaler","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We design a laboratory experiment to study bargaining behaviour when negotiations involve multiple issues. Parties must discover both trading prices and agreement scopes, giving rise to unexplored information structures and bargaining strategies. We find that bargainers often trade the efficient set of issues despite lacking information about individual aspects. However, beneficial agreements critically hinge on integrated negotiations that allow deals on bundles of issues. Moreover, access to more information boosts agreement rates in small-surplus negotiations but can also backfire as it triggers increased risk-taking and conflicting fairness preferences in large-surplus negotiations. Finally, successful negotiations display a specific bargaining convention that emerges endogenously. It involves alternating offers that meet the other side’s most recent demand halfway.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135383659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kory Kroft, Jean-William Laliberté, René Leal-Vízcaino, Matthew J Notowidigdo
{"title":"Salience and Taxation with Imperfect Competition","authors":"Kory Kroft, Jean-William Laliberté, René Leal-Vízcaino, Matthew J Notowidigdo","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies commodity taxation in a model featuring heterogeneous consumers, imperfect competition, and tax salience. We derive new formulas for the incidence and marginal excess burden of commodity taxation highlighting interactions between tax salience and market structure. We estimate the necessary inputs to the formulas by using Nielsen Retail Scanner and Consumer Panel data covering grocery stores and households in the U.S. and detailed sales tax data. We estimate a large amount of pass-through of taxes onto consumer prices and find that households respond more to changes in prices than taxes. We also estimate significant heterogeneity in tax salience across households. We calibrate our new formulas using these results and conclude that essentially all of the incidence of sales taxes falls on consumers, and the marginal excess burden of taxation is larger than estimates based on standard formulas that ignore imperfect competition and tax salience.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135384230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Credit Access, Selection, and Incentives in a Market for Asset Collateralized Loans: Evidence from Kenya","authors":"W. Jack, M. Kremer, Joost de Laat, T. Suri","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the potential for asset collateralization to expand access to credit in rural Kenya. Increasing the share of a loan for a durable agricultural asset that is collateralized by the physical asset itself (from zero to 96%) while reducing the share backed by financial assets increases loan take-up considerably, with only a very limited impact on repayment behavior and the lender’s profitability. A Karlan-Zinman test finds evidence of small and marginally significant selection effects in some specifications but no evidence of moral hazard. We find no evidence that joint versus individual liability affects take-up or repayment. Loans had real impacts on investment, milk sales and girls’ school enrollment. The lender, a savings and credit cooperative, responded to the study results by offering 80% asset-collateralized loans.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49440368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies","authors":"Gabriele Gratton, Barton E. Lee","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater economic security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We show that stronger checks and balances are a double-edged sword: they slow down autocratization but may make it more likely. We discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework and its connection to real world examples.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135892205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Death Events","authors":"Julien Sauvagnat, Fabiano Schivardi","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labour market thickness for executives that vary by industry and location. We show that firm performance is strongly and persistently affected by executive death, but only in thin local labour markets. The new executives hired after death events in thin local labour markets have lower education levels and are more likely to be replaced. These predictions are consistent with a simple model of executive search in which market thickness determines the arrival rate of applications for executive positions.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"497 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136121305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation","authors":"Fuhito Kojima, Ning Sun, Ning Neil Yu","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterisation theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to re-establish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136146858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Nicolas Urdaneta
{"title":"The Size and Life-Cycle Growth of Plants: The Role of Productivity, Demand, and Wedges","authors":"Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Nicolas Urdaneta","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What determines the distribution of establishments in terms of size and life-cycle growth? How are those determinants related to aggregate productivity? We provide novel answers by developing a framework that uses price and quantity information on establishments’ outputs and inputs to jointly estimate the demand and production parameters, and subsequently, establishments’ quality-adjusted productivity, deriving both micro-level and aggregate implications. We find that the dominant source of variation in establishment size is variation in quality/product appeal but that variation in technical efficiency plays an important supporting role. Multiple factors dampen dispersion in establishment size including dispersion in input (quality-adjusted) prices, markups, and residual wedges. Relatively moderate dampening factors induce large aggregate allocative efficiency losses relative to their absence. We show that joint estimation of the parameters of the demand and production function crucially affects inferences on the determinants of the size distribution of firms and their implications for aggregate productivity.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"543 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136173897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States","authors":"Morris M Kleiner, Evan J Soltas","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad015","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We assess the welfare consequences of occupational licensing for workers and consumers. We estimate a model of labour market equilibrium in which licensing restricts labour supply but also affects labour demand via worker quality and selection. On the margin of occupations licensed differently between U.S. states, we find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12% of occupational surplus. Workers and consumers respectively bear 70% and 30% of the incidence. Higher willingness to pay offsets 80% of higher prices for consumers, and higher wages compensate workers for 60% of the cost of mandated investment in occupation-specific human capital. Welfare effects appear more favourable in occupations in which licensing is more common.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136196796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"International Spillovers and Bailouts","authors":"Marina Azzimonti, Vincenzo Quadrini","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study how cross-country macroeconomic spillovers caused by sovereign default affect equilibrium bailouts. Because of portfolio diversification, the default of one country causes a macroeconomic contraction in other countries, which motivates a bailout. But why do creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries instead of their own private sector? We show that this is because an external bailout could be cheaper than a domestic bailout. We also show that although anticipated bailouts lead to higher borrowing, they can be Pareto improving not only ex post (after a country has defaulted) but also ex ante (before the country chooses its debt).","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"159 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136389498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diagnostic Business Cycles","authors":"Francesco Bianchi, Cosmin Ilut, Hikaru Saijo","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A large psychology literature argues that, due to selective memory recall, decision-makers’ forecasts of the future are overly influenced by the perceived news. We adopt the diagnostic expectations (DE) paradigm [Bordalo et al. (2018), Journal of Finance, 73, 199–227] to capture this feature of belief formation, develop a method to incorporate DE in business cycle models, and study the implications for aggregate dynamics. First, we address (1) the theoretical challenges associated with modelling the feedback between optimal actions and agents’ DE beliefs and (2) the time-inconsistencies that arise under distant memory (i.e. when news is perceived with respect to a more distant past than just the immediate one). Second, we show that under distant memory the interaction between actions and DE beliefs naturally generates repeated boom–bust cycles in response to a single initial shock. We also propose a portable solution method to study DE in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models and use it to estimate a quantitative DE New Keynesian model. Both endogenous states and distant memory play a critical role in successfully replicating the boom–bust cycle observed in response to a monetary policy shock.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"295 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135030223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}