{"title":"Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations","authors":"Paulo Barelli, S. Govindan, Robert Wilson","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"89 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138951433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment","authors":"Rohan Dutta","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad106","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players’ demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"39 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135874840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capital Regulation and Shadow Finance: A Quantitative Analysis","authors":"Hyunju Lee, Sunyoung Lee, Radoslaw Paluszynski","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad105","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the effects of higher bank capital requirements. Using new firm-lender matched credit data from South Korea, we document that Basel III coincided with a 25% decline in credit from regulated banks, and an increase of similar magnitude from nonbank (shadow) lenders. We use our data to estimate the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, and the spillover effect of the reform on non-bank lending. We then build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks and firms that replicates these micro estimates. We find that Basel III can account for most of the observed decrease in regulated bank lending, and about three quarters of the increase in shadow lending. The latter is driven exclusively by general equilibrium effects of the reform.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135874665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contingent Thinking and the Sure-Thing Principle: Revisiting Classic Anomalies in the Laboratory","authors":"Ignacio Esponda, Emanuel Vespa","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad102","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present an experimental framework to study the extent to which failures of contingent thinking explain classic anomalies in a broad class of environments, including overbidding in auctions and the Ellsberg paradox. We study environments in which the subject’s choices affect payoffs only in some states, but not in others. We find that anomalies are in large part driven by incongruences between choices in the standard presentation of each problem and a ‘contingent’ presentation, which focuses the subject on the set of states where her actions matter. Additional evidence suggests that this phenomenon is in large part driven by people’s failure to put themselves in states that have not yet happened even though they are made aware that their actions only matter in those states.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"13 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments","authors":"Navin Kartik, SangMok Lee, Daniel Rappoport","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad103","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An agent’s preferences depend on an ordered parameter or type. We characterize the set of utility functions with single-crossing differences (SCD) in convex environments. These include preferences over lotteries, both in expected utility and rankdependent utility frameworks, and preferences over bundles of goods and over consumption streams. Our notion of SCD does not presume an order on the choice space. This unordered SCD is necessary and sufficient for “interval choice” comparative statics. We present applications to cheap talk, observational learning, and collective choice, showing how convex environments arise in these problems and how SCD/interval choice are useful. Methodologically, our main characterization stems from a result on linear aggregations of single-crossing functions.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"42 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134909263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jean-Paul L'Huillier, Sanjay R Singh, Donghoon Yoo
{"title":"Incorporating Diagnostic Expectations into the New Keynesian Framework","authors":"Jean-Paul L'Huillier, Sanjay R Singh, Donghoon Yoo","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad101","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Diagnostic expectations constitute a realistic behavioral model of inference. This paper shows that this approach to expectation formation can be productively integrated into the New Keynesian framework. Diagnostic expectations generate endogenous extrapolation in general equilibrium. We show that diagnostic expectations generate extra amplification in the presence of nominal frictions; a fall in aggregate supply generates a Keynesian recession; fiscal policy is more effective at stimulating the economy. We perform Bayesian estimation of a rich medium-scale model that incorporates consensus forecast data. Our estimate of the diagnosticity parameter is in line with previous studies. Moreover, we find empirical evidence in favor of the diagnostic model. Diagnostic expectations offer new propagation mechanisms to explain fluctuations.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135666732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness","authors":"Rahul Deb, Anne-Katrin Roesler","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad100","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type vector is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known prior distribution. The seller chooses a mechanism to maximize her worst-case profits against all possible signals from which the buyer can learn about his values for the goods. We show that it is robustly optimal for the seller to bundle goods with identical demands (these are goods that can be permuted without changing the buyer’s prior type distribution). Consequently, pure bundling is robustly optimal for exchangeable prior distributions. For exchangeable priors, pure bundling is also optimal for the seller in the information environment (with the reverse timing) where an information designer, with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus, first selects a signal for the buyer, and then the seller chooses an optimal mechanism in response. We derive a formal relationship between the seller’s problem in both information environments.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135944954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Unemployment Insurance in Macroeconomic Stabilization","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad092","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Understanding Cultural Persistence and Change","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad097","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135142697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Raphael Auer, Ariel Burstein, Sarah Lein, Jonathan Vogel
{"title":"Unequal Expenditure Switching: Evidence From Switzerland","authors":"Raphael Auer, Ariel Burstein, Sarah Lein, Jonathan Vogel","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What are the unequal effects of changes in consumer prices on the cost of living? In the context of changes in import prices (driven by, e.g., changes in trade costs or exchange rates), most analyses focus on variation across households in initial expenditure shares on imported goods. However, the unequal welfare effects of non-marginal foreign price changes also depend on differences in how consumers substitute between imported and domestic goods, on which there is scant evidence. Using data from Switzerland surrounding the 2015 appreciation of the Swiss franc, we provide evidence that lower-income households have higher price elasticities. We quantify the contribution of heterogeneous elasticities for the unequal welfare effects of observed price changes between 2014–15 and for counterfactual shocks to the mean and dispersion of import price changes.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}