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Designing Interrogations 设计审讯
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae002
Alessandro Ispano, Péter Vida
{"title":"Designing Interrogations","authors":"Alessandro Ispano, Péter Vida","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141101965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests 不对称竞争中的自愿披露
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae001
Christian Ewerhart, Julia Lareida
{"title":"Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests","authors":"Christian Ewerhart, Julia Lareida","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly asymmetric, then full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog reveals her type in an attempt to moderate the favourite, while the strongest type of the favourite tries to discourage the underdog—so that the contest unravels. This strong-form disclosure principle is robust with respect to correlation, partitional evidence, randomized disclosures, sequential moves, and continuous type spaces. Moreover, the assumption of uniform asymmetry is not needed when incomplete information is one-sided. However, the principle may break down when type distributions are too similar, contestants possess commitment power, or information is unverifiable. In fact, cheap talk will always be ignored, even if mediated by a trustworthy third party.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141098701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Does Pricing Carbon Mitigate Climate Change? Firm-Level Evidence from the European Union Emissions Trading System 碳定价能缓解气候变化吗？来自欧盟排放交易体系的公司层面证据
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae055
J. Colmer, Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls, U. Wagner
{"title":"Does Pricing Carbon Mitigate Climate Change? Firm-Level Evidence from the European Union Emissions Trading System","authors":"J. Colmer, Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls, U. Wagner","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae055","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In theory, market-based regulatory instruments correct market failures at least cost. However, evidence on their efficacy remains scarce. Using administrative data, we estimate that, on average, the EU ETS – the world's first and largest market-based climate policy – induced regulated manufacturing firms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 14-16% with no detectable contractions in economic activity. We find no evidence of outsourcing to unregulated firms or markets; instead, firms made targeted investments, reducing the emissions intensity of production. These results indicate that the EU ETS induced global emissions reductions, a necessary and sufficient condition for mitigating climate change. We show that the absence of any negative economic effects can be rationalized in a model where pricing the externality induces firms to make fixed-cost investments in energy-saving capital that reduce marginal variable costs.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141101198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consumption Quality and Employment Across the Wealth Distribution 不同财富分布的消费质量和就业情况
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae052
Domenico Ferraro, V. Valaitis
{"title":"Consumption Quality and Employment Across the Wealth Distribution","authors":"Domenico Ferraro, V. Valaitis","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae052","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the United States, market hours worked are approximately flat across the wealth distribution. Accounting for this phenomenon is a standing challenge for standard heterogeneous-agent macro models. In these models, wealthier households consume more and work fewer hours. We propose a theory that generates the cross-sectional wealth-hours relation as in the data. We quantify this theory in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-markets model with three key features: a quality choice in consumption, non-homothetic preferences, and a multi-sector production structure. We show that the model produces consumption expenditure patterns consistent with the data and realistic ``quality Engel curves.''","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141104869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: The U.K. as a Technological Follower: Higher Education Expansion and the College Wage Premium Correction to：英国作为技术追随者：高等教育扩张与大学工资溢价
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-05 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae029
{"title":"Correction to: The U.K. as a Technological Follower: Higher Education Expansion and the College Wage Premium","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140737454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: Uncertainty and Consumer Durables Adjustment 更正：不确定性与耐用消费品调整
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae030
{"title":"Correction to: Uncertainty and Consumer Durables Adjustment","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140778212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: How Credit Constraints Impact Job Finding Rates, Sorting, and Aggregate Output 更正：信贷约束如何影响求职率、排序和总产出
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-02-15 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae014
{"title":"Correction to: How Credit Constraints Impact Job Finding Rates, Sorting, and Aggregate Output","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139963359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Outside Options in the Labor Market 劳动力市场的外部选择
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae006
Sydnee Caldwell, Oren Danieli
{"title":"Outside Options in the Labor Market","authors":"Sydnee Caldwell, Oren Danieli","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper develops a method to estimate workers’ outside employment opportunities. We outline a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, from which we derive a sufficient statistic, the “outside options index” (OOI), for the effect of outside options on earnings, holding worker productivity constant. The OOI uses the cross-sectional concentration of similar workers across job types to quantify workers’ outside options as a function of workers’ commuting costs, preferences, and skills. Using German micro-data, we find that differences in options explain 20% of the gender earnings gap, and that gender gaps in options are mostly due to differences in the implicit costs of commuting and moving.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139523144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations 高效理性预期的战略基础
IF 5.8 1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad116
Paulo Barelli, S. Govindan, Robert Wilson
{"title":"Strategic Foundations of Efficient Rational Expectations","authors":"Paulo Barelli, S. Govindan, Robert Wilson","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad116","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138951433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment 讨价还价是承诺的竞争尝试之间的斗争
1区 经济学
Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdad106
Rohan Dutta
{"title":"Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment","authors":"Rohan Dutta","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad106","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players’ demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135874840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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