讨价还价是承诺的竞争尝试之间的斗争

IF 5.9 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI:10.1093/restud/rdad106

Rohan Dutta

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引用次数: 0

摘要

承诺在议价中的战略重要性已得到广泛认可。然而，将其角色与规范模型的关键特征(如提案权力和声誉问题)区分开来是困难的。本文介绍了一个以战略承诺为核心的议价模型。继谢林(1956)之后，承诺能力源于让步的代价性质，并由参与者的需求内生地决定。熟悉的谈判者会立即达成协议，这是通过重新谈判证明的模型。高特许权成本极限下的独特预测为卡莱议价方案提供了战略基础。具有延迟的均衡具有需求的渐进式特征。

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Bargaining as a Struggle Between Competing Attempts at Commitment

Abstract The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players’ demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Studies ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

10.40

自引率

3.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： Founded in 1933 by a group of young British and American economists, The Review of Economic Studies aims to encourage research in theoretical and applied economics, especially by young economists. Today it is widely recognised as one of the core top-five economics journals. The Review is essential reading for economists and has a reputation for publishing path-breaking papers in theoretical and applied economics. The Review is committed to continuing to publish strong papers in all areas of economics. The Editors aim to provide an efficient and high-quality review process to the Review''s authors. Where articles are sent out for full review, authors receive careful reports and feedback. Since 1989 The Review has held annual May Meetings to offer young students in economics and finance the chance to present their research to audiences in Europe.