Victor Couture, Cecile Gaubert, Jessie Handbury, Erik Hurst
{"title":"Income Growth and the Distributional Effects of Urban Spatial Sorting","authors":"Victor Couture, Cecile Gaubert, Jessie Handbury, Erik Hurst","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad048","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We explore the impact of rising incomes at the top of the distribution on spatial sorting patterns within large U.S. cities. We develop and quantify a spatial model of a city with heterogeneous agents and non-homothetic preferences for neighbourhoods with endogenous amenity quality. As the rich get richer, demand increases for the high-quality amenities available in downtown neighbourhoods. Rising demand drives up house prices and spurs the development of higher quality neighbourhoods downtown. This gentrification of downtowns makes poor incumbents worse off, as they are either displaced to the suburbs or pay higher rents for amenities that they do not value as much. We quantify the corresponding impact on well-being inequality. Through the lens of the quantified model, the change in the income distribution between 1990 and 2014 led to neighbourhood change and spatial resorting within urban areas that increased the welfare of richer households relative to that of poorer households, above and beyond rising nominal income inequality.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135017690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications","authors":"Yuichiro Kamada, F. Kojima","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad046","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points of a certain function. Building on this result, we characterize the class of constraints on individual schools under which there exists a student-optimal fair matching (SOFM), the matching that is the most preferred by every student among those satisfying the three desirable properties. We study the numerical relevance of our theory using data on government-organized daycare allocation.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78742034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Figlio, Paola Giuliano, Riccardo Marchingiglio, Umut Ozek, Paola Sapienza
{"title":"Diversity in Schools: Immigrants and the Educational Performance of U.S.-Born Students","authors":"David Figlio, Paola Giuliano, Riccardo Marchingiglio, Umut Ozek, Paola Sapienza","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the effect of exposure to immigrants on the educational outcomes of U.S.-born students, using a unique dataset combining population-level birth and school records from Florida. This research question is complicated by the substantial school selection of U.S.-born students, especially among White and comparatively affluent students, in response to the presence of immigrant students in the school. We propose a new identification strategy, comparing sibling outcomes with the inclusion of family fixed effects, to partial out the unobserved non-random selection of native-born families into schools. We find that the presence of immigrant students has a positive effect on the academic achievement of U.S.-born students, especially for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Moreover, the presence of immigrants does not negatively affect the performance of affluent U.S.-born students, who typically show a higher academic achievement compared to immigrant students. We provide suggestive evidence on potential channels.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135463330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Adam M Guren, Timothy J McQuade
{"title":"The 2000s Housing Cycle with 2020 Hindsight: A Neo-Kindlebergerian View","authors":"Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Adam M Guren, Timothy J McQuade","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With “2020 hindsight,” the 2000s housing cycle is not a boom–bust but a boom–bust–rebound. Using a spatial equilibrium regression in which house prices are determined by income, amenities, urbanization, and supply, we show that long-run city-level fundamentals predict not only 1997–2019 price and rent growth but also the amplitude of the boom–bust–rebound. This evidence motivates our model of a cycle rooted in fundamentals. Households learn about fundamentals by observing “dividends” but become over-optimistic in the boom due to diagnostic expectations. A bust ensues when beliefs start to correct, exacerbated by a price–foreclosure spiral that drives prices below their long-run level. The rebound follows as prices converge to a path commensurate with higher fundamental growth. The estimated model explains the boom–bust–rebound with a single shock and accounts quantitatively for the dynamics of prices, rents, and foreclosures in cities with the largest cycles. We draw implications for asset cycles more generally.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135862716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"House Price Dynamics, Optimal LTV Limits and the Liquidity Trap","authors":"Andrea Ferrero, Richard Harrison, Benjamin Nelson","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the optimal design of a macro-prudential instrument, a loan-to-value (LTV) limit, and its implications for monetary policy in a model with nominal rigidities and financial frictions. The analysis accounts for both an effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate and an upper bound on the ability of LTV limits to stimulate credit demand. The welfare-based loss function features a role for macro-prudential policy to enhance risk-sharing. Optimal LTV limits are strongly countercyclical. In a house price boom-bust episode, the active use of LTV limits alleviates debt-deleveraging dynamics and prevents the economy from falling into a liquidity trap.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135861967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial Cycles with Heterogeneous Intermediaries","authors":"Nuno Coimbra, Hélène Rey","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We develop a dynamic macroeconomic model with heterogeneous financial intermediaries and endogenous entry. Time-varying endogenous macroeconomic risk arises from the risk-shifting behaviour of the cross-section of financial intermediaries. When interest rates are high, a decrease in interest rates stimulates investment and decreases aggregate risk. In contrast, when they are low, further stimulus can increase financial instability while inducing a fall in the risk premium. In this case, there is a trade-off between stimulating the economy and financial stability. This provides a model of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135127223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Value of Data Records","authors":"Simone Galperti, Aleksandr Levkun, Jacopo Perego","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many e-commerce platforms use buyers’ personal data to intermediate their transactions with sellers. How much value do such intermediaries derive from the data record of each single individual? We characterize this value and find that one of its key components is a novel externality between records, which arises when the intermediary pools some records to withhold the information they contain. Our analysis has several implications about compensating individuals for the use of their data, guiding companies’ investments in data acquisition, and more broadly studying the demand side of data markets. Our methods combine modern information design with classic duality theory and apply to a large class of principal-agent problems.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135289338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equilibrium Analysis in Behavioral One-Sector Growth Models","authors":"Daron Acemoglu, M. K. Jensen","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad043","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Rich behavioral biases, mistakes and limits on rational decision-making are often thought to make equilibrium analysis much more intractable. We establish that this is not the case in the context of one-sector growth models such as Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans or Bewley-Aiyagari models. We break down the response of the economy to a change in the environment or policy into two parts: the direct response at the given (pre-tax) prices, and the equilibrium response which plays out as prices change. Our main result demonstrates that under weak regularity conditions, regardless of the details of behavioral preferences, mistakes and constraints on decisionmaking, the long-run equilibrium will involve a greater capital-labor ratio if and only if the direct response (from the corresponding consumption-saving model) involves an increase in aggregate savings. One implication of this result is that, from a qualitative point of view, behavioral biases matter for long-run equilibrium if and only if they change the direction of the direct response. We provide detailed illustrations of how this result can be applied and generates new insights using models of misperceptions, self-control and temptation, and naïve and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.8,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42182971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information","authors":"Vladimir Asriyan, Victoria Vanasco","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contracts are never part of equilibrium; (2) mispricing of claims faced by the seller is always greater than in exclusive markets; (3) there is always a semi-pooling equilibrium where all sellers issue the same debt contract priced at average-valuation, and sellers of low-quality assets issue remaining cash flows at low-valuation; (4) market liquidity can be higher or lower than in exclusive markets, but (5) the average quality of originated assets is always lower. Our model’s predictions are consistent with empirical evidence on the issuance and pricing of mortgage-backed securities, and we use the theory to evaluate recent reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and exclusivity in markets.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135836241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Follow the Money","authors":"Marco Grotteria","doi":"10.1093/restud/rdad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I study, both empirically and theoretically, the economic and financial consequences of corporate lobbying. Firms lobby politicians to increase their share of government contracts, but political competition creates firm-level risk, inflating their cost of capital and reducing their incentive to invest in research and development (R&D). I document an annual 6–8% return premium for stocks of high-lobbying firms, which compensates investors for political risk. An estimated model in which firms can lobby and innovate and investors are risk averse replicates key features of corporate lobbying in the U.S., including the well-established paradox that lobbying contributions are small relative to the policies at stake. The model predicts that if investors ceased seeking compensation for political risk, R&D investment would increase by 6% and the innovation rate by 0.4% points. The risk-premium costs of lobbying are quantitatively and economically important even if the resources “wasted” on lobbying are objectively small.","PeriodicalId":48449,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economic Studies","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135903047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}