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Editorial data 编辑数据
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101665
John E. Core, Ed deHaan, Wayne Guay, Michelle Hanlon, Mark Lang, Joanna Wu
{"title":"Editorial data","authors":"John E. Core, Ed deHaan, Wayne Guay, Michelle Hanlon, Mark Lang, Joanna Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101665","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101665","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 2","pages":"Article 101665"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410123000897/pdfft?md5=c9b79dca634eac4e3cc2e705d8cdda39&pid=1-s2.0-S0165410123000897-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135220906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic complexity in disclosure 信息披露的战略复杂性
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101635
Cyrus Aghamolla , Kevin Smith
{"title":"Strategic complexity in disclosure","authors":"Cyrus Aghamolla ,&nbsp;Kevin Smith","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101635","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101635","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Extensive evidence suggests that managers strategically choose the complexity of their descriptive disclosures. However, their motives in doing so appear mixed, as complex disclosures are used to obfuscate in some cases and to provide information in others. Building on these observations, we first identify a novel stylized fact: disclosure complexity is <em>non-monotonic</em><span> in firm performance. We develop a model of disclosure complexity that incorporates the dual roles of complexity and can explain this stylized fact. In the model, a manager discloses to investors of heterogeneous sophistication and can adjust the complexity of the disclosure to either provide more precise information or to obfuscate. When the firm's investor base is largely unsophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure only upon observing negative news. In contrast, when the firm's investor base is more sophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure upon observing either highly positive or negative news. As a result, the market may react more positively to complex information releases than to simple releases, complex disclosures generate heightened return volatility, and firms with more inherently complex information are more likely to use their discretion to simplify their disclosures.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 2","pages":"Article 101635"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lost in standardization: Effects of financial statement database discrepancies on inference 标准化迷失：财务报表数据库差异对推理的影响
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101573
Kai Du , Steven Huddart , Xin Daniel Jiang
{"title":"Lost in standardization: Effects of financial statement database discrepancies on inference","authors":"Kai Du ,&nbsp;Steven Huddart ,&nbsp;Xin Daniel Jiang","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101573","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>SEC-mandated, machine-readable structured filings are an alternative source to Compustat for companies' accounting data. Discrepancies between as-filed and Compustat data, potentially a result of Compustat's standardizations, are more pronounced for firms with complex financial reporting. We show that these data discrepancies affect inferences in four research settings: (i) properties of accrual accounting, including accruals-cash flow relationships and abnormal accruals; (ii) real earnings management; (iii) the existence and magnitude of six of 21 accounting-based anomalies examined, including the accruals anomaly; and (iv) disclosure quality assessments based on the hierarchical structure of financial statement items. FactSet data also exhibit significant and often larger discrepancies from as-filed data. Our findings demonstrate the importance of these data discrepancies for the interpretation of empirical tests.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101573"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market 黑暗中的契约：银团贷款市场中公共贷款机构的崛起
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101586
Hami Amiraslani , John Donovan , Matthew A. Phillips , Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
{"title":"Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market","authors":"Hami Amiraslani ,&nbsp;John Donovan ,&nbsp;Matthew A. Phillips ,&nbsp;Regina Wittenberg-Moerman","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101586","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101586","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We document a novel trend in syndicated lending where some participants voluntarily waive their rights to borrowers' private information. We posit that “public-side” lending emerged to facilitate broad lender participation in the syndicated loan market by mitigating concerns about the leakage of borrowers' private information into public securities markets. In line with this proposition, we find that public-side lending facilitates the loan market participation of lenders for which maintaining robust information barriers is particularly costly. Furthermore, while public-side lending increases within-syndicate </span>information asymmetry, our findings indicate that it does not materially increase interest spreads and is associated with lower coordination costs among syndicate participants. Collectively, we document how debt contracting practices evolved to address frictions associated with the protection of borrowers’ private information and the related changes in loan contracting equilibria.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101586"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Locked-in at home: The gender difference in analyst forecasts after the COVID-19 school closures 封闭在家：新冠肺炎学校关闭后分析师预测的性别差异
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101603
Mengqiao Du
{"title":"Locked-in at home: The gender difference in analyst forecasts after the COVID-19 school closures","authors":"Mengqiao Du","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101603","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper explores the shock of school closures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic to study the effect of childcare responsibilities on analyst forecasts. With manually collected data on whether analysts have children, I find that female analysts with children (mother analysts) are less likely to issue timely forecasts after school closures, compared to male analysts with children (father analysts). Mother analysts’ forecasts also become less accurate after school closures, but the negative effect only exists among forecasts for firms with relatively low institutional ownership, suggesting that mother analysts prioritize maintaining the forecast accuracy for firms that are more important to their careers. Additionally, mother analysts shift forecast release times to avoid childcare hours. My findings imply that childcare responsibilities hurt the productivity of mother analysts more than that of father analysts, even though these women have established themselves in a competitive industry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101603"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Executive compensation, individual-level tax rates, and insider trading profits 高管薪酬、个人税率和内幕交易利润
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101574
Nathan C. Goldman , Naim Bugra Ozel
{"title":"Executive compensation, individual-level tax rates, and insider trading profits","authors":"Nathan C. Goldman ,&nbsp;Naim Bugra Ozel","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101574","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span>We examine whether individual-level taxes affect executives' propensity to use nonpublic information in insider trades. We predict and find a positive relation between abnormal insider trading profitability and </span>income tax rates<span>. Using plausibly exogenous variation in state income tax rates, we estimate that the average executive uses insider trading profits to offset between 12.2% and 19.6% of the effect that income taxes have on their net compensation. We show that the sensitivity of these profits to tax rates varies predictably with the executives' compensation and shareholdings, firm monitoring effectiveness, and information asymmetry<span> between insiders and outside investors. We also demonstrate a positive association between SEC enforcement actions and tax rates, suggesting that tax-rate-driven changes in abnormal trading profits expose insiders to legal risk. We find that insider trading volume exhibits little sensitivity to tax rates. Our findings show that income taxes affect executives’ tendency to use private information in their trades.</span></span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101574"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49850873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Delegated leadership at public accounting firms 公共会计师事务所的委派领导
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101572
Clive Lennox , Chunfei Wang , Xi Wu
{"title":"Delegated leadership at public accounting firms","authors":"Clive Lennox ,&nbsp;Chunfei Wang ,&nbsp;Xi Wu","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101572","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Public accounting firms are owned by all equity partners, but day-to-day management is generally delegated to a team of leaders. Using data from China, this study examines which equity partners are selected to the firm's national leadership team, and whether firmwide audit quality is related to leadership attributes. We find that a partner is more likely to be selected as a leader if the partner is more experienced in public company auditing and has attracted more new clients to the firm. Firmwide audit quality is higher when leaders are more experienced in public company audits or have a past record of larger audit adjustments, and is lower when leaders have attracted more high-risk new clients to the firm. Leadership attributes exhibit a relatively strong (weak) association with audit quality at the headquarters (branch offices). Moreover, audit quality is higher when a firm has more leaders in an audit-quality role.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101572"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Accounting conservatism and relational contracting 会计稳健性与关系契约
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571
Jonathan Glover , Hao Xue
{"title":"Accounting conservatism and relational contracting","authors":"Jonathan Glover ,&nbsp;Hao Xue","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101571","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper develops a positive role for accounting conservatism in fostering relational contracts between two agents in a two-period model of moral hazard. Building on Kreps (1996), the principal in our model designs a conservative measurement system and optimal contracts to create multiple equilibria that foster a team-based corporate culture. Accruals introduced by conservatism increase each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it matters most—when it is going badly. This makes staying in the relationship worthwhile for the agents, even if they plan to play a low payoff equilibrium in the second period to punish first-period free-riding. In turn, this allows the principal to use lower-powered (and less costly) team incentives in the first period of the relationship. In contrast, deferred compensation increases each agent's stake in the future of the relationship when it is going well, making it less efficient in fostering relationships.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101571"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49848132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Not just for investors: The role of earnings announcements in guiding job seekers 不仅仅针对投资者：盈利公告在引导求职者方面的作用
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588
Bong-Geun Choi , Jung Ho Choi , Sara Malik
{"title":"Not just for investors: The role of earnings announcements in guiding job seekers","authors":"Bong-Geun Choi ,&nbsp;Jung Ho Choi ,&nbsp;Sara Malik","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101588","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the information content of earnings announcements and its relevance for job search using detailed search data from half a million anonymous job seekers. We find evidence consistent with job seekers initiating job-search activity in response to a prospective employer's earnings announcements. Job seekers search more intensely for employers with media coverage and earnings growth, consistent with the attention and information roles of earnings announcements. We find corroborating evidence about the usefulness of earnings announcements' financial information content to job seekers: (1) a survey experiment indicates that job seekers are more willing to apply to firms when provided with evidence of positive performance; (2) job seekers search for financial information during applications and interviews; and (3) financial information is predictive of future job prospects, including job openings and career growth. Overall, our paper suggests that earnings announcements—among other sources—prompt and guide job seekers' search activities.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101588"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Public firm disclosures and the market for innovation 上市公司披露与创新市场
IF 5.9 1区 管理学
Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577
Jinhwan Kim , Kristen Valentine
{"title":"Public firm disclosures and the market for innovation","authors":"Jinhwan Kim ,&nbsp;Kristen Valentine","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101577","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the spillover effect of public firm disclosures on the patent trading market. The patent market is rife with information frictions, yet can potentially facilitate the reallocation of innovation to the most productive users. We find that going from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in public firm presence – our proxy for public firm disclosures – is linked to a 9.4% increase in other related parties' future patent sales. The positive link between public firm presence is stronger where information asymmetry is greatest and where information uncertainty prevails relative to transactions less likely to suffer from information frictions. Tests exploiting cross-sectional variation and public firms' EDGAR implementation corroborate the resolution of information frictions as a mechanism. Additional tests reveal financial statement disclosure as an important information source facilitating patent sales. Our results speak to an important and underexplored externality of public firm disclosures – its contribution to the patent market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101577"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49808947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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